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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Over the last five hundred years, several conceptually incommensurable theories 
of ethics have been promulgated. For some moral philosophers, this 
incommensurability is a matter of deep concern because, in complex cases, there 
is no tradition-independent method for resolving moral conflict. More recently, a 
new discipline of applied or practical ethics has emerged. Practical ethics attempts 
to fill the void between rival moral theories by appealing, first, to the role of 
reason from an impartial observer perspective and, second, to decision making 
protocols based on moral principles. This ―first generation‖ attempt at codifying 
practical ethics failed to bridge the incommensurability gap because decisions 
based on the application of principles turned out to be just as divisive, in complex 
cases, as decisions made from a theory-centred perspective. This thesis 
reconstructs and critiques two of the most prominent decision making protocols in 
practical ethics. 
 
For other philosophers, the diversity that one finds in ethical theory is precisely 
what a moral agent ought to expect from a complex discipline such as ethics, 
particularly in a pluralist society. These philosophers argue that the main problem 
is not that philosophy failed to deliver a unified or standard model of moral 
deliberation, but that philosophers took so long to appreciate why epistemological 
certainty is an unrealistic goal for a discipline primarily concerned with human 
behaviour. 
 
 5 
This thesis argues that the moral diversity one finds in a pluralist society requires 
moral agents to engage in two types of consensus about ethics. First, ethics 
requires a thin consensus about the teleological imperatives that enable people to 
live peaceably in the polis. This thin minimalist consensus engages moral agents 
in a discussion about universals held in common, universals that sustain a civil 
society, even while its moral agents hold incommensurable views on many other 
things. A second type of thick consensus is found in the concept of a practice. As 
defined by Alasdair MacIntyre, a practice is a long-lived coherent human activity 
consistent with the telos of the whole human life. The concept of a practice can be 
usefully employed in a pluralist society because it trades on a thick maximalist 
consensus on the internal goods that sustain the activity. In this context, rational 
agents who are separated by thick epistemological disagreement can be shown to 
hold more things in common than is often appreciated. 
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CHAPTER 1: ETHICS IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
People working in the natural sciences share in more or 
less agreed-upon tasks, but the agenda of philosophy has 
always been contested: its credentials have never been 
agreed upon, even by its classic authors.
1
 
As matters now stand, our need to reappropriate the 
reasonable and tolerant (but neglected) legacy of 
humanism is more urgent than our need to preserve the 
systematic and perfectionist (though well established) 
legacy of the exact sciences; but, in the last resort, we 
cannot dispense with either. We are indebted to Descartes 
and Newton for fine examples of well-formulated theory, 
but humanity also needs people with a sense of how theory 
touches practice at points, and in ways, that we feel on our 
pulses.
2
 
Stephen Toulmin 
The central claim of this thesis is that in a pluralist society, a practice-guided form 
of moral enquiry offers greater explanatory power for both the agreements and the 
disagreements within practical ethics than other forms of moral enquiry. The 
thesis will argue that a practice-guided approach to moral conflict enables theory 
―to touch‖ practice in the sense that Toulmin refers to above because it focuses 
attention on a type of consensus that transcends traditional theological and 
                                                 
1
 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), 10. 
2
 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 180. 
 9 
philosophical conflicts. In short, this thesis will defend the idea that the consensus 
that one finds in a practice (law, medicine, politics, etc.) has sufficient explanatory 
power to transcend many of the controversial debates in practical ethics. 
 
Practice-guided enquiry is an adaptation of a method of enquiry originally 
advocated by Alasdair MacIntyre.
3
 MacIntyre uses the concept of practice as an 
evaluative tool for analysing rival moral traditions, the aim of which is to defend a 
tradition (Aristotelian Thomism) that he thinks best supports the teleological and 
rational nature of human beings.
4
 The type of practice-guided pragmatism 
advocated in this thesis has a more limited scope. The justification for this limited 
claim is that a consensus over internal goods within a practice (i.e. medicine or 
law) is self-authenticating in ways that MacIntyre does not seem to appreciate.
5
 
 
The type of pragmatism advocated in this thesis trades on Aristotle‘s awareness 
that the study of the Good is an imprecise science. In his Nicomachean Ethics the 
search for the Good is intricately linked to the study of politics because in 
Aristotle‘s mind ethics informs the political process. For Aristotle, ethics and 
politics belong together because the natural state of mankind is to live in some 
form of organised society.
6
 A rational agent, for Aristotle, is one who gives 
serious consideration to a discipline because ―the man who has been educated in a 
                                                 
3
 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, third edition (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 187.  
4
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 52. 
5
 Chapter 5 of this thesis will outline both the strengths and the weaknesses of MacIntyre‘s 
tradition-guided methodology. 
6
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ in Great Books of the Western World, ed., Mortimer J. Adler 
(Chicago: William Benton, 1952), 1169
b
, 423. 
 10 
subject is a good judge of that subject.‖7 However, because politics is not an exact 
science, a rational agent should not expect to gain any more clarity than the 
subject matter admits.
8
 The central focus of the Nicomachean Ethics is therefore 
on types of behaviour (virtues) that moral agents ought to exhibit if they intend to 
live well in a civilised society (polis).  
 
By placing the search for the Good within the realm of politics, Aristotle links the 
flourishing of an individual life to the success of the polis itself. Aristotle‘s 
approach seems pragmatically useful for a modern pluralist society such as 
Australia because moral agents can agree on the general idea of human flourishing 
even when they engage in sharp disagreement over particular issues. Unlike some 
liberal democracies, Australia does not have a legislative link with a particular 
form of religious expression. The ―Preamble‖ to the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 asks for the blessing of God and entreats the proclamation 
from the Queen, but the authority and influence of religious institutions and the 
Queen have waned in the intervening years.
9
 
 
This waning influence is not because those who hold religious or monarchist 
views comprise an insignificant minority. The majority of Australians still seem to 
lack trust in the formation of an Australian republic,
10
 and according to the 
National Church Life Survey of 2001, more people attend religious services than 
                                                 
7
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1095a, 340. 
8
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1094b, 339. See also J. O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 109-10. 
9
 Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster, ―Preamble,‖ Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 (1901). 
10
 A constitutional amendment to change Australia to a republic was rejected in 1999. 
 11 
attend the most popular sporting pastime, the Australian Football League.
11
 
However, people committed to a constitutional monarchy and those who attend 
religious services do not present a united voice on many complex moral issues. 
Prior to European settlement (1788) there were many indigenous forms of 
spirituality and in the years since this diversity has been added to by people from 
almost every nation, culture, and religious expression. Religious pluralism in 
Australia is therefore an incontrovertible reality, and debates over complex moral 
issues reveal that no single religious tradition trumps all others.  
 
During this same time frame moral pluralism also became more widely 
appreciated in philosophy. When Toulmin claims above that the ―credentials‖ of 
philosophy ―have never been agreed upon, even by its classic authors,‖ he is 
referring to the variety of epistemic claims that provided the foundation for moral 
theories during the Modern period. Problems associated with the conceptual 
incommensurability of rival moral arguments will be outlined in Chapter 2 so it 
suffices to say at this stage that the absence of an agreed-upon foundation for 
moral argument does not imply that the influence of any particular moral tradition 
is necessarily negated.  
 
A moral tradition is diminished, in a technical epistemic sense, if the premises on 
which it rests turn out not to be as foundational as envisaged by its original 
proponents. However, even in cases like this the practical applications that evolve 
from these diminished theories can remain significant. The historical link that 
                                                 
11
 National Church Life Survey, Occasional Paper 3: Church Attendance Estimates (NCLS, 
2001). 
 12 
Australia has with English social policy, primarily through the legacy of British 
utilitarianism, is a case in point. The distributive justice legacy of British 
utilitarianism is most obvious in the social security and Medicare safety-nets, and 
both of these policies are generally recognised as among the best forms of social 
welfare.
12
 The consensus over the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis for social 
policy breaks down, however, when it comes to specific moral issues because the 
―cash value‖ or ―practical consequences for human conduct‖ of both Bentham‘s 
hedonic calculus and Mill‘s higher quality pleasures is not as self-evident as they 
assumed.
13
 Philosophical pluralism is now also an incontrovertible reality in 
Australia because no single philosophical tradition trumps all others. 
 
Australia‘s unique brand of representative democracy also includes a limited form 
of political pluralism. Political parties that are not mainstream can become 
politically significant if and when their advocates can create a perception among 
Australian voters that the two-party system is lacking.
14
 In Australia the ballot box 
is a significant force for change and politicians ignore this reality at their peril. 
However, the political motivation to take heed of majority opinion has its own 
problems. Mill‘s warning concerning the ―tyranny of the majority‖ is part of the 
reason why Australia inherited from Britain a somewhat clumsy political 
approach to dealing with complex moral issues.
15
 For some complex issues the 
                                                 
12
 See Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 1-27.  
13
 Pragmatists argue that a truth-claim should be analysed for its ―cash value‖ or practical 
consequences for human conduct rather than for its epistemic certainty. See ―Pragmatism‘s 
Conception of Truth,‖ Lecture 6 in William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways 
of Thinking (New York: Longman Green and Co., 1907), 76-91. 
14
 The movements that led to the Australian Democrats (1977), the Nuclear Disarmament Party 
(1984), and One Nation (1996) typify the type of niche politics possible in Australia. 
15
 John Stuart Mill, ―On Liberty‖ in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government 
(London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 73. 
 13 
Australian parliament takes heed of various points of view and on others it 
mandates policy solely for reasons of political expediency.  
 
Distrust over the tyranny of power was well entrenched in the minds of nineteenth 
century British citizens, and Mill was concerned that the British public 
acknowledge the destructive influence of democratic tyranny as well. He 
advanced two maxims of the harm principle on which public interference with 
private liberty ought to be based. First, individual citizens ought to be left alone as 
long as their actions do not impact on others, and second, intervention (social or 
legal punishment) is only permissible if actions of individuals are prejudicial to 
the interests of others.
16
 
 
Mill‘s argument for liberty of conscience illustrates the difficulty of merging 
theory with practice in moral philosophy. The practical problem of deciding 
which actions require interference by the State, and which do not, now seems self-
evident. Mill‘s explanation of individual behaviours that should or should not be 
constrained by the State reflects his own time and place. According to Mill, public 
gambling houses should not be permitted but prostitution should be (but not in 
brothels). Sellers of strong drink should have their liberty restricted and so should 
those who have a conscientious objection to war.
17
 Mill‘s list of objections to 
liberty seems incompatible with a twenty-first century context, and these 
contingency problems highlight the practical difficulty of forming legislation 
based on the harm principle. Mill seems to concede this point in the beginning of 
                                                 
16
 Mill, ―On Liberty,‖ 149 
17
 Mill, ―On Liberty,‖ 65. 
 14 
On Liberty when he says that the practical issue over where to place limits is ―a 
subject on which nearly everything remains to be done.‖18 
 
The problematic shift from ethical theory to ethical practice in a pluralist society 
is even more noticeable than it was in Mill‘s day because no single form of moral 
philosophy or moral theology is dominant. For some complex moral issues, 
Australia‘s parliament has acknowledged this plurality by attempting to reach a 
political consensus beyond these competing voices. A pragmatic political 
consensus of this type does not, and cannot, alleviate the concerns of all 
stakeholders, but it does provide an opportunity for the stakeholders to be heard, 
and it usually results in a political or legal resolution. 
 
The most recent debates in Australia over bioethical issues are cases in point. Like 
all other western democracies, Australia has been attempting to engage its citizens 
in complex bioethical debates. In the initial stages of these debates, the Australian 
government has engaged the various stakeholders by calling for expressions of 
interest, by holding community consultation meetings, and even by using the 
parliament itself as a forum for various points of view. Eventually, however, the 
consultative process reaches an end-point and a decision is made or a vote is cast.  
 
Australia‘s parliaments have arbitrated on some of the most controversial issues in 
bioethics, including abortion, prenatal genetic testing, and more recently the use 
of embryos for non-reproductive purposes. For some other controversial issues 
                                                 
18
 Mill, ―On Liberty,‖ 25. 
 15 
this end-point is extended further through the judiciary, such as the High Court‘s 
1983 decision to overturn the Tasmanian Government‘s decision to build a dam 
on the Franklin River. For still other issues, this end-point is extended even 
further and results in a referendum put to the Australian electorate, perhaps the 
most significant being the 1967 vote that enabled Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians to be counted in the national census (approved 90.8%).
19
 
 
This same consultative process has not been the case in Australia for all important 
moral issues, however, and political expediency seems to determine how 
consultative Australian parliaments will be. Over the last decade, for instance, the 
Australian government conducted an intensive internment programme for asylum 
seekers and other refugees who came to Australia by boat. This Federal 
Government sponsored programme, known as the ―Pacific solution,‖ led to 
several thousand refugees being interned in gulag style camps, both on Australian 
soil and on surrounding island nations such as Nauru. During this period people 
from divergent moral traditions railed against the inhumane Pacific solution but 
with very little impact. Lawyers acted pro-bono in several court cases on behalf of 
refugees, and on some occasions Federal Members of the Government made a rare 
protest by crossing the floor of the House to vote against their own party.
20
  
 
From a moral perspective, Australia‘s most high profile philosopher, Peter Singer, 
had earlier co-authored a paper with Renata Singer that sought to show how the 
                                                 
19
 Only four constitutional reforms have been approved by the Australian electorate since the first 
in 1906 (forty-four in total). 
20
 See Michael Gordon, ―Risking Political Death but Undeterred,‖ The Age, August 10, 2006. 
 16 
principle of equal consideration of interests, a form of means-ends reasoning, 
ought to be applied to refugee problems around the world.
21
 During this period the 
Australian Catholic Bishops issued a paper that urged the Australian Parliament to 
take seriously its international obligations in relation to asylum seekers and other 
refugees. The Bishops argued that ―It is always unjustifiable to detain asylum 
seekers in order to deter future asylum seekers from coming to Australia,‖ 
claiming that Catholic moral tradition ―has always insisted that it is morally 
wrong to use unacceptable means even for an arguably good end.‖22 The Catholic 
Bishops were unequivocally critical of the refugee policy, and they shared Singer 
and Singer‘s moral judgment that interning refugees was wrong. However, Singer 
and Singer argue that means-ends reasoning can resolve the problem whereas the 
Catholic Bishops argue that means-ends reasoning caused the problem in the first 
place. 
 
In this case there was a consensus that the Pacific solution was unjust even though 
the respective parties were in fundamental disagreement over their respective 
epistemic justifications for that judgment. Consensus of this type is possible 
because moral agents agree on what Michael Walzer and others call a thin moral 
motivation.
23
 This thin moral motivation enables agreement on many moral issues 
because it presupposes a moral awareness that transcends the tradition-based 
contingency of the moral arguments concerned. Walzer is not suggesting that the 
                                                 
21
 Peter Singer and Renata Singer, ―The Ethics of Refugee Policy,‖ in Mark Gibney ed., Open 
Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 
111-130. 
22
 Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, A Message from the Australian Catholic Bishops 
Conference (May 2004). 
23
 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 1-4. 
 17 
various moral agents accept, or even recognise, that the language they use has this 
thin aspect to it. His point, rather, is that when moral maxims play themselves out 
in practice they have both a thin (minimalist) expression and a thick (maximalist) 
expression. For Walzer, moral thinness is the more vital aspect of moral discourse 
because it allows for an ―intense unity‖ between various moral agents, whereas 
moral thickness promotes ―qualification, complexity, and disagreement.‖24 Walzer 
seems right about this because on many important ethical issues serious thinking 
people agree; consequentialists agree with non-consequentialists, and theists agree 
with atheists, because they recognise in the opposing argument a conclusion that 
resonates with their own. In the asylum seekers case, the justificatory arguments 
of utilitarian philosophers and Catholic Bishops revealed a shared thin agreement 
that Australia‘s policy was unjust and needed to be changed. 
 
For some moral issues, however, this thin consensus is not possible, and on these 
occasions political expediency takes over. Disagreement of this type occurs when 
the various discussants derive their respective moral imperatives from what 
Walzer refers to as a thick maximalist morality.
25
 Using the same two moral 
traditions from the asylum seekers case above, we can see how the standoff over 
stem-cell harvesting exemplifies the type of thick moral disagreement that Walzer 
refers to.  
 
                                                 
24
 Walzer, Thick and Thin, 7. 
25
 Walzer, Thick and Thin, 4. See also ―Conflicts of Values‖ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 71-82; and Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, 
―Morality and Thick Concepts,‖ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 
66 (1992): 267-283. The relationship between thin and thick moral evaluation will be analysed in 
more detail in Chapter 2. 
 18 
In the asylum seeker case, the two moral traditions achieved a thin consensus 
from arguments that are conceptually incommensurable. In the stem-cell case, 
however, consensus is not possible because the defining issue, the moral status of 
the embryo, draws opposite conclusions from the two moral traditions. From a 
Catholic perspective, the moral argument against stem-cell harvesting is based on 
a thick theological and philosophical tradition that promotes the claim that 
because embryos have a significant moral status it would therefore be unethical to 
use them for non-reproductive purposes.
26
  
 
Utilitarian philosophers Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer take the opposite view 
when they argue that stem-cell harvesting should be permitted because it raises 
few moral issues. From their perspective, an embryo does not have a significant 
moral status and therefore, as far as the principle of equal consideration of 
interests is concerned, the utilisation of embryos for stem-cell harvesting raises 
few moral concerns.
27
 In a case like this there is no epistemic mediation possible 
because neither side is prepared to concede that its respective arguments, both the 
premises and the conclusions drawn from them, are internal to particular traditions 
and not the product of rationality qua rationality. The Catholic concern for the 
high moral status of an embryo is contingent on a thick moral tradition that 
incorporates the philosophical argument of natural law and the theological 
premise that life is a gift from God. The opposing argument from Kuhse and 
Singer, that an embryo has no inherent moral status, is contingent on an equally 
                                                 
26
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitas personae: on certain ethical questions 
(Offices of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 8 September 2008). 
27
 Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, ―The Moral Status of the Embryo,‖ in H. Kuhse, ed., Peter 
Singer: Unsanctifying Human Life (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 181-187. 
 19 
thick moral tradition derived from utilitarianism that incorporates both the 
nuanced perspective of preference calculus and the decision making protocol of 
equal consideration of interests. Both arguments are coherent and reasonable but 
they are also conceptually incommensurable.  
 
This type of thick epistemic standoff occurs whenever the topic under debate is 
complex and whenever a thin agreement between the stakeholders is not 
forthcoming. Moral philosophers have long been aware of the epistemic 
difficulties associated with converting a general theory of ethics into a specific set 
of action-guides.
28
 This lack of consensus in moral philosophy has already been 
well documented, primarily by showing how and why consensus is not possible, 
given the incommensurable epistemological divide between competing moral 
theories.
29
  
 
Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the most vocal critics of applied moral philosophy, has 
for several decades now focused his criticism on the conceptual 
incommensurability of rival moral theories. MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided response 
to the incommensurability of moral theories will be analysed in detail in Chapter 6 
of this thesis so a brief summary here will suffice to outline the problem as he sees 
it. In the first of a trilogy of books that deal with the incommensurability problems 
associated with rival moral traditions MacIntyre describes why he thinks moral 
philosophy is in a state of crisis: 
                                                 
28
 These epistemic difficulties will be addressed in detail in Chapter 2. 
29
 See ―The Archimedean Point‖ in Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(London: Fontana Press, 1985), 22-29. 
 20 
Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be 
easily expanded so as to be made so; the conclusions do 
indeed follow from the premises. But the rival premises 
are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the 
claims of one as against another.
30
 
In the second book, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre extends this 
critique and argues that the incommensurability problem is internal to philosophy 
itself and not simply a problem between rival traditions.  
Modern academic philosophy turns out by and large to 
provide means for a more accurate and informed definition 
of disagreement rather than progress toward its resolution. 
Professors of philosophy who concern themselves with 
questions of justice and of practical rationality turn out to 
disagree with each other as sharply, as variously, and so it 
seems, as irremediably upon how such questions are to be 
answered as anyone else.
31
 
In the third book, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre restates the 
problem in even starker terms: 
debate between fundamentally opposed standpoints does 
occur; but it is inevitably inconclusive. Each warring 
position characteristically appears irrefutable to its 
adherents; indeed in its own terms and by its own 
standards of argument it is in practice irrefutable. But each 
warring position equally seems to its opponents to be 
insufficiently warranted by rational argument.
32
 
                                                 
30
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 8. 
31
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988), 3. 
32
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 7. 
 21 
MacIntyre argues that the frustration associated with contemporary moral debate 
is because the types of debates we have are unsettlable at one level and 
interminable at another.
33
  
 
Over the last fifty years, a new discipline evolved within moral philosophy that 
attempted to side-step the epistemic problems associated with conceptually 
incommensurable theories. Known variously as applied or practical ethics, this 
new discipline sought to overcome the theoretical divide by focusing on decision 
making protocols. Most of these new protocols advocate a composite approach 
whereby the rational agent takes on the role of an impartial moral agent and 
incorporates aspects of both consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories of 
ethics in the decision making process. Advocates of this approach argue that 
practical ethics of this type can solve moral dilemmas in a way that had not been 
possible using traditional ethical theories. These decision making protocols are 
now referred to as common morality theories because they appeal to aspects of 
moral enquiry that rational agents hold in common. In Australia, the two most 
influential decision making models used in practical ethics are the four-principle 
approach advocated by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and the preference-
utilitarian approach advocated by Peter Singer.
34
  
 
                                                 
33
 Alasdair MacIntyre, ―Why is the search for the foundations of ethics so frustrating?‖, Hastings 
Center Report 9/4 (1979): 16-22. 
34
 See Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979) with subsequent editions in 1983, 1989, 1994, 2001, and 2008; and 
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979 and 1993) and The 
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A central aim of this thesis is to show that the problem solving capacity of 
common  morality theories for complex moral dilemmas is overstated because the 
practical consequences for human conduct of a decision making protocol is not as 
systematic or as coherent as its adherents claim. The major epistemic problem 
with decision making protocols is that they do not acknowledge the thin/thick 
distinctions of moral enquiry referred to earlier. While there is a consensus that 
moral principles or rules are useful (thin moral minimalism), there is no consensus 
that these same principles or rules are definitive for solving complex moral issues.  
 
The main practical problem with decision making protocols is that moral agents 
use the principles or rules in ways that are consistent with their own moral 
traditions (thick moral maximalism). This thesis will show how MacIntyre‘s 
concept of a practice can be usefully employed for resolving moral disagreements 
in a pluralist society, without the necessity for a thick teleological and theological 
narrative that his form of Aristotelian Thomism implies. For MacIntyre, moral 
enquiry requires an appreciation of what he calls the ―telos of the whole human 
life,‖35 and this appreciation involves a ―fundamental contrast‖ between ―man-as-
he-happens-to-be‖ and ―man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖36  
The state of ―man-as-he-happens-to-be,‖ however, is not as stark as MacIntyre 
thinks because the internal goods (standards of excellence) of a given practice are 
more self-authenticating than he seems to appreciate. This is because the self-
authenticating thick standards of a good practice have positive practical 
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consequences for human conduct even when there is only thin agreement over 
how that practice fits into the telos of the whole human life.
37
  
 
This thesis will endeavour to show, first, that the discontent within philosophy 
over foundationalist assumptions was already well established prior to the 
evolution of practical ethics (Chapters 2 & 3). Second, the thesis will reconstruct 
three different types of moral enquiry (Chapters 4, 5, & 6) and show that, from a 
pragmatist perspective, the practical consequences for human conduct are not as 
significant as the various adherents of the respective theories claim. Third, the 
thesis will show how the concept of a practice (Chapter 7) can be usefully 
employed as an aid to resolving complex moral disputes by appealing to levels of 
agreement or consensus that the various stakeholders share, even when they are in 
serious disagreement. 
 
1.2 Foundationalism: Discontent from Within 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis will show that the discontent within philosophy over 
foundationalist assumptions was already well established in both the philosophy 
of science and moral philosophy prior to the establishment of the discipline of 
practical ethics. The history of scientific enquiry provides a neat comparison with 
moral enquiry because Modern thinkers sought the same epistemic certainty in 
ethics as they did in science. Unlike many scientific disciplines, however, moral 
philosophy has never developed the concept of a standard model. In science a 
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standard model is usually an open ended theory or set of laws that provide the 
epistemological foundation for further thinking or experimentation. Philosophy 
has never had a standard model for moral enquiry, so when philosophers were no 
longer constrained by religious or civil authority it is not surprising that the 
Modern period produced several distinct forms of moral enquiry. There seems to 
be a more appreciative attitude among contemporary scientists and philosophers 
of science to the evolutions and revolutions in scientific theories than is often 
exhibited by critics of rival moral theories. It would seem odd to describe Isaac 
Newton as a failure simply because Newtonian physics gives an inadequate 
explanation for scientific evidence based on quantum physics. In the same way it 
would be odd to describe Kant as a failure simply because the application of 
moral duty is not as absolute as he seemed to think.  
 
The consensus view that stems from the concept of a standard model provides a 
useful paradigm for the type of practice-guided enquiry advocated in this thesis. 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic argues that the contemporary understanding of the 
theory of science widens the scope of enquiry to incorporate a breadth of opinion 
that would not have been acceptable in the Modern/Cartesian paradigm of 
scientific method: 
According to this approach, scientific knowledge is the 
product of a collective human enterprise to which 
scientists make individual contributions that are purified 
and extended by mutual criticism and intellectual 
cooperation. According to this theory the goal of science is 
 25 
a consensus of rational opinion over the widest possible 
field.
38
 
This same breadth of opinion seems applicable to moral theory in a liberal 
democracy because both classic and contemporary liberalism accept that the twin 
concepts of freedom and liberty are expressed within a social polis that engages 
with people who have diverse and at times competing points of view.
39
 This 
chapter will endeavour to show that moral foundationalism had already been the 
subject of serious critique prior to the evolution of practical ethics. 
 
1.3 Decision Making and Practical Ethics 
 
Chapter 3 will examine the historical background that led to common morality 
theories being overstated by their original proponents and thus subsequently so 
heavily criticised by their detractors. Arguments over practical ethics break down 
because they slide too easily from thin minimalist concepts to the thick application 
of those concepts in particular cases. Common morality theories appeal to thin 
principles or rules that many moral agents accept, and this level of argument is 
relatively uncontroversial. The controversy erupts when practical ethicists 
overstate the efficacy of these thin principles or rules for solving particular cases.  
 
When John Harris argues that the proper business of decision making in medical 
ethics is to resolve moral dilemmas he overstates the level of resolution that is 
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possible for moral debate in a liberal pluralist society.
40
 Similarly, when Singer 
addresses the abortion question and states, ―I shall show that, at least within the 
bounds of non-religious ethics, there is a clear-cut answer and those who take a 
different view are simply mistaken,‖41 he overstates the capacity of preference 
utilitarianism to achieve moral consensus even when limited to a non-religious 
perspective. These overstated claims highlight the major criticism that has been 
leveled by some at so-called ―first generation bioethicists.‖42 This chapter will 
argue that an anxiety over medical advances coupled with what Richard Bernstein 
calls a ―Cartesian anxiety‖ over epistemic foundations43 produced a first 
generation of bioethics text books that were too simplistic for the type of complex 
moral dilemmas that moral agents face in a pluralist society. 
 
1.4 Principle-Guided Enquiry 
 
Chapter 4 will focus on the most popular non-consequentialist version of common 
morality theory, the four-principle approach advocated by Beauchamp and 
Childress. Now in its sixth edition, Principles of Biomedical Ethics is probably the 
most successful text book on practical ethics ever written. However, it is also one 
of the most heavily criticised and is seen by its critics as the prime example that 
illustrates why ―second generation‖ bioethics is now necessary.44 This chapter will 
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show that the four-principle model, based on autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, and justice, is usefully thin because it provides a common set of 
terms that moral agents can utilise in complex moral debates. However, the 
principles are not definitive enough on their own to solve complex cases, and this 
failure illustrates a common problem for most forms of practical ethics. The thin 
consensus over the four-principles breaks down when they are applied to 
particular cases. This is because the application of the principles in complex cases 
is thick with the ideological and philosophical concerns of the various 
stakeholders, thereby making a resolution impossible.  
 
To illustrate, the abortion debate presents straightforwardly in the four-principle 
approach as a clash between autonomy and nonmaleficence. However, there is no 
mechanism within the four-principle approach that serves to adjudicate why one 
principle trumps another. Moral agents are therefore likely to choose whatever 
principle best fits the position they held prior to the application of the principles. 
The standoff over the clash of principles (autonomy vs. nonmaleficence) is as 
divisive as the standoff arising from the utilisation of rights language (right to 
choose vs. right to life) or that created by disagreement over whether the interests 
of fetuses ought to count in the personhood debate. The standoff over an agreed-
upon set of principles is what MacIntyre refers to when he says that ―modern 
academic philosophy turns out by and large to provide means for a more accurate 
and informed definition of disagreement rather than for progress towards its 
resolution.‖45  
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The main epistemological problem for the principle-guided method of decision 
making occurs when it is presented as a means of resolving debates in bioethics. 
Bioethics is a general term that incorporates diverse issues and even more diverse 
points of view because the rational discussants bring with them numerous 
medical, religious, philosophical, and scientific points of view. A diverse group of 
rational discussants is unlikely to agree on how to apply the four-principles in 
complex cases because each moral agent approaches the issue from what 
MacIntyre calls a ―story-filled‖ perspective.46 This epistemological divide is less 
significant when the principle-guided approach is used within a particular practice 
such as nursing. This is because nursing is a practice with a clearly recognised 
telos (health) and with clearly defined internal goods that have been forged over 
the course of the history of the practice. The individual nurse is not the arbiter of 
―good practice‖ because he or she plays a role in a discipline with a much longer 
and deeper history. In this context, the four-principle approach is pragmatically 
useful because it provides a relatively straightforward set of action-guides in a 
discipline with an agreed-upon telos and an agreed-upon set of internal goods 
(standards of excellence).
47
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1.5 Preference-Guided Enquiry 
 
Chapter 5 will evaluate the most popular consequentialist form of common 
morality theory, Peter Singer‘s Practical Ethics. Singer argues that many of the 
difficulties associated with decision making in practical ethics can be overcome 
when a moral agent takes on the role of an ―impartial spectator‖ or ―ideal 
observer.‖48 This chapter will show that, as with the four-principle approach, 
decision making based on equal consideration of interests can be useful as a 
general guide to decision making but is not definitive enough to solve complex 
problems.  
 
Singer presents his version of common morality as emerging from within the 
tradition of utilitarianism, but through a nuanced perspective of interest or 
preference satisfaction rather than the more general pleasure/pain calculus that 
Bentham and Mill used. The two main epistemological problems with Singer‘s 
version of practical ethics is that he overstates, first, the role of an impartial moral 
agent and, second, the uniformity of decision making based on equal 
consideration of interests. He states at the beginning of Practical Ethics that his 
concern is to show how a ―broadly utilitarian position‖ deals with some of the 
more complex issues in bioethics.
49
 This chapter will show that Singer‘s broadly 
utilitarian position breaks down on its own terms so that he has to incorporate 
non-utilitarian thinking into his argument in order to sustain the conclusions he 
draws. The practical consequences for human conduct of decisions based on 
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equal consideration of interests are not as significant as Singer maintains because 
interests or preferences are not self-evident in complex cases.   
 
1.6 Tradition-Guided Enquiry 
 
Chapter 6 will begin by showing why MacIntyre thinks that the discipline of 
practical ethics rests on a fundamental epistemological mistake. The epistemic 
problem for practical ethics is that it is presented through the guise of impartial 
consideration on the basis of which a balanced evaluation of fundamental 
principles or rules can be achieved. MacIntyre argues that because no objective 
criterion exists on which this balancing can take place, the use of principles and 
rules is itself empty of application: 
the metaphor of weighing claims that invoke rights against 
claims that invoke utility, or claims that invoke justice 
against claims that invoke freedom, in some sort of moral 
scale is empty of application. There are no moral scales … 
hence moral arguments terminate very quickly and in 
another way are interminable. Because no argument can 
be carried through to a victorious conclusion, argument 
characteristically gives way to the mere and increasingly 
shrill battle of assertion with counter assertion.
50
 
In another place he is even more dismissive of ―balancing‖ in practical ethics 
when he states: ―there are no scales—and the metaphor of balancing, if thought of 
as a rational process, is a misleading and disguising fiction… This is why these 
are not genuinely moral principles or rules.‖51 For MacIntyre, the epistemic 
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problems associated with decision making in ethics stem from a fundamental 
teleological mistake. Because a moral agent cannot be removed from his or her 
own personal history and sense of purpose, MacIntyre argues that moral enquiry is 
primarily a teleological account of what it means to be human. Acknowledgement 
of the telos of the whole human life is necessary, according to MacIntyre, because 
it mediates between those practices that promote human flourishing (e.g., 
medicine) and those practices that do not (e.g., slavery). MacIntyre says that 
moral enquiry from this perspective presupposes ―some account of potentiality 
and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all 
some account of the human telos.‖52  
 
According to MacIntyre, the success of a moral tradition depends on how well it 
distinguishes between those practices that inform and nourish the essential nature 
of a human being and those practices that are destructive of this end. For 
MacIntyre, the internal analysis of a practice is the first stage of moral enquiry 
because it provides the methodological framework for fair assessment and 
because it evaluates a moral tradition from the inside. Once this first stage is 
complete a moral agent can then advance to the second stage and compare one 
tradition with another. Over a twenty-year period, MacIntyre used this tradition-
guided methodology to argue for a revised form of Aristotelian Thomism because, 
for him, this tradition succeeds on its own terms when other moral traditions fail.  
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MacIntyre asserts at the beginning of After Virtue that the language of morality is 
in a ―state of grave disorder,‖53 but this assessment seems overly pessimistic at 
one level and overly optimistic at another. It is overly pessimistic because his first 
stage of moral evaluation, practice-guided enquiry, reveals a history of consensus 
over moral issues that he seems to ignore. At the same time the conclusion he 
draws from the tradition-guided comparison of rival moral traditions, that his 
tradition (Aristotelian Thomism) succeeds where others fail, seems overly 
optimistic.
54
 A significant discrepancy within MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided 
account will be highlighted in this chapter. MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice is 
self-authenticating (because internal goods of a practice are derived from 
consensus) whereas his appeal to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is not 
(because no consensus has been forthcoming that this tradition succeeds on its 
own terms when others do not). Many philosophers agree with MacIntyre‘s claim 
that rival moral arguments are conceptually incommensurable, but they do not see 
this as a major practical problem, particularly in a pluralist society. Bernard 
Williams, for instance, argues that the contingency of a moral life has to be 
perspectival and therefore disagreement is exactly what one should expect from a 
complex discipline like ethics:  
[O]ur ethical ideas consist of a very complex historical 
deposit. When we consider this fact, and the relations that 
this deposit has to our public discourse and our private 
lives, there seems no reason at all to expect it to take, in 
any considerable measure, the shape of a theory.
55
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Williams is more concerned that moral philosophers do not sufficiently 
acknowledge that the study of ethics, from an epistemic perspective, has limits, 
and therefore a rational moral agent ought to explore ways of transcending these 
epistemic limits. His preferred method, and here he agrees with MacIntyre, is to 
give serious recognition to the thick ethical concepts within a practice: 
One thing that will make a difference is the extent to 
which ethical life can still rely on what I have called thick 
ethical concepts … a practice that uses them is more stable 
in face of the general, structural reflections about truth of 
ethical judgements than a practice that does not use 
them.
56
 
1.7 Conclusion: Practice-guided enquiry 
 
 
The final chapter of this thesis shows why moral enquiry that focuses on 
principles, preferences, or tradition fails to achieve the level of certainty 
advocated by the respective adherents, primarily because these models lack the 
unifying consensus that a standard model has in other disciplines. Further, it 
provides a justification for how and why practice-guided pragmatism offers 
greater explanatory power for both the agreements and the disagreements within 
practical ethics than other forms of moral enquiry in a liberal pluralist society. The 
major justification for this central claim is that practice-guided enquiry sets the 
standard of authentication at a level on which consensus has already been 
achieved, the level of a practice. The three other types of moral enquiry – 
principle-guided, preference-guided, and tradition-guided – fail on their own 
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terms, at least as far as reaching moral consensus in a modern pluralist society is 
concerned. The failure of first generation practical ethicists to solve ethical issues 
stems directly from the lack of consensus over how the four-principle approach or 
the preference-calculus approach ought to be applied in complex situations. 
MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided alternative has also failed, however, because it relies 
on a comparative consensus, concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
one rival tradition over another, that has not been forthcoming.  
 
Beauchamp and Childress, Singer, and MacIntyre share a common philosophical 
goal, that is, they want to overcome the lack of agreement that epitomises debates 
over complex moral issues. This goal sets the standard of authentication too high 
within a modern liberal democracy because it relies on a level of consensus that 
has not been forthcoming to date and is unlikely to be forthcoming any time soon. 
Practice-guided enquiry avoids this problem because it accepts that a pluralist 
society is made up of serious thinkers from diverse cultural, religious, and 
philosophical traditions, each of whom can give a rational justification for the 
position he or she takes on a given issue.  
 
Given the lack of agreement over the foundations on which moral argument ought 
to be based, the goal of finding an epistemic solution for complex moral dilemmas 
seems unrealisable. However, the overriding significance of MacIntyre‘s work is 
not the conclusion he has drawn from tradition-guided enquiry. Academics from 
several distinct disciplines have adapted his concept of a practice, and this thesis 
will argue that it is equally as useful in moral debates, perhaps even more than 
 35 
MacIntyre appreciates, because it helps to clarify reasons for both agreement and 
disagreement in relation to complex moral dilemmas. MacIntyre describes a 
practice as follows: 
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal 
to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying 
to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.
57
 
The overriding difference between the practice-guided approach and the other 
three methods of moral enquiry is that it can be utilised whenever and wherever a 
thin agreement about human flourishing is achieved. This thin agreement is 
presumed whenever an appeal is made to concepts such as the rule of law, 
universal suffrage, or civil society. For example, a thin teleological consensus on 
concepts such as health or justice is strong enough to establish the thick internal 
goods on which practices such as medicine and law are based. Practice-guided 
enquiry takes for granted that moral agents share in a process of political, legal, or 
social resolution of complex moral debates, even when their preferred moral 
solution has been ignored. In a pluralist society a practice like medicine is self-
authenticating whenever its internal goods, as measured by its practitioners, 
achieves its thinly recognised teleological imperative (health). Likewise, in a 
pluralist society legal practice is self-authenticating whenever its internal goods, 
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as measured by its practitioners, achieve its thinly recognised teleological 
imperative (justice).  
 
Practice-guided enquiry acknowledges the contingency of practical rationality 
most cogently articulated by Aristotle. Aristotle uses the phrase pros ton kairon, 
which usually translates as ―as the occasion demands‖ or ―with an eye to the 
occasion,‖ to emphasise the temporal, local, and conditional aspects of practical 
rationality. A rational decision for Aristotle is one made at the ―right time,‖ with 
the ―right motive,‖ and in the ―right way.‖58 The major point of departure between 
MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided enquiry and a practice-guided approach is that a 
thick consensus is achieved among practitioners (man-as-he-happens-to-be) even 
when they share only a thin agreement, or even when they disagree, on the 
teleological purpose for human beings (man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
essential-nature).
59
 The internal goods within medical practice, for instance, are 
knowable and attainable because they habituate a standard of excellence that is 
independent of the individual medical practitioner‘s concern for whatever the 
essential nature of human beings comprises. Even when medical practitioners 
come from diverse cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions, it is possible to 
discern good medicine from bad medicine (malpractice) because good medicine 
has a history (time, place, and circumstance) that is not linked to the individual 
beliefs of practitioners. The benefit of practice-guided enquiry is that it enables a 
rational agent in a pluralist society to appreciate the contingency of decision 
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making in its various forms. Practice-guided enquiry is a type of stakeholder 
analysis which attempts to give a fair presentation of the various practices 
concerned. A decision made from the perspective of preference calculus, for 
instance, is contingent not only on the tradition from which it derives 
(utilitarianism) but also on the cultural, psychological, and emotional aspects of 
the decision maker. Similarly, a decision made from the perspective of Catholic 
moral theory is contingent on a different philosophical and theological tradition, 
but one that is no less rigorous. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
The contention of this thesis is that practice-guided enquiry allows theory ―to 
touch‖ practice because it aims for a pragmatic practice-guided resolution of 
moral dilemmas in a pluralist society. Practice-guided enquiry trades on an 
inherent appeal to authority and this will be defended. The history of many 
practices reveals actions that were once considered to be internal goods but are 
now considered to be harmful. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that 
practice-guided enquiry provides a viable way forward that merits careful 
consideration and cannot be readily or prejudicially dismissed. As with most 
philosophical deliberation, a consensus of rational discussants is an appropriately 
reasonable goal.
60
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CHAPTER 2: FOUNDATIONALISM – DISCONTENT FROM WITHIN 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A note of urgency can sometimes be heard, even in 
otherwise unhurried writers, when they ask for a 
justification of morality. Unless the ethical life, or (more 
narrowly) morality, can be justified by philosophy, we 
shall be open to relativism, amoralism, and disorder.
1
 
Bernard Williams 
 
Williams‘ observation above refers to epistemological anxiety over moral claims. 
Either we come up with an impartial philosophical justification for moral decision 
making or we will collapse into relativism, amoralism, and disorder. This is a 
false dichotomy, according to Williams, because it fails to take seriously the 
epistemological limits of moral rules and maxims.
2
 Williams argues that there is 
no ―self-contained‖ theory of morality because the empirical facts necessary for a 
decision making protocol in ethics do not exist.
3
 He accepts that the rejection of 
moral facts requires him to advocate a type of moral relativism, a ―relativism of 
distance,‖4 about which more will be said later in this chapter. 
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In a chapter entitled ―The Archimedean Point‖ Williams argues that the anxiety 
over ―relativism, amoralism, and disorder‖ can be directly traced to the search for 
a rational pivot point that provides a foundation on which to construct an answer 
to Socrates‘ famous question, ―How should we live?‖5 This chapter will show that 
discontent with foundationalist assumptions in philosophy was well entrenched 
prior to the evolution of practical ethics as a distinct discipline in the second half 
of the twentieth century. Much of this discontent is directed at what Stephen 
Toulmin refers to as the ―hidden agenda of Modernity.‖6 This hidden agenda, 
according to Toulmin, led Modern thinkers to take up the Cartesian ―quest for 
certainty‖7 too uncritically, at least as far as the foundation of knowledge is 
concerned. 
 
Foundationalists argue that inferences about truth and knowledge are justified if 
and only if they are grounded in non-inferential axioms that are properly basic, 
that is, non-inferentially justified. Foundationalism appeals to a correspondence 
theory of truth, wherein beliefs are held to be true just in case they correspond to 
states of affairs in the world. The main problem with the correspondence theory of 
truth, when used as a justification for moral claims, is that it relies on some moral 
facts being knowable or real. 
 
This chapter will reconstruct the significant level of discontent among 
philosophers regarding the problematic assumptions that underlie the Cartesian 
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quest for certainty. The primary reason for this reconstruction is to show how a 
central concern of Enlightenment thinkers, that reason ought to replace appeals to 
authority and tradition, was overstated. The purpose of this review is to show that 
the discontent within philosophy concerning foundationalist assumptions – over 
concepts such as rationality, truth, and objectivity – had been voiced long before 
the various decision making protocols that now dominate practical ethics began to 
emerge. 
 
2.2 Foundationalism: The Standard Model in the Sciences 
 
The Modern period produced several distinct forms of moral enquiry. The most 
influential version of non-consequentialism was Kant‘s categorical imperative, 
and the most influential version of consequentialism was Bentham‘s hedonic 
calculus. At this early stage the two dominant theories were already conceptually 
incommensurable even while independently satisfying the Modern agenda by 
postulating a form of reasoning that did not require an appeal to authority or 
tradition. MacIntyre argues that the conceptual incommensurability between rival 
moral arguments dominates moral enquiry: 
The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance 
is that so much of it is used to express disagreement; and 
the most striking feature of the debates in which these 
disagreements are expressed is their interminable 
character.
8
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The attempt to incorporate foundationalist thinking into moral claims, given the 
historical setting in which Modern thinkers lived and worked, is hardly surprising. 
In order to break the stranglehold that religious and civil authorities held over 
truth-claims, moral philosophers had to circumvent the appeal to authority in 
much the same way that Nicholaus Copernicus and Galileo Galilei did in 
astronomy. The history of many scientific disciplines reveals that at various times 
and places the explanatory power of a new discovery or theory is so significant 
that a consensus develops within the discipline such that this new discovery or 
theory supersedes what was previously held to be the case.  
 
Among contemporary astronomers, for instance, there is a clear consensus that the 
explanation of celestial bodies provided by Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galileo 
(1564-1642) provides substantially more explanatory power than that offered by 
Ptolemy and his contemporaries in the second century. Similarly, the explanation 
proffered by Albert Einstein and Alan Guth far exceeds that of Copernicus and 
Galileo. These dramatic transitions in astronomy exemplify the problems 
associated with committing too readily to foundationalism in science or even to 
the scientific method itself.  
 
In astronomy the search for certainty led to several epistemological revolutions, 
and even now astronomy is in the midst of a quantum-driven epistemological 
crisis that may lead to major revision of the standard model of gravitation. In 
scientific research the search for certainty evolved into what came to be known as 
the scientific method, and this method of enquiry initially served humans well 
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because it broke the influence that religious and civil authorities had on the 
interpretation of scientific discoveries.  
 
However, over the last several decades scientists and philosophers of science have 
shown that the concept of scientific method is itself tradition-dependent because 
many scientific theories are themselves based on ideas or assumptions that are not 
derived from the scientific method itself.
9
 The attempt to establish a grand unified 
theory or theory of everything in science illustrates this point. Scientists at the turn 
of the twentieth century thought they were within sight of establishing a complete 
view of the fundamental laws that govern the universe. There was little indication 
of the tumult that the next thirty years would bring or that something like a 
scientific revolution was going to be necessary in order to deal with this tumult. 
This revolution in subsequent decades proved to be so profound that at the 
dawning of the twenty-first century, the finding of a grand unified theory seems 
more distant now than it ever was. 
 
Many scientific disciplines now use the concept of a standard model to delineate 
the foundational premises and boundary assumptions on which evidence derived 
by means of the scientific method is evaluated. A standard model in science 
provides the best explanation hypothesis
10
 for the discipline based on current 
evidence but is open-ended to incorporate new evidence that can influence the 
epistemological status of current theories. In cosmology and astronomy, for 
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instance, the standard model concept is used to describe the different types of 
matter in the universe and the influence that this diversity of matter has on the 
theory of gravitation (baryonic matter makes up 5%, cold dark matter a further 
25%, and dark energy the final 70%). This model has explanatory power because 
the gravitational effect of baryonic matter alone is insufficient to explain evidence 
of gravitation gleaned from the Hubble telescope and the WMAP.
11
 Physicists 
also use a standard model of particle physics to explain how three of the four 
fundamental forces of the universe (electromagnetic, weak nuclear, and strong 
nuclear) interact with all the visible matter in the universe. In an OECD Global 
Science Forum report Sharon Butler states that ―the standard model has proved a 
triumph of modern science, with enormous explanatory and predictive power.‖12  
 
The explanatory power of a scientific theory is crucial to establishing the 
epistemological status of the real-world facts on which the theory is based. For 
biologists,
13
 anthropologists, and geneticists the theory of evolution by means of 
natural selection serves as the standard model for explaining the origins of 
biological life on planet Earth.
14
 The explanatory power of evolution by natural 
selection is superior to other theories because it gives a more coherent account of 
current scientific evidence. The concept of a standard model is based on a 
consensus about the basic hypotheses and assumptions that govern a particular 
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discipline. This consensus, however, does not imply agreement at all levels of 
enquiry within the discipline. Contemporary biologists, for instance, agree on the 
theory of evolution by natural selection but disagree over how this takes place 
(punctuated equilibrium or phyletic gradualism).  
 
The type of consensus one finds in a contemporary scientific discipline is often 
derived from debates over many years, sometimes centuries, until one theory 
finally takes precedence over all others. A classic example is the standard model 
of geographical formation associated with Earth‘s lithosphere (crust), now known 
as the theory of plate tectonics. As early as 1596 Abraham Ortelius noticed that 
continents on opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean seem to fit together on a map. 
This initial observation was roundly rejected until it was revisited in the 1960s, 
and subsequently the theory of plate tectonics became the dominant theory or 
standard model of geographical formation.
15
  
 
The concept of a scientific method post-Descartes was originally thought to 
encapsulate observations about real-world experiences that were independent of 
any appeal to tradition or authority. However, over the last hundred years the 
concept of scientific method has changed considerably and the idea of an 
impartial real-world experience has also been challenged. 
 
                                                 
15
 For an insider‘s view of the advocacy, rejection, and final acceptance of the Theory of Plate 
Tectonics see Naomi Oreskes ed., Plate Tectonics: An Insider’s History of the Modern Theory of 
the Earth (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003). 
 45 
The history of science reveals two relatively recent developments that reformed 
the narrow inductive description of scientific enquiry. The first of these is simply 
an historical recognition that many scientific discoveries have either survived into 
the present only with major modification or have long since been discarded 
because they have been superseded by a better explanation for the way things 
are.
16
 The naïve acceptance of the scientific method proved to be an over-
simplification of what actually happens in scientific practice. The second 
development concerns the acknowledgement that many important discoveries 
were in fact serendipitous and not the product of the scientific method itself.
17
  
 
Running parallel to interpretive problems associated with the naïve acceptance of 
the scientific method was a more troubling realisation that the empirical 
transparency of a real world was itself being challenged. In a 1927 collection of 
essays, J. B. S. Haldane muses: 
I have no doubt that in reality the future will be vastly 
more surprising than anything I can imagine. Now, my 
own suspicion is that the Universe is not only queerer than 
we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.
18
  
Haldane‘s broad vision of science early in the twentieth century recognised the 
revolutionary contribution of Einstein‘s theories of special relativity (1905) and 
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general relativity (1916), but it best encapsulates the sometimes bizarre world 
revealed by quantum mechanics.
19
 For all its strangeness, however, Johnjoe 
McFadden states that ―quantum mechanics prevailed, even against Einstein‘s 
intellect, because of its vast explanatory power.‖20 The problems associated with 
the scientific method being interpreted too narrowly, combined with the 
appreciation that the universe is itself strange, led several prominent philosophers 
of science to posit a broader model of scientific enquiry. 
 
Willard Van Orman Quine was one of the first scientists to link the problematic 
assumption of scientific realism with epistemological foundationalism. He 
rejected, first, the Kantian analytic-synthetic distinction and, second, the 
empiricist argument that meaningful statements can be reduced to terms that refer 
to immediate experience. He argued that both dogmas are ―ill founded‖ and that 
the effect of abandoning them leads to both ―a blurring of the supposed boundary 
between speculative metaphysics and natural science‖ and, just as importantly, a 
―shift toward pragmatism.‖21 This blurring of the boundary between speculative 
metaphysics and natural science also blurred the boundary between the role of 
reason and the place of tradition in the philosophy of science. 
 
A decade later another scientist, Thomas Kuhn, also acknowledged the role that 
tradition plays in his incommensurability thesis and the concept of a paradigm. 
Kuhn‘s concept of science is that it is a tradition in which progress is sometimes 
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routine (normal) and sometimes revolutionary (abnormal).  Kuhn states that ―the 
normal scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only 
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone 
before.‖22 Kuhn proposed several forms of the incommensurability thesis and also 
used the concept of a paradigm in such diverse ways that there is now little 
agreement over how either concept should be understood.
23
 His explanation of 
paradigmatic knowledge has therefore been the subject of extensive criticism, 
particularly in the loose way he appropriates concepts like ―paradigm change‖ and 
―conceptual scheme.‖24 However, even though much of this criticism is valid, 
because Kuhn is fuzzy in the way he uses terms such as ―paradigm,‖ his 
conceptual scheme for scientific practice can be understood more 
straightforwardly in the sense of an explanation of what one believes to be the 
case now, in comparison with what one took to be the case before.
25
  
 
Rorty argues, for instance, that Kuhn‘s concept of a conceptual scheme refers to a 
―collection of views which make up present day culture,‖ and he thinks that this 
description of a conceptual scheme is also shared by Quine, Sellers, and 
Feyerabend.
26
 Rorty‘s assessment here is not meant to imply that Kuhn and other 
philosophers now agree on how scientific practice should be conducted, because 
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they do not. Rather, Rorty is only suggesting that Kuhn‘s initial proclamation that 
scientific knowledge is built around conceptual schemes rather than foundational 
truths should not be overlooked.       
   
During this same decade another philosopher of science, Karl Popper, argued that 
there is nothing foundational about a scientific theory because a theory does not 
rely on bedrock for foundational truths. Popper argues that the structure of 
scientific theory is like a platform that rests on piles driven into a swamp. These 
piles do not rest on a firm foundation but they are firm enough to get the job done. 
In Popper‘s words, ―if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm 
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.‖27  
 
More recently, Alan Chalmers has argued that the Modern claim that the scientific 
method provides objective truth, because scientific knowledge is derived from 
facts, can only be advocated in a highly qualified form. Chalmers suggests that a 
strong case can be made, first, that ―scientific knowledge can neither be 
conclusively proved nor conclusively disproved by reference to the facts,‖ and, 
second, that even when ―facts are assumed an increasing attention is being paid to 
the history of science.‖28 This pragmatic shift in science has taken various forms 
and its most recognisable legacy is the standard model approach outlined above.  
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Arthur Fine also advocates a similar approach when he argues that the goal of the 
scientific enterprise is empirical adequacy or appropriate reasonableness because 
prevailing beliefs are relative to particular social circumstances and the narrative 
context in which scientific enquiry takes place. For Fine, 
The realism/antirealism debate largely sidesteps science. 
The debate over a constructive reshaping of 
constructivism may be more important… This seems to 
me the heart of the program, the right corrective to 
philosophical (especially realist) distortions of science, 
and the place where lots of good work can be done too. 
Among the work to be done is to achieve some 
understanding of what is actually involved in the rational 
acceptance and proof in science… This job involves 
exploring the diverse range of contexts, historical and 
contemporary, in which inquiry is carried out.
29
 
 
2.3 Moral Philosophy Without a Standard Model 
 
In spite of Kant‘s claim to the contrary, moral philosophy never had a 
Copernican-style revolution in which an ancient theory of the moral life was so 
thoroughly superseded by a Modern moral theory. As a result moral philosophy 
never developed a consensus-based standard model of moral enquiry. When Kant 
claimed that knowledge ―begins with experience‖ but is not derived ―out of 
experience,‖30 he thought that this new account of knowledge was like a 
Copernican revolution in philosophy. While contemporary philosophers 
appreciate the contribution that Modern philosophers like Kant made to moral 
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philosophy, there is no consensus among philosophers that his concept of moral 
duty, via the categorical imperative, provides substantially more explanatory 
power than the explanation of the moral life posited by philosophers of the 
Classical Period, such as Plato and Aristotle. Many contemporary moral 
philosophers still trade on a foundationalist legacy whenever appeals are made to 
concepts such as inalienable
31
 or basic human rights, moral duties, moral 
absolutes, the impartial spectator, the universal point of view, or fundamental 
moral principles. The search for certainty in ethics during the Enlightenment 
shared a common epistemological vision with the new science that was being 
done, namely, to establish a rational foundation on which to ground claims that do 
not rely on appeals to authority or tradition.  
 
When MacIntyre argues that professors of philosophy ―disagree with each other as 
sharply, as variously, and so it seems, as irremediably … as anyone else,‖32 he is 
referring to the lack of agreement over foundations, the fundamental premises on 
which moral debate is conducted. The lack of a standard model does not imply 
that moral philosophers always disagree, however, and MacIntyre‘s criticism of 
the absence of agreement with respect to epistemological foundations for moral 
theory seems overstated. As the discussion in Chapter 1 has shown, thin moral 
agreement is possible on many moral imperatives. Careful thinkers in a modern 
liberal democracy, for instance, do not usually debate the epistemological status of 
claims such as ―torture is wrong‖ or ―a person should be considered innocent until 
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proven guilty.‖ Clearly this type of thin agreement can break down when moral 
maxims are applied to particular cases, but this does not diminish the value of thin 
agreement in a pluralist setting.  
 
While MacIntyre‘s criticism seems overstated, his critique of practical ethics 
seems legitimate because the focus of many practical ethics texts is to provide 
rational solutions to particular cases by means of easily understood decision 
making protocols. Wherever and whenever moral enquiry is conducted solely 
from this perspective, like an on/off toggle switch that supplies right or wrong 
answers, it is diminished by epistemological pluralism. This is because the 
decision making protocols are not derived from a consensus or standard model of 
moral theory, leaving moral agents to apply them in a way that corresponds to the 
premises and conclusions of their own respective traditions.  
 
For MacIntyre, moral pluralism is deeply problematic because he seems to want 
more out of moral theory than it delivered during the Enlightenment period. For 
other moral philosophers (Williams and Walzer), moral pluralism is not 
problematic because it is precisely what one ought to expect from a complex 
discipline like moral enquiry. Many moral philosophers now advocate a non-
foundationalist approach to moral enquiry. This non-foundationalist emphasis has 
taken various forms. Some philosophers adopt a hermeneutical approach to moral 
enquiry (Bernstein), others argue for a return to casuistry (Toulmin), and still 
others argue for a type of moral prescriptivism.
33
 The following reconstruction 
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highlights the discontent over foundationalist assumptions of the Modern period. 
This reconstruction will serve as an introduction to the critique of the raison 
d’être of practical ethics in general (Chapter 3) and of the two dominant decision 
making protocols currently influential in Australia (Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
The critique of theological foundationalism began as Modern biblical scholars 
began to appreciate the hermeneutical dimensions of interpreting ancient biblical 
texts.
34
 Biblical scholars recognised that a foundationalist approach to textual 
analysis is too narrow because it ignores the Sitz im Leben (life situation) of the 
original authors. For several decades now theologians and biblical scholars have 
incorporated non-foundationalist emphases into various theological disciplines 
apart from biblical studies, including theological ethics.
35
 The legacy of Cartesian-
type foundationalism in theology was systematically critiqued in a 1994 collection 
of essays entitled Theology without Foundations: Religious Practice and the 
Future of Theological Truth.
36
 In her introduction to this collection, Nancey 
Murphy claims that the theological preoccupation with Cartesian-type 
foundationalism was a mistake made by both conservative and liberal interpreters 
of biblical texts.
37
 The conservative appeal to an inerrant biblical text fails because 
it appeals to what Murphy calls a first-floor foundational presupposition that the 
biblical material is in fact revelation of a particular sort. She further claims that 
when faced with the new historical-critical method of studying scripture, some 
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theologians sought another form of foundationalism in the guise of religious 
experience, and thus theological liberalism was born.
38
 The future of theological 
truth, according to Murphy, is a theology without foundations based on the 
concept of a practice as a ―vehicle for community self-assessment‖ and a story-
filled approach to theology and ethics.
39
 Murphy argues for a pre-modern 
theological epistemology in which the paradigm for knowledge is articulated 
within a particular community.
40
 This story-filled understanding of theology 
involves a serious consideration of biography as a form of theology, and the role 
that stories play in religious life.
41
 
 
Contemporary pragmatists argue that something like Fine‘s concern for 
appropriate reasonableness in science is also necessary in moral philosophy. 
Vincent Colapietro argues that traditional philosophy and contemporary bioethics 
lack the vocabulary to deal with the ―highly dynamic character of our modern 
technological culture.‖42 A modern technical culture, within which genomic 
research is but one of several big science projects, is also likely to identify itself as 
a pluralist multicultural society. For pragmatists, the ―cash value‖ of a 
philosophical idea or a theory operates in ways similar to the standard model 
approach used in science because in both cases it is the explanatory power of the 
idea or observation that is significant. Colapietro argues that pragmatism of this 
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sort does not reduce theory simply to the ―handmaiden of practice‖ because 
pragmatism conceives theory itself as a form of practice. Pragmatism is therefore 
heuristically self-conscious and self-critical, according to Colapietro, because 
pragmatism is itself a practice and therefore necessarily linked to its own narrative 
account but also to resources outside of pragmatism that might impact on how 
pragmatists get the job done.
43
 In this historicist sense, truth-claims are 
acknowledged not because they are self-evident truths independent of tradition but 
because they are consistent with internal goods that mediate what truth means, in 
the context of particular traditions or practices.
44
 A consensus such as this goes 
beyond both naïve objectivism and pessimistic relativism, as the following 
discussion of major voices in recent philosophical discourse reveals. 
 
2.4 Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) 
 
Richard Rorty is even more dismissive of the Modern project than most. He 
argues that the legacy of Descartes was responsible for the failed Kantian attempt 
to ―render all knowledge-claims commensurable.‖45 For Rorty the problem is 
epistemology itself, or at least the style of epistemology that dominates the 
Cartesian quest. He uses Descartes to illustrate the failings of the Modern project 
and he refers to the Cogito as the ―original sin of philosophy.‖46  
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In the introduction to a collection of essays devoted to The Linguistic Turn, Rorty 
argues against the Modern assumption that philosophy ought to transform itself 
into a science. New methods such as Descartes‘ ―clear and distinct ideas,‖ Kant‘s 
―transcendental method,‖ and Husserl‘s ―bracketing‖ all failed, according to 
Rorty, because all attempts to find a starting point without presuppositions are 
doomed because in order to know what method one is going to adopt one must 
already have presupposed ―some metaphysical and some epistemological 
conclusion.‖47 The linguistic turn was coined to refer to a type of non-
foundationalism that focused on the link between philosophy and language. 
Among pragmatist philosophers, however, the ―pragmatic turn‖ more 
appropriately describes the search for a language that deals with what James refers 
to as the ―cash value‖ or practical consequences for human conduct.  
 
Rorty rejects Descartes‘ suggestions that one should withdraw from history and 
tradition, first, because he thinks it is a bad idea, and second, because he argues 
that it is impossible. Rorty argues that any description of how things are from a 
―God‘s eye point of view‖ does not ―free us from the contingency of having been 
acculturated as we were.‖48 It is this acculturation that determines why some 
theories about the real world are accepted and some rejected. He emphasises that 
the historical or hermeneutical dimension of truth is pivotal because truth is based 
on an inter-subjective agreement or consensus among members of a community.
49
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He adopts what he refers to as the ―Quine-Sellars‖50 approach to epistemology 
and argues against the correspondence view of truth primarily because there is no 
way to get outside existing beliefs and language. This is because nothing would 
count as justification without reference to what was already being taken for 
granted.
51
 For Rorty the Modern anxiety over relativism should be seen as a desire 
to preserve existing habits of contemporary European life that were ―nurtured by 
the Enlightenment‖ and justified ―by it in terms of an appeal to reason.‖52  
 
Rorty agrees with Williams that foundationalist assumptions concerning the need 
for universals and the subsequent desire for impartial detachment should be 
rejected.
53
 Following Nietzsche, he describes this desire for objectivity as a 
―disguised form of the fear of death‖ and ―an attempt to avoid facing up to 
contingency, to escape from time and chance.‖54 He accepts Foucault‘s analysis 
that science and philosophy produce usefulness rather than truth. As new theories 
and discoveries unfold, ―objectivity‖ is that which serves as a means for 
grounding further theories and further discovery.
55
  
 
Rorty aims to replace Enlightenment rationalism with a general turn away from 
theory toward a more pragmatic, holistic and narrative account of knowledge.
56
 
The pragmatic reality of moral claims, according to Rorty, is that they are not 
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universalisable: thus objectivity is best understood as a consensus of rational 
discussants because this is the most objectivity we can hope for.
57
 The consensus 
referred to here is not universal because the aim is to achieve limited consensus 
among rational discussants with respect to particular practices. This pragmatic 
approach to objectivity, based on consensus, is both more practical and realisable 
than theory-centred objectivity. This type of consensus aims to achieve 
perspectivally good decisions rather than universally right decisions. A good legal 
decision, for instance, would be one that conforms to the history and practice of 
law. A limited teleological consensus develops between rational discussants 
(lawyers, judges, politicians, legal academics, etc.) over actions, protocols, and 
behaviour that is consistent with good practice and therefore consistent with the 
teleological goal of law, namely, justice. 
 
A pragmatic appreciation for truth and justification, with a commitment to rational 
consensus, is more edifying for Rorty than the attempt to update or modify 
foundationalist truth-claims every time they fail.
58
 Rorty prefers James‘ 
description of truth, a truth which is ―better for us to believe,‖ rather than some 
representational version of truth.
59
 He acknowledges that the ―holistic, anti-
foundationalist, pragmatist treatments of knowledge and meaning‖ found in his 
own work and in the work of Dewey, Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, and Davidson 
is offensive to many philosophers because by abandoning the quest for 
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commensuration they become relativists.
60
 Like Williams, however, Rorty is not 
inclined to give much credence to the charge that he is a relativist:  
In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential 
difficulties into which ‗the Relativist‘ keeps getting 
himself is to move everything over from epistemology and 
metaphysics into cultural politics, from claims to 
knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions 
about what we should try.
61
 
This charge of relativism has come even from philosophers who are in general 
agreement with Rorty‘s non-foundationalist stance because they are concerned 
with how his rejection of foundationalism will cash out in disciplines like ethics 
and politics. In a collection of essays devoted to Rorty‘s work, Charles Guignon 
and David Hiley suggest that the consequences of taking a non-foundationalist 
stance is deeply troubling for moral and social thought. They claim that Rorty‘s 
non-foundationalist stance results in some form of moral relativism because it 
would be difficult to discern ―why we have the commitments we have‖ or why 
―we should take one path into the future rather than another.‖62 Rorty‘s response 
is to argue that in the history of Modern philosophy one often finds philosophers 
who resemble each other in their distrust of the idea that ―man‘s essence is to be a 
―knower of essences,‖ and he claims that Goethe, Kierkegaard, Santayana, James, 
Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, and the later Heidegger are ―figures of this sort‖ 
who were also accused of relativism or cynicism.
63
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The charge of relativism often misses the point that pragmatists such as Rorty 
make. The pragmatist is cynical of foundational versions of truth but not to truth 
that is perspectival, a truth that is relative to particular traditions with particular 
justificatory processes. For Rorty, truth is perspectival because ―We cannot justify 
our beliefs (in physics, ethics, or any other area) to everybody, but only to those 
whose beliefs overlap ours to some appropriate extent.‖64 For Rorty one can be an 
epistemological relativist, because truth does not mirror nature, without being 
either a scientific or moral relativist. This is because truth is understood as a 
concept with a history or, in his words, ―a consensus chosen by rational 
discussants.‖65 Rorty contends that Dewey was an edifying philosopher because 
Dewey incorporates the concept of philosophy as conversation when he writes 
about philosophy being a mentoring exercise rather than an exercise in the 
transmission of knowledge.
66
 For Dewey, mentoring is a purposeful activity in 
which people ―strive for the realization of ends‖;  when people are asked why they 
behave as they do, Dewey says the only answer, apart from blind custom, is that 
―they strive to attain certain goals because they believe that these ends have an 
intrinsic value of their own; they are good, satisfactory.‖67 Thus the realisation of 
ends and attainment of goals is only possible when there is a broad agreement 
about what those ends or goals are. 
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The critique of foundationalism has gathered momentum over the last fifty years 
and many critics use Descartes as a paradigm for what has gone wrong. According 
to this view, Descartes‘ attempt to ground theological and philosophical truths on 
self-evident principles failed because no agreement has been forthcoming in 
philosophy over what these first principles comprise. ―Non-foundationalism‖ has 
therefore come to refer to various theories that advocate taking a more historicist 
view of knowledge.  
 
2.5 Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) 
 
The impact that the Cartesian quest for certainty has had on moral thinking can be 
seen in the way various Modern theorists have sought to overcome moral 
relativism. This chapter opened with Williams describing an epistemic anxiety 
over relativism. In Morality: An Introduction to Ethics Williams was already 
rejecting the attempt by practical ethicists to simplify moral enquiry. He rejects 
foundationalism in ethics primarily because it attempts to simplify what cannot be 
made simple. Simplification is a mistake, according to Williams, because 
complexity and conflict is a basic fact of moral deliberation. He prefers to see 
moral deliberation as a complex mix of local and universal concerns that includes 
the psychological and emotional concerns of the moral agent.
68
 In Moral Luck 
Williams again rejects the idea that a completely impartial position is possible for 
any ethical theory, though his primary target is the alleged impartial consideration 
advocated by Henry Sidgwick and other utilitarian philosophers. Williams argues 
                                                 
68
 Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), 23-24. 
 61 
that the desire for a discrete moral theory, and an accompanying decision making 
protocol, is misguided. 
There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or self-
contained theory of what morality is, nor, despite the 
vigorous activities of some present practitioners, can there 
be an ethical theory, in the sense of a philosophical 
structure which, together with some degree of empirical 
fact, will yield a decision procedure for moral reasoning.
69
  
Williams returns to this theme in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, in which he 
asks why moral reductionism arose in the first place and why simplification in 
ethics is wrong. 
If there is such a thing as the truth about the subject matter 
of ethics – the truth, we might say, about the ethical – why 
is there any expectation that it should be simple? … 
Perhaps we need as many concepts to describe it as we 
find we need, and no fewer?
70
 
Williams says that the fact that we appeal to a variety of ethical considerations is 
precisely what one would expect to find in the complex world we inhabit. Ethical 
considerations, according to Williams, are ―genuinely different from one another,‖ 
and this is precisely what moral agents should expect because all of us are ―heirs 
to different long and complex ethical traditions, with many different religious and 
other social strands.‖71 Williams argues nonetheless that a moral agent can be an 
epistemological skeptic without being an ethical skeptic: 
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In my sense, to be skeptical about ethics is to be skeptical 
about the force of ethical considerations; someone may 
grant them force, and so not be a skeptic, but still not think 
that they constitute knowledge because he does not think 
the point lies in their being knowledge.
72
 
Williams argues that Sidgwick‘s requirement that rational agents ought to 
examine ethical issues from a point of view of the universe is wrong because 
―neither psychology nor the history of ethical reflection gives much reason to 
believe that the theoretical reasonings of the cool hour can do without a sense of 
the moral shape of the world, of the kind given in everyday dispositions.‖73 
Williams claims that Sidgwick‘s point of view of the universe is nowhere to be 
found,
74
 and he refers to this type of thinking as government house 
utilitarianism.
75
 He suggests that rather than concentrating on a non-existent point 
of view of the universe, a moral agent should be more concerned with the point of 
view of here and now and with ―how a practice hangs together in comparison with 
other practices.‖76 Williams argues that the justification for rejecting the 
foundationalist enterprise in moral philosophy, in favour of practice-guided 
enquiry, is the same justification for rejecting it in the philosophy of science.  
No process of reason-giving fits this picture, in the 
sciences or elsewhere. In theoretical connections, the 
foundationalist enterprise, of resting the structure of 
knowledge on some favored class of statements, has now 
generally been displaced in favor of a holistic type of 
model, in which some beliefs can be questioned, justified, 
or adjusted while others are kept constant, but there is no 
process by which they can all be questioned at once, or all 
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justified in terms of (almost) nothing. In Neurath‘s famous 
image, we repair the sea while we are on the sea.
77
 
A moral agent, according to Williams, ought to be concerned with how a practice 
―hangs together in comparison with other practices in a way that makes social and 
psychological sense.‖78 Because Williams argues that a moral agent is necessarily 
conditioned by culture, psychology, and history he has also been labeled a moral 
relativist. This is a tag he eventually came to own, or perhaps reform, because he 
argues that from the point of view of a moral objectivist, he is indeed advocating a 
type of moral relativism. However, he claims that the moral objectivist is simply 
wrong to think that the key aspect of moral deliberation is avoidance of relativism. 
He uses the phrase, ―relativism from a distance,‖ to show that moral deliberation 
is always perspectival, always local, and therefore by definition always relative to 
the types of people we are.
79
  
 
In the opening chapter to his last book, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay In 
Genealogy, Williams argues that the commitment to truth and the suspicion of this 
commitment still dominates the cultural scene.
80
 In this book he further articulates 
what was for him a familiar theme, namely, Nietzsche‘s concept of genealogy.81 
Our ethical ideas are a complex deposit of many different 
traditions and social forces, and they have themselves 
been shaped by self-conscious representations of that 
history. However, the impact of these historical processes 
is to some extent concealed by the ways in which their 
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product thinks of itself. The most general reason for this is 
that a truthful historical account is likely to reveal a radical 
contingency in our current ethical conceptions.
82
 
2.6 Jonathan Dancy: Ethics Without Principles (2004) 
 
Another philosopher who rejects foundationalist moral philosophy and thus has 
also been labeled a moral relativist is Jonathan Dancy. In his Introduction to 
Contemporary Epistemology, Dancy contends that the focus of foundationalism 
was to satisfy the demands of epistemology in order to avoid skepticism. He 
argues that the research programme of classical foundationalism fails to show how 
beliefs about an ―external world,‖ or about ―past and future,‖ or about ―other 
minds‖ is justified on the basis of ―infallible beliefs about our sensory states.‖83  
 
This failure to secure epistemic foundations for truth-claims subsequently impacts 
on issues associated with moral foundationalism, at least as far as universalisable 
moral principles are concerned. Dancy argues that the search for moral 
universalisability is itself mistaken because it ignores the possibility that a new 
case may throw up alternative properties of sufficient importance to defeat 
previously held universalisable moral principles.
84
 Dancy also uses the 
assumptions of scientific foundationalism as a paradigm for exposing the type of 
epistemological problems found in moral philosophy. In the same way that one 
can never be certain that experimental probability leads to scientific facts, a moral 
agent can never be certain that moral principles or rules can be adequately applied 
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to all particular cases. In Ethics Without Principles Dancy argues that ―morality 
has no need for principles at all,‖85 and he advocates what he calls an extreme 
form of particularism: 
we can perfectly well rely on people by and large to do 
what is right in the circumstances. We don‘t need 
principles to tell them what to do, or to determine what is 
right, or to tell us what they are likely to do.
86
 
Dancy is referring here to the type of reliance one concedes to practitioners within 
a particular practice. The rules and principles that govern a practice are particular 
to that tradition and not universally shared by others.    
 
2.7 Richard Bernstein: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983) 
 
Richard Bernstein, in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, 
and Praxis, also advocates for a practice-guided hermeneutic awareness of 
epistemological claims. Bernstein is a relativist as far as truth-claims are 
concerned because he agrees with Rorty that there is no grand narrative or 
overarching framework that can mediate between alternative foundationalist 
arguments: 
there is no substantive overarching framework in which 
radically different and alternative schemes are 
commensurable—no universal standards that somehow 
stand outside of and above these competing alternatives.
87
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Bernstein agrees with Rorty that the Modern attempt to replace the contingency of 
social practices with a more solid and substantial epistemological objectivism has 
failed.
88
 He argues that in spite of several decades of debate over concepts like 
rationality, truth, and knowledge, contemporary discussion still takes an either/or 
approach to what he calls traditional extremes. Bernstein‘s either/or approach to 
epistemological arguments closely resembles that same comparison referred to 
earlier by Williams. Bernstein argues that a Cartesian either/or anxiety exists 
because moral agents are informed that they either adopt forms of ―objectivism, 
foundationalism, ultimate grounding of knowledge, science, philosophy, and 
language‖ or society collapses into ―relativism, skepticism, historicism and 
nihilism.‖89 
 
Bernstein also argues that Descartes‘ search for certainty produced an overriding 
―intellectual confidence‖ that the ―secure path for philosophy‖ had been 
discovered, a ―right method‖ that would yield ―genuine intellectual progress‖ 
because it turned philosophy into a discipline that yields knowledge (epistēmē) 
rather than a discipline based on the ―endless battleground for competing and 
shifting opinions (doxai).‖90 The belief in a ―permanent, ahistorical matrix or 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness‖91 was driven by what 
Bernstein refers to as a ―Cartesian anxiety.‖92  
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Either there is some support for our being, a fixed 
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the 
forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with 
intellectual and moral chaos.
93
  
Bernstein claims that the reason why the battle against relativism has been so 
pervasive is because there may be nothing, ―not God, Philosophy, Science, or 
Poetry—that satisfies our longing for foundations, for a fixed Archimedean point 
upon which we can secure our thought and action.‖94 In the historical setting of 
distrust toward traditional repositories of truth (church, state, culture, etc.), anxiety 
might seem reasonable and perhaps even pragmatically necessary during the early 
stages of the Enlightenment. Bernstein‘s suggestion is that we should now reject 
the anxiety of both unsatisfied objectivism and pessimistic relativism. Like others 
mentioned previously, he advocates a return to practice-guided decision making 
contingent upon history and precedent. Bernstein cites MacIntyre‘s argument that 
objectivity comes from knowing ―how and when to put rules and principles to 
work and when not to‖ in disciplines like law, medicine, and science because 
there are no set rules ―specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for large 
areas of such practices‖ and because skills associated with practical rationality are 
communicated ―partly by precepts‖ but much more by ―case-histories and 
precedents.‖95 
 
Bernstein says the twentieth century hermeneutic shift in philosophy began as a 
Continental movement with the publication of Heidegger‘s Being and Time and 
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Gadamer‘s Truth and Method.96 He follows Gadamer in claiming that rather than 
attempting to escape relativism by continuing the fruitless search for theory-
centred objectivism, that pursuit should be discontinued and replaced by a 
practice-guided form of objectivity, following Aristotle.
97
 Gadamer and Bernstein 
claim that philosophical hermeneutics is heir to the type of practical philosophy 
that Aristotle advocates.  
 
According to Bernstein, this old/new understanding of practical rationality is 
―dialogical‖ because it places stress on the ―practical communal character‖ of 
rationality.
98
 He acknowledges that this approach is pluralistic, but not in a flabby 
or defensive sense of pluralism.
99
  Some moral claims are better than others in the 
same way that some scientific claims are better than others, primarily because 
they seem to work. Defensive or fortress-like pluralism occurs when disparate 
groups work out their own isolated frameworks for ethics without communicating 
with others.
100
 Bernstein rejects this approach as well and advocates a type of 
―engaged pluralism‖ whereby multiple parties acknowledge their own fallibilities 
and attempt to be responsive to each other. He argues for ―engaged fallibilistic 
pluralism‖ because it represents what is best in the pragmatic tradition. It involves 
vigilance against the dual temptations of ―simply dismissing what others are 
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saying‖ and also of ―thinking we can always easily translate what is alien into our 
own entrenched vocabularies.‖101 
 
2.8 Stephen Toulmin: Cosmopolis (1990) 
 
The final philosopher in this review is perhaps the most significant because he 
was a genuine insider in the classic theory-centred view of Modernity. In 
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Toulmin presents a stark contrast 
from what he now calls the ―received view‖: 
Looking back at the ―received view‖ of Modernity after 
fifty years, my inclination is to retort, ―Don‘t believe a 
word of it!‖ From the start, that whole story was one-sided 
and over-optimistic, and veered into self-congratulation.
102
 
Toulmin used this exaggerated claim deliberately because his main criticism of 
the Enlightenment project was not the ideal of rational enquiry but the 
exaggerated product and historical inaccuracy of many of its major advocates and 
because the Modern project assumed too much. His change of mind begins with 
what he refers to as the hidden agenda of Modernity, the ―Erwartungshorizonten, 
or horizons of expectation,‖ that he says dominated Modernity.103 Toulmin uses 
the term ―received account‖ to describe the confident assertion that human 
rationality could transcend traditional presuppositions of religion and culture. He 
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is not saying that the Enlightenment project itself was a failure because major 
advances did occur in almost every field of human enquiry.  
In choosing as the goals of Modernity an intellectual and 
practical agenda that set aside the tolerant, skeptical 
attitude of the 16
th
-century humanists, and focussed on the 
17
th
-century pursuit of mathematical exactitude and logical 
rigor, intellectual certainty and moral purity, Europe set 
itself on a cultural and political road that has led to its 
most striking technical successes and to its deepest human 
failures.
104
 
The first chapter of Cosmopolis describes an increasing distrust over the received 
wisdom of Modernity. Toulmin says the scientific blessing of the Enlightenment 
(especially in medicine) was that scientific enquiry has made significant progress 
since Galileo and Descartes. However, this progress was itself a long-term product 
of prior ―17th-century revolutions undertaken in physics by Galileo, Kepler, and 
Newton, and in philosophy by Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz.‖105 Toulmin‘s 
change of mind focuses on what he calls the ―shared assumptions about 
rationality‖ as the starting point of Modernity.106 He claims that acknowledging 
the limits of rational enquiry is less contentious now in science than it is in 
philosophy because scientists ―share in more or less agreed-upon tasks‖ whereas 
philosophers do not.
107
 The more or less agreed-upon task of scientific enquiry is 
the standard model approach referred to previously. 
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Further, Toulmin says the self-doubt of philosophy, and thus his own, necessitated 
a fresh start because the ―burden of proof‖ shifted once the dream of finding a 
scratch line for epistemic claims failed to materialise.
108
 John Dewey‘s Gifford 
Lectures (1929) provide the starting point for Toulmin‘s critique. Taking his cue 
from Wittgenstein, Toulmin suggests that the theory-centred focus of Modernity 
is over and done with because the ―destructive work of Dewey, Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, and Rorty‖ has left philosophy with limited options. Toulmin thinks 
there are three possibilities for philosophy: 
[1] It can cling to the discredited research program of a 
purely theoretical (i.e. ―modern‖) philosophy, which will 
end by driving it out of business; [2] it can look for new 
and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and 
develop the methods needed for a more practical (―post-
modern‖) agenda; or [3] it can return to its pre-17th-
century traditions, and try to recover the lost (―pre-
modern‖) topics that were sidetracked by Descartes, but 
can be usefully taken up for the future.
109
  
The Modern project, according to Toulmin, did not provide certainty for 
―intellectual problems—let alone, practical ones,‖ and the claim that philosophical 
or scientific problems could be de-contextualized was itself based on an historical 
motivation. He uncompromisingly rejects the Modern assumption that rationality 
was commonly available to anyone ―who sets superstition and mythology aside‖ 
in ways ―free of local prejudice and transient fashion.‖110 Toulmin‘s criticism of 
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the false assumptions of Modernity has broadened to become a critique of 
rationality itself.
111
  
 
After fifty years of reflecting on the received view of Modernity Toulmin argues 
that it was simply over-optimistic.
112
 He is not suggesting a rejection of all aspects 
of the standard account but argues that it was simply over-optimistic and that its 
worst defects are matters of historical fact. He highlights three basic historical 
assumptions of seventeenth-century rationalism. First, he argues that general 
historians have long since rejected the myth of social progress that many 
philosophers still cling to. Second, also on historical grounds, he rejects the 
assumption that the Enlightenment led to freedom from ecclesiastical tyranny. 
Third, he claims that the assumption of a clean intellectual break with the Middle 
Ages is at best a half-truth.
113
  
 
At this point in his reconstruction for a modern Cosmopolis Toulmin sets the 
scene for a re-evaluation of pre-Modernity because one aim of seventeenth-
century philosophers was to frame questions independent of context. Toulmin 
claims that his task is now to ―recontextualize the questions these philosophers 
took most pride in de-contextualizing.‖114 For Toulmin, the social implications of 
the new Cosmopolis share one feature, which is that they foreshadow a notion that 
has recently played a part in political and social rhetoric.  
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Toulmin claims that throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, clerics and 
educated laypeople understood that problems in social ethics were not resolved by 
appeal to any single universal tradition so when they confronted serious moral 
issues they appealed to multiple considerations and coexisting traditions that were 
weighed against one another.
115
 For this reason Toulmin now argues for a return 
to casuistry in ethics – to re-contextualise philosophical truth-claims for a modern 
Cosmopolis:  
Until the 17
th 
century turned ethics into a branch of 
theoretical philosophy, ―case ethics‖ was as intellectually 
challenging as constitutional interpretation in the judicial 
practice of the United States. It did not aim to provide a 
unique resolution of every moral problem: rather, it 
triangulated its way across unexplored ethical territory, 
using all the available resources of moral thought and 
social tradition.
116
 
In a collaborative project with Albert Jonsen, Toulmin argues that a moral agent 
can resort to type-cases or paradigm cases without becoming an absolutist.
117
 A 
type-case uses standard principles as referential markers so that an individual case 
can be compared and contrasted with the typical. Jonsen and Toulmin argue that 
standard maxims such as ―don‘t use violence against innocent human beings,‖ 
―don‘t lie,‖ and ―don‘t take unfair advantage of other people‘s misfortune‖ serve 
as ―markers or boundary stones that delimit the territory of ‗moral‘ considerations 
in practice.‖118 A central concern behind Toulmin‘s recent work resembles 
MacIntyre‘s reconstructive project when he suggests that because the criticism of 
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leading philosophers ―undermines the whole ‗foundationalist‘ program,‖ a new 
Cosmopolis is now required that favours a research program ―concentrated on 
narrative and practice.‖119 Toulmin argues that the search for ―common 
grounding,‖ based either on Cartesian rationalism (clear and distinct ideas) or on 
Lockean empiricism, has not produced common results and a new ―grounding‖ is 
required that focuses on the ―overall narrative of conceptual history.‖120 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
The seemingly secure path that philosophy embarked on at the start of the 
seventeenth century had by the end of the twentieth century diverged into 
numerous and often disparate versions of the original position. The various types 
of moral enquiry advocated by Rorty, Williams, Dancy, Bernstein, and Toulmin 
represent a non-foundationalist shift in emphasis, even though they provide a 
diverse range of alternatives. This diversity, however, seems eminently 
reasonable, given Aristotle‘s insight that ethics is a practical rather than a 
theoretical science. In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that a 
rational agent does not spend time deliberating about ends when he says that ―a 
doctor does not deliberate whether he should heal, nor an orator whether he shall 
persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order.‖121 For 
Aristotle, a rational agent ought to be more concerned with practical intelligence 
or prudence and thus the concentration of thought for doctors, orators, and 
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statesmen is to ―assume the end‖ (health, persuasion, and law and order) and to 
spend time contemplating ―how and by what means‖ the end ―is to be attained.‖122  
 
Aristotle‘s concept of practical wisdom stands in stark contrast to the decision 
making models currently being advocated in practical ethics. For Aristotle, 
practical ethics is forged in a shared teleological activity of a specific practice 
(i.e., medicine→health; law→justice; politics→civil society), and the virtues of 
these practices are shaped by hands-on engagement of the practitioners concerned. 
Doctors, lawyers, and politicians can and do achieve standards of excellence 
sufficient to be labeled as experts in their respective fields. Aristotle‘s engaged 
version of practical wisdom is very different from the most popular contemporary 
versions of practical ethics that argue for a disengaged process of decision 
making.  The motivation for the contemporary focus on practical ethics was 
driven, in part, by a level of anxiety over modern medical techniques and the 
corresponding desire to be able to deal with these issues independently, free from 
traditional moral divides, and with a level of professional expertise. Singer and 
Wells make this claim when they argue that, when faced with complex ethical 
issues, we should be ―a little more ready to gather together those [ethicists] best 
qualified to consider the issues in an open and informed manner‖ because their 
understanding and qualifications provide ―an understanding of the nature of ethics 
and the meanings of the moral concepts‖ and ―a reasonable knowledge of the 
major ethical theories.‖123 The overriding difficulty with this approach is that 
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 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1113a, 359. 
123
 Peter Singer and Deane Wells, The Reproductive Revolution: New Ways of Making Babies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 199-200. 
 76 
those people who are ―best qualified‖ in philosophy are no more likely to reach 
agreement over complex moral issues than less qualified people from other 
disciplines.  
 
Clearly, as stated before, philosophers can and do reach thin agreement on moral 
issues, but this type of agreement is also shared by many others who are not moral 
experts. Even if it were true that philosophers derive common conclusions from 
shared premises, this would still not help solve a significant practical problem 
associated with ethical decision making in a modern liberal democracy. A modern 
liberal democracy provides space for people from numerous cultural and religious 
persuasions. The inherent pluralism of a modern democracy allows people to hold 
to a variety of competing positions, and the search for an approach that ignores 
this diversity is misguided. The next chapter will explore the historical and 
theoretical background behind the types of justificatory arguments currently being 
posited in contemporary practical ethics. The aim of this analysis will be to show 
that the attempt to simplify the decision making process was misguided from the 
start because the type of divisions one finds in connection with complex moral 
issues is precisely what one ought to expect in a modern pluralist society. 
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CHAPTER 3: DECISION MAKING AND PRACTICAL ETHICS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the criticism of Cartesian foundationalism in 
general and the impact that this type of either/or thinking has on moral enquiry. 
Most of the philosophers in the previous chapter adopt a Peircian-type response to 
knowledge by arguing that the pursuit of knowledge is conducted from within a 
―community of inquirers,‖1 although each understands this concept in his own 
way.  
 
The philosophers discussed in the previous chapter also share an initial agreement 
that the pursuit of moral knowledge is in some sense tradition-dependent, but they 
differ markedly over the consequences that they think flow from this. Williams 
thinks that the variety of moral traditions in the Western philosophical canon is 
precisely what one ought to expect from a complex discipline like ethics, and he is 
not anxious about the diversity of moral claims that results from this mix. 
MacIntyre, on the other hand, is deeply concerned because he thinks that this 
variety, when it is not linked to a thick teleological imperative, leaves moral 
philosophy in a state of crisis.
2
 
                                                 
1
 See C. S. Peirce in Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss eds., The Collected Works of Charles S. 
Peirce, Volume 5 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 311. Peirce argues that ―The real, 
then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is 
therefore independent of the vagaries of you and me. Thus, the very origin of the conception of 
reality shows that the conception essentially involves the notion of community, without definite 
limits, and capable of a definite increase in knowledge.‖ 
2
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 8.  
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MacIntyre‘s claim that the Enlightenment period produced various forms of 
emotivism seems too harsh, for reasons that will be explored later in this chapter, 
but he is right that the Modern project did not produce a standard model for moral 
philosophy. The lack of a standard model is implied in the ―disquieting 
suggestion‖ to which MacIntyre refers in the opening chapter of After Virtue.3 He 
asks the reader to imagine a world in which the tradition of scientific enquiry has 
been lost and the scientific debates that do remain are fragmentary and have little 
connection to a longer and deeper narrative of scientific enquiry.  
 
Using this thought experiment, MacIntyre argues that a similar crisis exists in 
contemporary moral enquiry. Moral debates cannot be resolved because the 
proper context for moral enquiry has been lost and replaced by several discrete 
theories of ethics, each of which is internally coherent. So a moral agent is 
expected to weigh up the claims from various rival theories of ethics but is not 
provided with the scales that enable this adjudication to take place. This moral 
standoff is what MacIntyre refers to when he says that rival moral arguments can 
be ―logically valid or can be easily expanded so as to be made so,‖ but there is no 
way to adjudicate between them because ―we possess no rational way of weighing 
the claims of one as against another.‖4  
 
An example of this epistemological divide can be seen in the work of two 
Australian philosophers. In Practical Ethics (1979), The Expanding Circle (1981), 
and Rethinking Life and Death (1994), Singer posits that rational decision making 
                                                 
3
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 1-5. 
4
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 8. 
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in ethics is possible by rejecting the ―old ethic‖5 of ―traditional moralists‖6 and 
replacing it with the ―new way‖ based on a version of preference utilitarianism 
and the principle of equal consideration of interests. David Oderberg, in contrast, 
argues in Applied Ethics that Singer is wrong because ―traditional morality is not 
dead,‖7 and because the ―old way‖ of doing ethics still provides a coherent moral 
system. Singer and Oderberg provide non-specialists with a good introduction to 
the way a consequentialist and a non-consequentialist apply theory to practice in 
ethics, but they are at odds on almost every practical issue they discuss. For 
instance, Singer argues that abortion is morally right (in most circumstances) and 
Oderberg argues that abortion is morally wrong (in most circumstances).
8
  
 
In a pluralist society such as Australia this disagreement illustrates why complex 
moral issues are so intractable and why MacIntyre claims that contemporary 
moral debate is unsettlable at one level and interminable at another.
9
 This thesis 
focuses on what pragmatists
10
 refer to as the cash value or practical consequences 
for human conduct of moral claims. In a pluralist society, the most immediate 
practical consequence of moral enquiry is that agreement is not possible for many 
                                                 
5
 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (Melbourne: 
Text Publishing, 1994), 187ff. 
6
 Singer, Practical Ethics, 1. 
7
 David S. Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), viii-ix. The same criticism of preference utilitarianism is offered in David S. Oderberg, 
Moral Theory: A Non-consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
8
 Singer argues that abortion is wrong if the method of termination causes pain to the fetus 
(Practical Ethics, 152). Oderberg argues that abortion can sometimes be right when the doctrine of 
double effect applies (Applied Ethics, 3). 
9
 MacIntyre, ―2for the foundations of ethics so frustrating?‖, 16-21. 
10
 C. S. Peirce describes pragmatism as the guiding rule for the scientist and the mathematician, in 
―How to Make Your Ideas Clear,‖ Popular Science Monthly 12 (1878): 286. William James 
echoes this when he claims that ―The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what 
definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula 
or that world-formula be the true one,‖ in John J. McDermott ed., The Writings of William James: 
A Comprehensive Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 379.  
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issues in practical ethics because moral enquirers do not appeal to a standard 
theoretical model.  
 
Texts in practical ethics, such as those mentioned above, routinely begin with an 
historical survey, often by introducing the main consequentialist and non-
consequentialist theories. The authors then explain to readers why a particular 
version of consequentialism or non-consequentialism is to be preferred and then 
show how this preferred theory can be applied to particular cases. The aim of most 
practical ethics texts is not simply to describe what ethics is but to provide readers 
with rational objectivity in their decision making. In the previous chapter this 
desire for objectivity was described by Toulmin as the ―hidden agenda of 
Modernity,‖11 by Williams as a desire to simplify what cannot be made simple,12 
and by Bernstein as an either/or attempt to overcome Cartesian anxiety over 
relativism.
13
 
 
At roughly the same time that theoretical objectivism in ethics was being 
challenged, a new and different type of social anxiety arose which put extra 
pressure on moral philosophers and theologians.
14
 As the twentieth century began 
to unfold, a series of technical achievements in science caused a technical anxiety 
that had hitherto been unknown. Two major developments serve as book-ends to 
this twentieth-century period of technical anxiety, Einstein‘s theories of special 
and general relativity (1905, 1916) and the completion of the human genome map 
                                                 
11
 Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. 
12
 Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, 23-24. 
13
 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 16-20. 
14
 See Jacques Ellul, The Technological Bluff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 1-16. 
 81 
(2000). One of the practical applications of E = mc
2
 was the development and use 
of atomic weapons. For several decades after, the threat of a nuclear exchange 
between feuding nations produced a social anxiety that psychiatrists labeled 
―nuclear anxiety.‖15  
 
At the other end of the century, advances in the genomic sciences produced a 
technical anxiety over the hereditary risks associated with transgenic species, the 
moral issues associated with cloning, and the ―big brother‖ risks associated with 
genetic information. At the start of the Human Genome Project (1990), 
researchers from the National Human Genome Research Institute acknowledged 
public anxiety over genetic research and devoted US$18 million dollars annually 
to what they refer to as the ―Ethical, Legal and Social Issues‖ (ELSI) associated 
with mapping the human genome.
16
  
 
The anxiety over modern technical developments drove some people working in 
moral philosophy to endorse a more practical approach to ethics. While all of the 
major ethical theories endorse decision making protocols, these protocols are 
second order considerations for some. The first order of moral enquiry for a 
Modern philosopher like Kant was to answer the epistemological question, What 
foundations are required to ground ethical standards?
17
 Bentham, on the other 
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 Stewart Meacham, ―The Social Aspects of Nuclear Anxiety,‖ American Journal of Psychiatry 
120 (1964): 837-841. 
16
 Funding to the National Human Genome Research Institute for the ELSI program exceeds all 
other funding that had previously been devoted to ethical, legal, and social issues in health care.  
17
 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton 
(London: Random House, 1948) 77. 
 82 
hand, concentrated on a second order question, namely, How ought moral agents 
to make decisions on the application of ethical standards to particular situations?  
 
Over the last fifty years or so, it is Bentham‘s second order focus that has come to 
dominate practical ethics.
18
 This dominance seems to have been for two reasons 
already highlighted. First, the conceptual incommensurability of rival moral 
theories is problematic if one thinks that the purpose of ethics is to resolve moral 
issues and, second, anxiety over modern technical developments motivated 
philosophers and theologians to concentrate on practical ethics.  
 
This chapter will examine the link between technical anxiety and the emergence 
of practical ethics in the twentieth century. The first section will outline how and 
why technical anxiety influenced the current dominance of practical ethics. The 
second section will explain why the lack of a standard model in moral philosophy 
is not as stark as portrayed by MacIntyre. The third section will build on the 
previous one by showing how thin agreement is possible even when people do 
have conceptually thick incommensurable views over how ethics ought to be 
applied. The fourth section will illustrate how decision making protocols slide too 
easily between agreement on thin universals and disagreement over how thin 
universals ought to be applied in complex cases.  
 
                                                 
18
 Anne Maclean argues that bioethics is dominated by utilitarian sophistry in The Elimination of 
Morality: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics (New York: Routledge Press, 1993), 1-16. 
Maclean‘s description of utilitarianism as sophistry is clearly debatable but her analysis that 
utilitarian thinking dominates bioethics seems valid. Utilitarian concepts such as cost-benefit 
analysis, quality adjusted life year (QALY), best-interest of the child, and harm minimisation 
dominate health care policy in many liberal democracies. 
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3.2 The Twentieth Century: An Era of Technical Anxiety 
 
Technical developments in the twentieth century produced rapid changes in the 
physical and biological sciences, and these developments challenged traditional 
models of moral enquiry. When German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz 
Strassmann discovered in 1938 that they could split a uranium atom by 
bombarding it with neutrons, their discovery unleashed a series of events that led 
seemingly ineluctably to the development and subsequent use of atomic weapons. 
The destructive power of atomic weaponry, and the corresponding fear of 
annihilation, caused many post-war people to exhibit a type of psychological 
stress that psychiatrists named ―nuclear anxiety.‖19  
 
Subsequently, technical developments such as kidney transplantation (1954), the 
oral contraceptive (1960), heart transplantation (1967), the ability to fertilise a 
human ovum in vitro (1978), and a cloned sheep named Dolly (1996) added to the 
anxiety. Critics of the unbridled acceptance of technical progress coined the term 
―technological imperative‖ to describe the uncritical application of new 
techniques.
20
 In the 1990s various DNA-based research projects were instigated, 
thereby, leading to a genomic revolution that soon turned into one of the big-
science projects of human achievement. By 2000 the first draft of the human 
genome map had been completed, and now gene-splicing techniques allow 
                                                 
19
 See James Thompson, ―Threat of Nuclear Warfare,‖ in George Fink ed., Encyclopedia of Stress, 
Volume 3 (San Diego: Academic Press, 2000), 66-70.  
20
 French sociologist Jacques Ellul argued that the human race has become so enamoured by 
technique that ―no human activity escapes this technical imperative,‖ in The Technological Society 
(New York: Vintage Press, 1967), 6. Similarly, Ivan Illich argued that modern medicine has 
become seduced by technique and misappropriated the original medical telos of health, in Medical 
Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (London: Marion Boyars, 1975), 15-31.  
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implantation of genetic material from one animal to another or even from an 
animal to a plant.  
 
In a White Paper produced for the United Kingdom House of Commons (2003) 
health secretary John Reid argued that experts on the Human Genetics 
Commission would ease the ―understandable public anxiety about the coming 
revolution in health care‖ by ―ensuring public access to the information on human 
genetics and the social and ethical issues involved.‖21 The alleged benefits or 
harms resulting from the genomic revolution prompted a spectrum of claims 
ranging from the eradication of gene-linked disease to a catastrophic genetic 
accident. A sleeper issue in the controversy over biotechnology is the transfer of 
genetic material from one species to another.  Most of the controversy focuses on 
genetic research on humans, but this type of research is, for the most part, tightly 
regulated. The same caution is not the case for research on animals, and the 
potential risks to humans from creating transgenic animals is arguably greater 
because it bypasses the process of evolutionary fitness that prevents the 
transmission of viruses and other pathogens from one species to another.
22
 
 
In 1980 the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN) developed an 
―information matrix‖ that subsequently became the World Wide Web. This rapid 
information-sharing environment produced another form of modern stress now 
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 John Reid, White Paper: Our Inheritance, Our Future: Realising the Potential of Genetics in the 
NHS (Department of Health, June 2003), 1. 
22
 See ―Possible Dangers: Unwittingly Selecting for Pathogens,‖ in Bernard E. Rollin, The 
Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 114-117.  
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known as the ―big brother complex‖ or ―information anxiety.‖23 Sometime in late-
2009 or early-2010 CERN will add to this stress when they fire up the Large 
Hadron Collider (LHC), the most powerful particle accelerator ever built.
24
 
Leading up to the first but unsuccessful attempt at starting the LHC in 2008, 
anxiety over a runaway black hole led to a failed application in Hawaii‘s High 
Court for a temporary restraining order on the LHC start date. Newspapers gave 
up columns of space to people who argued that the scientists at CERN were going 
to blow up the solar system. These concerned citizens seemed unaware that the 
CERN accelerator was not the first particle accelerator, merely the most powerful, 
and that experiments involving colliding particles had been going on for decades. 
 
3.3 The Genesis of Practical Ethics 
 
In the midst of this era of technical anxiety an academic offshoot from traditional 
moral philosophy emerged. This academic discipline of practical ethics developed 
over the past sixty years in order to simplify the process of moral deliberation.
25
 
The justification for this simplified model of ethics was that a shared ―common 
morality‖ theory was thought to be necessary in order to overcome the divisions 
between consequentialists and non-consequentialists and between theists and non-
theists.
26
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 See Richard Saul Wurman, Information Anxiety (New York: Doubleday, 1989). 
24
 One of the primary goals of the LHC is to create a mini-black hole to replicate the first micro-
second of the universe prior to inflation.  
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This agenda has proved problematic for two reasons. First, it side-stepped 
contemporary debates in epistemology over concepts such as reason and 
objectivity and, second, the decision making protocols advocated in practical 
ethics texts turned out to be just as disputatious when applied to practical issues as 
the traditional theories they were trying to replace. The fixed divide between rival 
moral theories is not solved by the application of decision making protocols. If 
anything, it may even make the separation between rival points of view more 
fixed than it needs to be. Decision making protocols quickly gained a legitimacy 
that belied the infancy of practical ethics as a separate discipline.
27
    
 
In the historical life setting into which philosophers like Kant and Bentham were 
born, the ―flight from authority‖28 seemed warranted in order to find a 
philosophical foundation for the moral life that did not rely on the authority of 
religious or civil leaders. Problems associated with the appeal to traditional 
authorities (Church and State) were obvious, and the Cartesian anxiety over 
foundations was not unreasonable. Modern moral thinkers of this period wanted to 
establish a rational foundation for ethics for the same epistemological reasons that 
scientists of the period sought to establish a rational foundation for scientific 
disciplines. The attempt to link the objectivity of scientific enquiry with the 
objectivity of moral enquiry seems to be mistake, however. It is certainly a 
mistake for teleological thinkers like Aristotle, virtue ethicists like MacIntyre, and 
casuists like Toulmin because a sense of purpose or place, experience, awareness 
                                                 
27
 Benefits and problems associated with two major common morality theories will be examined in 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
28
 See Jeffrey R. Stout, The Flight from Authority: Religion, Morality, and the Quest for Autonomy 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).  
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and development of habits of action, together with a partial consideration of time, 
place, and circumstance are all necessary for practical wisdom. 
 
The type of rational objectivity appealed to in science is referred to as 
methodological reductionism
29
 because knowledge about a complex thing is 
enhanced by understanding the interaction of its constituent parts. When it comes 
to moral enquiry, however, there are good reasons to think that Aristotle was right 
because a complex discipline like ethics is not reducible in the same sense. 
Aristotle argues that scientific knowledge is derived from universals or first 
principles that are demonstrable without variation (that which is true cannot be 
made false). Practical wisdom (ethics and politics) cannot be scientific 
knowledge, however, because ―that which can be done is capable of being 
otherwise‖ and so for prudential reasons political and ethical decision making 
involves an appreciation of life‘s variables.30 
 
Aristotle suggests that the study of ethics is first and foremost a practical 
discipline, but for him the object of this type of enquiry is not knowledge for its 
own sake but rather for the practical benefits that flow from this type of enquiry 
for the life of the polis.
31
 In the opening chapter to his Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle explains why politics is the ―master art,‖ primarily because ―politics uses 
the rest of the sciences.‖32 In Book VI Aristotle expands on the intricate 
relationship between politics and ethics by first showing the difference between 
                                                 
29
 Reductionism in this context is empirically based and does not imply metaphysical or 
philosophical reductionism. 
30
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1140b and 1141a, 389. 
31
 This theme will be developed further in Chapter 7. 
32
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1094a, 339. 
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scientific knowledge and practical wisdom. For Aristotle scientific knowledge 
involves ―judgment about things that are universal and necessary,‖ as derived 
from ―first principles.‖33 Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is ―concerned with 
things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate.‖34 Aristotle is 
drawing from a tradition in which ethics (in the classical sense) is implemented 
within the life of the polis and therefore ethics requires politics for its 
implementation. This ancient link between ethics and politics was less significant 
for Modern thinkers. Prudent thinkers will exhibit different types of excellences 
because they have different ends in mind. In this respect Aristotle departs from his 
mentors (Socrates and Plato) when he says that ―there is no such thing as 
excellence in practical wisdom‖ because ―excellence‖ is a term that involves 
comparison of particular activities that are variable with respect to time, place, 
and circumstance, or as the occasion demands (pros ton kairon).
35
  
 
3.4 The Standard Model and the Appeal to Authority 
 
The conceptual incommensurability of rival moral theories negates the possibility 
that moral enquiry will exhibit anything like the standard model approach used in 
the sciences because the standard model is derived from a thick consensus that is 
missing among moral philosophers. As stated previously, the standard model 
concept is used in science to delineate the foundational premises and boundary 
assumptions on which evidence derived by means of the scientific method is 
                                                 
33
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1140b, 389. 
34
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1141b, 390. 
35
 Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1140b, 389 and 1109a, 354. 
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evaluated. In a pluralist society the standard model concept has vast explanatory 
power and can therefore be used to evaluate other rival theories. In biology, for 
instance, rival theories of the origin of life are evaluated against the standard 
model of evolution by natural selection. The standard model in biology stands 
above other rival theories of creation, intelligent design, or numerous indigenous 
narratives because it has vastly greater explanatory power. As a result, policies 
and protocols in a pluralist society can be developed in education and research by 
evaluating them against the standard model of evolution by natural selection. In 
other words, the justification for framing education policy, curricular 
development, and research funding for the study of biology or anthropology on 
the theory of evolution by natural selection, rather than any of the numerous 
creation narratives, is that the standard model of biology has vast explanatory 
power whereas other theories for the origin of life do not.  
 
Similarly, theories for the origin of the universe can be compared against the 
standard model of cosmology accepted by astronomers, cosmologists, and 
physicists because this standard model has explanatory power and the others do 
not.
36
 Preference for the standard model approach when framing policy decisions 
in a pluralist society does not imply that other forms of cosmology have no value. 
Australian indigenous cosmology (the ―Dreaming‖) has ontological value because 
it provides an anthropomorphic context for the animistic narrative of indigenous 
society. Also, when Kimberly aboriginals look into a dark night sky they see the 
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 In cosmology there are rival theories to the standard ―big bang‖ model. A modified ―steady state 
theory,‖ known as the Hoyle-Narlikar theory (Fred Hoyle and Jayant Vishnu Narlikar) is the most 
prominent. See Paul Davies, ―Hoyle-Narlikar Theory of Gravitation,‖ Nature 224 (1970): 270-271. 
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Great Emu that nestles down toward the egg (Earth). Apart from the ontological 
value that indigenous cosmology has, the names attached to different parts of the 
night sky has practical benefits because it enables indigenous people to navigate. 
So for sociological reasons, indigenous cosmology ought to be taught in schools 
because it helps modern humans appreciate the narrative context within which 
ancient societies understood the world around them. 
 
The narrative of the Great Emu, however, or any narrative based on a 
constellation of stars, has very little explanatory power for scientific disciplines 
like astronomy and physics. The view from Earth of a pattern of stars that looks 
something like a Great Bear (Ursa Major) is relative to an Earth-based observer. 
If it were possible to swing the observer around ninety degrees, the observer 
would see the same patch of sky from a different perspective and the Great Bear 
would be gone. Stars that appear to an Earth-based observer to be fixed and on the 
same plane are, from an astronomer‘s point of view, not fixed at all, and certainly 
not on the same plane. The depth separation of stars that make up the Great Bear 
is measured in thousands and sometimes millions of light years, and several of the 
visible ―stars‖ are in fact galaxies.37 
 
The type of appeal to authority in standard models differs from that which 
concerned philosophers of the Modern period. In formal logic the appeal to 
authority (argumentum ad verecundiam) is a fallacy because the appeal is made to 
the authority rather than by the authority, in other words, an appeal without 
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 Visible differentiation between galaxies and stars has only been possible since the invention of 
the telescope. 
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justification or argument. This is not the same as the appeal to the authority of 
standard models in science because the vast explanatory power of the standard 
model approach provides the necessary justification in a pluralist society.  
 
From a pragmatist perspective, the appeal to authority in this context has cash 
value or practical consequences for human conduct apart from the policies and 
protocols for education. The genomic revolution that is unfolding in medicine, for 
instance, is intricately related to knowledge derived from the standard model of 
biology. One of the major benefits will be better targeted pharmaceuticals and 
other forms of therapy.
38
 Similarly, the practical applications that flowed from 
knowledge of the standard model of particle physics are in almost every modern 
piece of machinery, including numerous household items. In the health sector, 
MRI and PET scanners are now routine diagnostic tools, and Neutron Beam 
therapy provides oncologists with an option for treating cancerous tumors other 
than traditional chemical therapies.
39
  
 
Rational discussants
40
 within a discipline use the standard model to make 
decisions on things such as education curriculum, funding for research, drugs to 
be listed on a hospital formulary, and what is and is not published in peer- 
reviewed journals. In a liberal pluralist democracy, a consensus among rational 
discussants within particular practices (science, law, politics, education, etc.) is 
                                                 
38
 See Health Research Institute, Personalized Medicine: The Emerging Pharmacogenomics 
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 David Harris, ―The Benefits of Particle Physics,‖ Editorial, Symmetry 5/6 (2008): 2.  
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 Richard Rorty, ―Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,‖ Proceedings and Addresses of the 
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pragmatically useful because it trades on agreement within a practice that defines 
an internal good. This rational appeal to authority has limits, however, because 
sometimes good practice in one discipline is bad practice in another. 
 
A liberal democracy such as Australia allows people to hold a range of diverse 
views and copes with this diversity when conflicts arise by applying the ―rule of 
law.‖ The rule of law is a concept that describes the basic tenets of dispute 
resolution in the Australian legal system. While the concept of the rule of law has 
been,
41
 and still is,
42
 the subject of extended legal and philosophical debate, it 
remains the primary vehicle for dispute resolution in Australia, via the legislature, 
the judiciary, and a network of other dispute resolution institutions. 
 
The rule of law operates to define general rules and policies, sometimes by 
legislation, sometimes by case law, and other times by international covenant. An 
example of this defining process can be seen in the way democratic countries deal 
with the concept of free speech. Unlike the Constitution of the United States of 
America,
43
 where the First Amendment directly prohibits the Congress from 
passing laws that prohibit free speech, the Australian constitution has no such 
prohibition. However, over the last several decades the Parliaments of Australia 
and the High Court have established an implied Constitutional protection to 
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freedom of speech.
44
 During the same period, both countries passed laws,
45
 and 
become signatories to international covenants,
46
 that directly prohibit free speech 
in specific circumstances. This defining process of the rule of law illustrates the 
type of mediation and compromise that are routine in a modern liberal democracy 
with international links.
47
  
 
For much of the history of medicine the doctor-patient relationship was dominated 
by the physician-knows-best maxim. This maxim is appropriate in most cases 
because patients present themselves to doctors for diagnosis. In some cases, 
however, the physician-knows-best standard has been shown to be incompatible 
with best practice standards of other disciplines, notably law and politics. A well 
known example of this clash of best practice occurred when Jehovah‘s Witness 
people successfully challenged doctors who ignored repeated requests not to be 
given emergency blood transfusions. Clearly, administering a life-saving blood 
transfusion to a patient is good practice within medicine, but Australian courts 
have established that in some circumstances this physician-knows-best standard 
can be grounds for common assault.
48
 A series of legal decisions across the 
Western world, based primarily on applications by Jehovah‘s Witnesses, has 
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established in both statute and common law that patients can refuse blood 
transfusions, even if their decision results in death.
49
 
 
Tangentially, the Jehovah‘s Witness decisions had wider implications, and many 
jurisdictions now use Living Will or Advance Directive protocols that allow 
competent adults to refuse medical intervention for a variety of reasons.
50
 Even in 
jurisdictions where this legal protection has yet to be established, the impact of the 
Jehovah‘s Witness type decisions has changed medical practice. The beneficent 
paternalism of physician-knows-best has been replaced by a more consultative 
process known as the ―reasonable person‖ or ―patient-centred‖ standard of 
consent.
51
  
 
A second example of how practice-guided enquiry intersects with the rule of law 
in a liberal democracy can be seen in the response to the complex issue of 
abortion. The debate over abortion still weighs heavily on the minds of many 
people, but in most Western democracies the application of the rule of law has 
provided a partial resolution to the debate. The partial resolution process in the 
USA and Australia is illustrative of what has happened in most Western 
democracies.
52
 In 1973, the USA Supreme Court (Roe v. Wade) was asked to 
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decide whether State-based laws that prohibited abortion were a violation of the 
implied constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The justices of the Supreme Court decided by a 7-2 
majority that abortion was a fundamental right under the United States 
Constitution and that all past and future laws must adhere to this strict scrutiny.
53
 
 
The political and legal resolution of the abortion debate in Australia is more 
complex because abortion laws are the responsibility of the States and Territories, 
and the Australian Constitution offers few grounds on which this can be 
challenged. Abortion in Australia was originally prohibited by all States and 
Territories, but over the last twenty years all have enacted legislation that allow 
women safe access to the termination of a pregnancy, although there is variation 
among the States over both the timing and the conditions that determine a lawful 
termination. In Western Australia, for instance, the Act Amendment (Abortion) Act 
1998 repealed the prohibition against abortion from the criminal code and 
replaced it with a new section that allows termination of a pregnancy to be 
governed by a new section 334 of the Health Act 1911. This had the effect of 
allowing abortion on demand up to twenty weeks of gestation and restricting 
abortion after twenty weeks to those cases in which either the pregnant woman or 
the fetus has a medical condition that justifies termination to the satisfaction of 
two doctors appointed by the Minister for Health. 
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The type of resolution illustrated in the examples above is not one in which people 
agree by reaching some middle ground because this is clearly not what has 
happened. Opponents on either side of the debate have not given ground on the 
moral issues associated with terminating a pregnancy. A pragmatic political and 
legal resolution does not arbitrate on the moral issues but it does provide a 
substantial end-point to the political and legal stand-off. This end-point is possible 
because the rule of law trades on thin agreement between the disputants that due 
process has been followed. In both Australia and the USA most people who 
disagree with the resolution respect the process from which it has been derived.
54
 
In some jurisdictions people opposed to the decriminalisation of abortion have 
launched further legal appeals or appealed to statutory authorities to rescind or 
override decisions made by the judiciary.
55
 This ongoing defining process is 
consistent with political and legal liberty intrinsic to a modern pluralist society. 
 
Although the end-point provided by the rule of law is substantial, it is by no 
means final and moral theologians and philosophers who have argued against the 
decriminalisation of abortion are unlikely to change their minds on this issue. In 
the year that the Roe v. Wade decision was made, Australian philosopher John 
Finnis wrote a vigorous defence for the moral and legal prohibition of abortion,
56
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and he continues to publish material on related themes.
57
 Philosophers like Finnis 
and Oderberg, mentioned previously, oppose abortion from a thickly nuanced 
understanding of human purpose and they express this opposition by means of 
standard academic procedure – books, articles, conference papers, etc. Finnis and 
Oderberg‘s opposition to abortion is consistent with the type of academic freedom 
that one expects within a liberal pluralist society. 
 
In Western Australia the Act Amendment (Abortion) Act 1998 is a health policy 
(harm-minimisation) compromise because the Parliament removed abortion from 
the criminal code and provided restricted access to abortion under the Health Act. 
This compromise position did nothing to solve the philosophical issues associated 
with abortion because the Act was designed primarily to clear up a legal loophole 
that placed doctors at risk of prosecution even though abortion services had been 
available in Western Australia for many years. Political and legal compromises 
like the above never suit all parties but they are common practice in any modern 
pluralist democracy. Because this issue is controversial the ideological debate will 
continue for many years and it is always possible, in a liberal democracy, that a 
community consensus could develop that might overturn political and legal 
protocols that allow for safe termination.  
 
The rule of law trades on a concept introduced earlier in Chapter 1, Walzer‘s ―thin 
consensus‖ or ―thin moral motivation.‖ A liberal democracy allows people to hold 
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divergent views, even over what for some are life and death issues (abortion, war, 
or poverty). This thin moral consensus is often overlooked because practical 
ethics so often focuses on the issues that divide people. Walzer argues that thin 
moral minimalism provides a powerful bridge, both for people with divergent 
views within a culture and for people separated by culture and language. The next 
section will explore this thinness, particularly as it applies to agreement within the 
confines of particular practices such as law, medicine and education. 
 
3.5 Thick and Thin Moral Evaluation 
 
The lack of agreement in moral philosophy is problematic if, as MacIntyre seems 
to think, it results in a series of rival moral traditions on which no consensus is 
possible. However, this view ignores the consensus over thin universals that many 
theories of ethics share (religious and secular). A thin universal maxim such as, ―It 
is wrong to cause deliberate suffering,‖ has explanatory power because 
consequentialists and non-consequentialists interpret the maxim in roughly similar 
ways. A moral agent who makes decisions based on some form of utilitarian 
calculus and a moral agent who makes decisions based on a categorical imperative 
will concur that the rational thing to do is to avoid causing deliberate suffering 
whenever possible. 
 
This thesis defends a practice-guided approach to moral enquiry primarily because 
MacIntyre‘s thick concept of a practice can be usefully employed in a pluralist 
society without the need for the practice to be necessarily linked to a thick 
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teleological account of the type that he offers (Aristotelian Thomism). The 
primary justification for this distinction is that a thick agreement in a practice, 
such as medicine, has sufficient explanatory power, or practical consequences for 
human conduct, because the practitioners (doctors, surgeons, nurses, etc.) share a 
thin sense of the teleological imperative (health) from which this practice derives 
its internal goods. In other words, the practical internal goods of a discipline like 
medicine are sufficiently clear and have sufficient explanatory power when the 
practitioners share a thin Aristotelian sense of human flourishing. The thick 
Thomistic account of flourishing that MacIntyre advocates is appropriately 
tentative in After Virtue because Aristotelian Thomism is part of his thick (story-
filled) explanation of a narrative that best supports the rational nature of human 
beings.
58
 
 
Walzer suggests that moral thinkers often agree on thin moral universals even 
when they interpret these universals through a thick historical narrative. He refers 
to this type of moral agreement as ―thin moral agreement‖ or ―moral 
minimalism.‖59 Moral minimalism is not foundational because a minimalist 
expression, such as ―slavery is wrong,‖ is grounded in an already thick narrative 
understanding of human life which varies from one tradition to another.
60
 A 
rational justification that explains why slavery is wrong is already a thick moral 
claim, either because slavery is inconsistent with broader religious concerns, or 
because it is inconsistent with the universalisable expression that all humans have 
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rights, or because it is inconsistent with various forms of preference satisfaction, 
or some other moral claim. 
 
Walzer argues that a thin agreement against slavery is predicated on a thick view 
of the moral life, a type of ―moral maximalism.‖61 He argues that a moral term, 
such as justice, is understood first as a thick description from within a particular 
tradition before it becomes a thin concept that is shared by people from different 
traditions. For Walzer, the concept of justice is thick from the beginning because it 
is ―culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special 
occasions, when moral language is turned to specific purposes.‖62 This thick view 
of justice is referred to by Walzer as a form of moral maximalism because it is 
already thick with a narrative history of ―qualification, compromise, complexity 
and disagreement.‖63 For Walzer, this thick view is not a better view of justice, 
simply the first view with which a moral agent is confronted. The thin view of 
justice is a second order concept, but it is more crucial for Walzer because it is as 
close as one can get to a moral universal. 
 
For Walzer, a thin or minimalist view of morality acknowledges that a common 
thread exists between different thick traditions. There are ―rules of engagement‖ 
for a thick principle like justice because ―minimalism leaves room for thickness 
elsewhere; indeed, it presupposes thickness elsewhere.‖64 Thus, in a pragmatist 
sense, a thin moral universal has greater cash value because it transcends the 
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limitations of thick traditions so that people can agree on the practical application 
of a principle even if they disagree over its justification. The example he uses to 
show the difference between thick and thin moral argument is the 1989 Velvet 
Revolution in Prague where news coverage showed people carrying signs which 
simply said ―truth‖ or ―justice.‖ 
 
Walzer claims that a serious thinker who watched this revolution unfold via news 
coverage, as he did, would share a thin perception of what the marchers were 
appealing to with their signs.
65
 For Walzer, the Prague marchers were entirely 
unfamiliar to him and he could neither speak their language nor know what they 
had experienced. Yet he could conceivably stand in solidarity with them, and had 
he been there, he too would carry the same signs. The reason this is the case, 
according to Walzer, is that the march had nothing to do with epistemology. The 
marchers were not defending a correspondence or coherence theory of truth, and 
they were not marching in defence of one ethical theory rather than another.
66
 
Walzer claims that they were marching for mainly pragmatic reasons; they did not 
want to be lied to and they wanted their political leaders to end arbitrary arrests 
and to abolish the privileges of the few.
67
 
 
This thin, common or ―garden variety‖ sense of justice was immediately 
recognisable to Walzer because his own tradition (Jewish-American) is thick with 
a concept of justice that resonates with ideals similar to those expressed in 
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Prague.
68
 From a pragmatic perspective, consensus is broadly possible on a 
concept like justice because thin recognition is all that is necessary to unite people 
from diverse moral traditions. The history of social activism contains numerous 
examples of the type of thin application of moral thickness to which Walzer 
refers. For instance, many moral agents would reject the theological argument that 
Martin Luther King Jr. used to justify nonviolent direct action during the 1960s 
civil rights movement. King‘s justification for civil protest in the ―I have a dream‖ 
speech was consistent with his theological stance and was gleaned primarily from 
Thomas Jefferson‘s defence in the Declaration of Independence (1776).69 
 
King follows Jefferson in declaring that it is a self-evident truth that ―all men are 
created equal‖ and therefore all people, the ―negro‖ included, have unalienable 
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The epistemic problem here is 
that nothing in this justificatory claim is as self-evident as King or Jefferson 
presumed, neither God the creator, nor human equality, nor even the unalienable 
rights that continue to provide justification for practical ethics and civil policy in 
the USA. The Christian tradition that undergirds both the Declaration of 
Independence and King‘s own theology is thick with a narrative account of what it 
means to be human. Many who took part in the civil rights movement were not 
Christians and they supported the appeal for justice during the Washington 
campaign for different epistemic reasons.  
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A contemporary Australian example of a thin moral consensus derived from 
diversely thick traditions was the Australia-wide rally against the second Gulf 
War, a month before conflict began in March 2003. At the Perth rally, 
approximately twenty thousand people gathered in the city square to voice 
disapproval at the decision of the Australian government to become involved in 
the conflict. The people who attended the rally came from diverse philosophical, 
religious, and political traditions, but they shared a thin solidarity that something 
was wrong with the political justification for war being offered by the federal 
government. This ―garden variety‖70 sense of wrongness, to use Walzer‘s term, is 
all that is necessary for serious thinkers to stand together in a demonstration for a 
common purpose. No participant in protests such as those outlined above is ever 
asked to justify claims over thin moral universals because solidarity has already 
been achieved and debate over epistemic issues would serve no useful purpose. 
 
Examples like this show that a moral concept like justice has both a maximal 
moral value that is thickly contingent on a set of shared assumptions and a 
minimal moral value that is thin enough to be a shared universal principle. This 
thin concept of universalisation provides the boundary conditions within which 
ethical discussion takes place in a pluralist society because it promotes the idea 
that there is something to be discussed about ethics that goes beyond both self- 
interest and the interests of a particular moral tradition. The next section will 
argue that the attempt to slide from thin universals to thick application is the 
mistake most often made in practical ethics. Practical ethicists often begin by 
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advocating a thin universal principle but they then slide too easily into a thick 
application of the principle without acknowledgement that this application is 
tradition-dependent.
71
 It is at this stage that consensus breaks down, at least in a 
pluralist society, because there is no shared method for evaluating the application 
of principles; ethics at this thick end of decision making is already dependent on 
specific philosophical, religious, or cultural assumptions. 
 
3.6 Practical Ethics: The Limitations  
 
Practical ethicists often overstate what rational enquiry can achieve when they 
apply thin moral universals to thick particulars. John Harris exemplifies this over-
confidence when he declares that the interest of a rational agent in medical ethics 
is to resolve problems and not simply to understand them.  
Just as the proper business of medicine is not merely to 
understand the nature and causes of illness but to try and 
prevent or cure it, so the proper business of medical ethics 
is not merely to understand the nature of the moral 
problems raised by medical practice but to try and resolve 
them.
72
 
Harris defends his optimistic comparison between medical practice and medical 
ethics by arguing that skepticism about his view is not justified: 
all people who think that it is possible either to do wrong, 
or for that matter to do what‘s right, depend upon and use 
moral argument. This reveals a very important fact about 
the nature of morality and hence about the nature of ethics. 
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It is simply that if something is right or wrong, morally 
right or wrong, there must be some reason why this is so. 
And reasons can always be scrutinised for their 
adequacy.
73
 
While one can appreciate Harris‘s concern that the proper business of medicine 
involves the prevention and cure of disease, his further claim that the proper 
business of medical ethics is to resolve moral dilemmas is not straightforward. 
There are strong reasons to be skeptical of the comparison between medical 
practice and medical ethics. Medical practice is based on a thick agreement that 
has been forged within the discipline. This is what is meant whenever the term 
―practice‖ is used, such as in general practice, or orthopedic practice, or nursing 
practice, because the concept of a practice in medicine involves a thick historical 
consensus over what a doctor or nurse ought to do. A practitioner who habituates 
the internal goods of the discipline, in an Aristotelian sense, replicates the 
standards of excellence that have been forged within the discipline over 
generations. 
 
The level of agreement that one finds in medical practice is missing in medical 
ethics, however, and Harris slides too easily from the thin consensus on health to 
the application of moral principles. When Harris claims that ―reasons can always 
be scrutinised for their adequacy‖ he assumes that there is some standard test to 
show why one argument is more adequate than another. Clearly a poorly 
constructed argument is inadequate, but this is not usually the cause of a moral 
stand-off in complex moral debates. For complex moral debates, the main 
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problem is not the adequacy of the various arguments but the inability to reach 
agreement on why one valid argument trumps another. This is the point referred to 
earlier when MacIntyre claims ―there are no moral scales‖ that can be used to 
evaluate why one reasonable argument trumps another.
74
 
 
It is the epistemic differences that lead to a moral impasse in the first place. Thus 
the comparison between solving a medical problem and solving a moral problem 
is forced. Health practitioners share a thin teleological awareness about the goal of 
medical practice (health), but they also share a thickly articulated understanding 
about how that goal ought to be achieved (internal goods). Aristotle makes this 
point when he says that for ―a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist … the good and 
the ‗well‘ is thought to reside in the function.‖75 So excellence in flute-playing can 
be compared with excellence in medicine because both flute-playing and medicine 
share a thin sense of purpose and a thickly articulated understanding of the 
activities or habits of action (internal goods) that are directed toward that purpose. 
A similar consensus between thin universals and thick practices is not possible in 
practical ethics because when moral agents agree on a thin moral maxim, such as 
―It is wrong to kill an innocent person,‖ they often disagree over whether that 
moral maxim applies in particular cases (e.g., abortion, war, euthanasia). Moral 
solutions cannot be drawn from a thin consensus on health because moral 
philosophers come from diversely thick traditions. Thus a moral dilemma exists at 
the thick end of medical practice because no agreement is possible given the 
diverse traditions to which philosophers and theologians belong.  
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Aaron Ridley also glosses over the epistemic differences between rival moral 
arguments when he says that the motivation for practical ethics should be to avoid 
bloodshed, resist relativism, and sidestep religion. He argues that this approach 
avoids the ―deadlock and futility characteristic of religious disagreement‖ because 
philosophical argument attempts to discover ethical principles that can be used by 
anyone, and he wants to avoid the emotional and angry stand-off common to 
ethical debate.
76
 
 
The problem for Ridley is that while reasonableness in discussion and charity in 
listening is commendable, this does not imply that rationality qua rationality can 
do all that Ridley thinks it can. He initially claims that problems in ethics offer no 
final solutions and that his approach only provides a strategy for clarification and 
discussion.
77
 He further claims that any philosophy that pretends to clear up all 
problems is guilty of oversimplification and misrepresentation, and on this he is 
surely right.
78
 However, while he begins with a fairly standard appeal to thin 
universal principles, his explanation for how these principles ought to be applied 
is immediately thick with philosophical presuppositions that are themselves 
disputed. 
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Ridley‘s chapter on abortion, for example, is typical of the type of slide referred to 
earlier that begins with a thin consensus over a universal principle but then applies 
the principle without acknowledging that consensus in a pluralist society may not 
extend this far. For instance, Ridley states that both defenders and opponents of 
abortion have powerful arguments but that the consequentialist or utilitarian 
character of the legislative framework supports decriminalisation.
79
 Ridley is right 
that the consequentialist or utilitarian character of the legislative framework 
supports decriminalisation because, as previously noted, there is a clear trend in 
liberal democracies toward this outcome. However, Ridley is wrong to assume 
that utilitarian justification avoids the ―deadlock and futility‖ that he claims is 
characteristic of religious disagreement because the lack of consensus in moral 
philosophy is well documented. 
 
Ridley‘s attempt to justify the moral efficacy of utilitarian decision making also 
seems forced. He argues that because actions such as lying and adultery are 
―surely morally wrong‖ but not illegal, we can extend this idea to the abortion 
debate because making abortion illegal would not make it go away.
80
 Ridley 
misrepresents utilitarian thinking here, however, because a utilitarian ethicist 
would dispute the claim that adultery and lying are ―surely morally wrong.‖ For 
utilitarian thinkers, no actions are intrinsically wrong because, as Singer states, 
―the utilitarian will judge lying bad in some circumstances and good in others, 
depending on its consequences.‖81 The strength of utilitarian calculus is that it 
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purports to rely on demonstrable facts, but this is also its greatest weakness 
because moral facts are elusive. In a pluralist society, rational agents will often 
disagree on how one ought to determine utilitarian efficacy in complex cases.
82
 
 
Ridley is right that harm minimisation policies are routinely used in Australia‘s 
legislative and healthcare networks, but this does not diminish the problematic 
account that he offers for how they work. Some harm minimisation policies are 
straightforward and do not provoke much discussion either because the factual 
basis of the policy is not in dispute or because the policy is not disruptive. In the 
case of car seatbelts it is straightforward to show how harm is minimised by 
seatbelt legislation. Countries in which seatbelt laws are enforced have lower 
mortality and morbidity rates among car users. The ―harm‖ done by compelling 
people to wear seatbelts is not significant, particularly as the legislation allows 
exemptions on health grounds. A greater total benefit is gained by a statute that 
requires people to wear a seatbelt when driving. 
 
Other harm minimisation policies, however, are not so straightforward. For 
instance, a motorcycle helmet policy does save lives but for several reasons it is 
more difficult to show that it reduces the overall amount of human suffering. First, 
wearing a motorcycle helmet is a more significant inconvenience than wearing a 
seatbelt. Second, the helmet policy may actually increase rather than decrease the 
total amount of human suffering because more people will survive motorcycle 
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accidents but with permanent injuries. Because only living people can suffer, the 
combined suffering of bikers who don‘t like wearing helmets and injured 
survivors who would previously have been killed could, at least theoretically, 
outweigh the suffering of those injured when helmets were not compulsory. Were 
this shown to be the case, a harm minimisation policy should conceivably reverse 
the helmet policy.  
 
While most liberal democracies instituted helmet wearing legislation, supported 
by medical research,
83
 the US Congress repealed State-based laws that required 
motorcyclists to wear a helmet on the grounds that the laws impinged a biker‘s 
constitutional rights.
84
 At least in the mind of legislators of the Congress, the 
constitutional right to freedom of interference outweighs the State concern for 
harm minimisation strategy. The problem in this case is that the concept of harm 
minimisation is already a thickly laden term because the National Coalition of 
Motorcyclists (NCOM) in the USA was able to convince the legislature that their 
civil rights or ―biker‘s rights‖ were being violated. This example shows that the 
type of harm minimisation strategies that Ridley advocates are not straightforward 
because what might be considered legitimate harm minimisation for one group of 
people is illegitimate for another.   
 
This is the case when Ridley argues for harm minimisation in relation to abortion. 
Whether his conclusion should be accepted or not depends on a set of 
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presuppositions about the abortion issue that are not of themselves self-evident. 
Ridley makes two claims to demonstrate why prohibition leads to a greater 
amount of human suffering: first, a ban on abortion would not lead to a reduction 
in the number of fetuses killed; and second, the ban would increase the sum total 
of human misery.
85
 Neither of these two claims is as straightforward as Ridley 
claims. The claim that a ban on abortion would not lead to a reduction in the 
number of fetuses killed is misleading. While it is true that prohibition would lead 
to more women dying while trying to procure the so-called ―backyard‖ option, 
there does not seem to be any evidence to suggest that the number of fetuses killed 
would remain the same under prohibition conditions.  
 
The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) estimates that 
abortion-related deaths have declined dramatically among the approximately 
70,000 terminations that occur annually in Australia since prohibitions against 
termination were removed in 1971.
86
 Ridley‘s claim that prohibition does not 
reduce the number of fetuses killed seems counterintuitive and nothing in the 
literature suggests anywhere near 70,000 terminations occurred in Australia at any 
time during the prohibition years, primarily because abortion was unsafe and 
therefore a decision of last resort. Women‘s Health Victoria estimates that 
termination of a pregnancy is now the second most common surgical procedure 
experienced by women in Australia.
87
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Ridley‘s second claim, that a ban on abortion would increase the sum total of 
human misery, depends on how one calculates human misery. While it is clear 
that unsafe or backyard abortions causes harm to women, it is not possible to 
calculate the total amount of human misery on utilitarian grounds. How much 
harm consideration, if any, ought to be allocated to fetuses, or to people opposed 
to abortion? Utilitarian calculus straightforwardly advocates that a large number 
of minor harms can trump a smaller number of major harms, but there is no 
agreed-upon formula for how a moral agent does this calculus in complex 
situations.  
 
Singer, a philosopher who advocates using utilitarian calculus for many issues in 
ethics, argues that harm minimisation arguments for abortion are inadequate 
because this type of justification fails to deal with the primary concern of 
opponents to abortion, namely, that termination of a pregnancy involves killing an 
innocent human being. He points out that because opponents of abortion claim 
that a fetus counts as a moral agent, they can and do argue that the weight of harm 
is against termination.
88
 Singer thinks that the moral justification for abortion has 
little to do with harm minimisation because a fetus is not an innocent human 
being.
89
 Once a fetus develops the capacity to feel pain, however, harm 
minimisation might actually restrict the technical aspects of a termination if the 
process causes pain to the fetus.
90
 In short, the type of consequentialism that 
Ridley advocates does not avoid ―deadlock and futility‖ because it relies on a 
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 Singer, Practical Ethics, 143-144. 
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 Singer, Practical Ethics, 149-152. 
90
 Singer, Practical Ethics, 152. 
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consensus over facts that are not self-evident. On the basis of harm minimisation 
alone, proponents and opponents of termination weigh the facts of harm in a way 
that is consistent with a position they already hold. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Two issues predicated the emergence and rapid growth of practical ethics over the 
last several decades. The first was the conceptual incommensurability of rival 
moral theories highlighted in Chapter 2, and the second was the level of anxiety 
over modern technical developments highlighted in this present chapter. Early on 
the focus on decision making rather than ethical theory seemed attractive, and 
early bioethics texts proved to be influential. However, the focus on decision 
making in practical ethics was short-lived because the various protocols slide too 
easily between thin principles or rules for which there is a consensus and the thick 
application of those rules to particular situations where consensus is not possible. 
 
In 1994, Edwin R. DuBose, Ronald Hamel and Laurence J. O‘Connell edited a 
series of essays entitled A Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics, in 
which the contributors are described as a second generation of bioethicists.
91
 Their 
assessment of the present state of bioethics exemplifies the shift away from 
principles and rules toward a more creative and complex approach to bioethics. 
They argue that the discipline of bioethics needed major rethinking because the 
principlism that had come to dominate the clinical scene had failed to produce a 
                                                 
91
 DuBose et al., eds., A Matter of Principles. 
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method of decision making that was any more capable of solving moral dilemmas 
than the theory-centred approaches it sought to supplant. Albert Jonsen, who 
wrote the foreword, called for a second-generation alternative approach to 
bioethics that recovers traditional forms of analysis such as ―phenomenology, 
hermeneutics, narrative ethics, casuistry, and virtue ethics.‖ 92 
 
In Australia, the two most influential decision making models used in practical 
ethics are the four-principle approach advocated by Beauchamp and Childress and 
the preference-utilitarian approach advocated by Singer. Both models begin by 
arguing for thin foundational or universal principles and then construct a rational 
decision making protocol by applying the principles to particular cases. It is this 
transition between thin universals and thick particulars that has proved 
problematic. The next two chapters will reconstruct and evaluate these two 
decision making protocols in order to show that appeal to common morality 
principles is justified on a more limited basis than its adherents advocate. The 
evaluation will show that application of principles in decision making does not 
provide an impartial prescriptive solution to moral dilemmas. Rather, the 
application of principles will be shown to be useful but not definitive for moral 
enquiry. 
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 Albert R. Jonsen, ―Foreword‖ in DuBose et al., A Matter of Principles, xvii.  
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Chapter 4: Principle-Guided Enquiry 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Now in its sixth edition, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress‘ text, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (PBE),
1
 is known colloquially as the bible of biomedical ethics, 
but the principle-guided method has also been used extensively for several other 
forms of practical ethics.
2
 The Beauchamp and Childress account of practical 
ethics appeals to four prima facie principles: autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, and justice. They argue that the four-principles can be used by 
people with little training in moral philosophy, using what they refer to as a 
―common morality‖ approach to ethical decision making.3  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis stated that the Beauchamp and Childress model of 
practical ethics is useful because the four-principles (autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, justice) are thin enough to provide moral agents with a common set 
of terms. However, the principles on their own are not definitive for complex 
cases in ethics because moral agents apply the principles according to their own 
thick narrative account of the moral life. This chapter will introduce the 
Beauchamp and Childress‘ four-principle model for biomedical ethics and assess 
the main criticisms associated with this approach.  
                                                 
1
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009). 
2
 See for example Tom L. Beauchamp, Denis G. Arnold, and Norman E. Bowie, Ethical Theory 
and Business, eighth edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
3
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994), 44. 
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4.2 Common Morality Theory and Reflective Equilibrium 
 
The strength of Beauchamp and Childress‘ four-principle approach to practical 
ethics is that it is constructed around a relatively simply model of decision 
making, but this simplicity is also its greatest weakness. Over the six editions the 
authors have engaged with their critics and provided with each new edition a more 
rigorous defence for using principles in ethics. At the heart of their model is a 
theory of common morality that has evolved over the six editions. This common 
morality theory involves an acceptance of rules and standards together with an 
understanding of how these rules and standards enable a moral agent to utilise the 
four-principles of biomedical ethics. In the most recent edition of PBE 
Beauchamp and Childress continue to defend a set of norms that they argue are 
―shared by all persons committed to morality‖ and are ―applicable to all persons in 
all places.‖4 Their list of norms is not fixed but it illustrates the type of ―standards 
of action‖ that they think a common morality theory ought to employ.5 
  
1) Do not kill     2)   Do not cause pain or suffering to others  
3) Prevent evil or harm   4)   Rescue persons in danger  
5) Tell the truth   6)   Nurture the young and dependent  
7) Keep your promises   8)   Do not steal  
9) Do not punish the innocent  10) Obey the law 
 
It seems reasonable to presume, as Beauchamp and Childress have done, that the 
above list represents the type of thin moral maxims that most theories of ethics 
appeal to when describing the concept of universals or norms in moral enquiry. 
                                                 
4
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 3.  
5
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 3.  
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However, there are limitations to the concepts of universals in the PBE model of 
decision making: first, they link the concept of common morality to a coherence 
version of justification in a way that is itself problematic; and second, the 
application of the four-principles is not derived directly from the universal 
norms.
6
  
 
The second feature of the common morality theory is a series of standards that are 
employed alongside the rules of obligation.
7
 
 
1) nonmalevolence   2)  honesty 
3) integrity    4)  conscientiousness 
5) trustworthiness   6)  fidelity 
7) gratitude    8)  truthfulness 
9) lovingness    10) kindness 
 
Once again, there is not much that is problematic about the list itself. However, 
the list of standards is usually associated with virtue ethics, a non-prescriptive 
form of moral deliberation. In the Aristotelian sense, moral virtues are states of 
character or habits of action that describe the mean behaviour between excess and 
deficiency. In the PBE model, the virtues are action guides, so a moral agent is 
virtuous by doing honest things rather than by being honest in the Aristotelian 
sense. Beauchamp and Childress justify this alternate version of the virtues by 
appropriating a common criticism of virtue ethics, namely, that virtue ethics 
                                                 
6
 These two problems will be address later in this chapter. 
7
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 3.  
 118 
―provides little, if any, guidance for actions,‖ and the concept of the virtues as 
action guides overcomes this inadequacy.
8
 
The third feature of Beauchamp and Childress‘ common morality theory involves 
a cluster of four prima facie principles – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
justice – and two subsidiary rules – confidentiality and veracity.9 The principles 
are used in the Beauchamp and Childress model as placeholders for the actions 
that a moral agent ought to take in order to satisfy the universal norms and 
standards listed previously. This is done by juggling the four-principles according 
to the specifics of a given case. The theory that Beauchamp and Childress now 
refer to as common morality (editions 4-6) was originally referred to as a 
composite theory (editions 1-3) because it appealed to several prima facie moral 
principles that combine deontological, teleological, and, to a lesser extent, virtue-
based criteria. Beauchamp and Childress originally stated that they defend a 
composite theory, in opposition to the monistic absolutism of act utilitarianism, 
Kantianism and Libertarianism, for the following reason: 
The composite theory permits each basic principle to have 
weight without assigning a priority weighting or ranking. 
Which principle overrides in a case of conflict will depend 
on the particular context, which always has unique 
features.
10
  
                                                 
8
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 45. Virtue theorists are little 
troubled by the criticism that virtues lack direct application because the point of moral virtue is 
that it focuses attention on being moral rather than doing moral things. 
9
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 16-17. 
10
 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, third edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 51. 
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The switch to using ―common morality‖ rather than ―composite theory‖ in the 
fourth edition was to strengthen the link between the theoretical understanding of 
ethics and the practical application of the four-principles:  
A common morality theory takes its basic premises 
directly from the morality shared in common by the 
members of society—that is, unphilosophical common 
sense and tradition.
11
 
Beauchamp and Childress also argued in the fourth edition that principles provide 
a universal or common morality starting point that can be extended to a consensus 
in particular cases via a process they refer to as reflective equilibrium (first 
advocated by John Rawls), a type of coherence theory of justification.
12
 Following 
Rawls, the concept of reflective equilibrium is used by Beauchamp and Childress 
as a method of justification for the pruning and adjustments that are made to 
moral judgments so that ―they are rendered coherent with the premises of 
theory.‖13 From the fifth edition Beauchamp and Childress make this link more 
explicit: 
Our method … is to unite principle-based, common 
morality ethics with the coherence model of 
justification… This strategy allows us to rely on the 
authority of the indispensable principles in the common 
morality theory, while incorporating tools to refine and 
correct its weaknesses and unclarities and to allow for 
additional specification.
14
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994), 100. 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994), 100ff. See also Tom 
Beauchamp, ―Methods and Principles in Biomedical Ethics,‖ Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (2003): 
269-274; and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 20ff. 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994), 21. 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994), 101; See also Beauchamp 
and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 396.  
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The application of the four-principles (autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
justice) is based on a presupposition that they have prima facie validity. A prima 
facie moral principle takes its place within a network of basic principles rather 
than as a single moral absolute that can never be broached. Any one of the 
principles can be overridden by another by juggling the principles according to the 
circumstances of a given case. Beauchamp and Childress defend this juggling 
process as follows: 
Prima facie duty indicates that duties of certain kinds are 
on all occasions binding unless they are in conflict with 
equal or stronger duties. An agent‘s actual duty in the 
situation is determined by an examination of the weight of 
all the competing prima facie duties.
15
 
Each principle has face-value validity but in an actual situation any one of them 
may take precedence over the others. Beauchamp and Childress are incorporating 
the concept of prima facie principles first advocated by W. D. Ross (1930). Ross 
advocates using a set of prima facie principles for decision making in order to 
avoid the problems associated with both the absoluteness of moral duty promoted 
by Kant and the lack of action-guiding principles in Bentham‘s utilitarian 
calculus.
16
 The main difference between Ross‘ use of prima facie principles and 
that of Beauchamp and Childress is that Ross viewed the principles as a means to 
a more important end, the promotion of general welfare.
17
 Ross was first and 
foremost a translator and interpreter of Aristotle, and he uses the principles as 
tools to promote a higher teleological purpose, the formation of a morally good 
                                                 
15
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1989), 52. 
16
 William David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 1-20. 
17
 Ross, The Right and the Good, 47. 
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person, whereas Beauchamp and Childress use the principles as problem solving 
tools.
18
 Beauchamp and Childress‘ justification for using the four-principles in 
practical ethics is relatively straightforward. In every edition of their text a chapter 
is devoted to each of the four-principles, and each chapter involves an historical 
account of why each principle is an important but not absolute principle of moral 
evaluation. 
 
Respect for the principle of autonomy in the PBE model seems self-evidently to 
be an important moral consideration.
19
 Respect for individuals as autonomous 
agents is integral to Kant‘s second formulation of the categorical imperative 
referred to as the Kingdom of Ends: ―Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply 
as a means, but at the same time as an end.‖20 Similarly, from the consequentialist 
perspective, Singer illustrates the importance of the principle of respect for 
persons when he says, ―Utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to J. J. C. Smart, take 
it as axiomatic that in deciding moral issues ‗each [person] counts for one and 
none for more than one‘.‖21 This is even more crucial in Singer‘s version of 
utilitarian calculus because he advocates counting individual preferences or 
interests, not simply units of pleasure.
22
 Clearly the appeal to autonomy, 
particularly in health care, is not a moral absolute, and therefore the prima facie 
status of autonomy in the PBE model is appropriate.
23
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 Singer, Practical Ethics, 11. 
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 Chapter 5 of this thesis will offer a critique of Singer‘s version of preference utilitarianism. 
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 See ―The Problem of Autonomy‖ in Kenneth Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy (New 
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The PBE model of decision making also places the principle of nonmaleficence 
(primum non nocere – ―above all do no harm‖) in the appropriate historical setting 
of health care.
24
 This principle, which forms the basis of the Hippocratic tradition 
in medicine, is the default position in medical practice. Obviously, the principle of 
nonmaleficence is not meant to be taken as an absolute because in some cases 
harm (surgery) is done for a greater health benefit (removal of a tumour). It seems 
reasonable to assume, therefore, as Beauchamp and Childress do, that health 
practitioners should always avoid doing harm to patients if possible. There are 
some circumstances, however, such as physician-assisted euthanasia, or the 
treatment of patients in a persistent vegetative state, where the principle of 
nonmaleficence is in dispute.
25
  
 
The principle of beneficence in the PBE model serves as a positive obligation to 
do good rather than simply to avoid harm.
26
 Once again, there is little to object to 
here if beneficence is understood as a thin moral principle. The concept of social 
welfare pivots on the idea that public beneficence is an obligation of a State 
toward poorer members of a community. State sanctioned beneficence, however, 
has sometimes been used to justify unwarranted paternalism, and Beauchamp and 
Childress acknowledge this as part of the prima facie status of the principle of 
beneficence.
27
 Tragically, as the Australian ―stolen children‖28 saga shows, A. O. 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 149-196. 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 206-207. 
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Neville, the so-called ―Chief Protector of Aborigines,‖ presumably elevated 
beneficence over nonmaleficence because of the prevailing orthodoxy that 
removing Aboriginal children from their parents was done ―for their own good.‖29 
The fourth principle in the PBE decision making toolkit is justice. Here too 
Beauchamp and Childress provide a reasonable introduction to show the non-
specialist how the principle of justice is an important but not absolute moral 
obligation. The concept of justice resonates with rational moral agents because 
most theories of ethics attempt to universalise moral maxims or rules. Justice is 
closely linked to the principle of fairness or desert, and Beauchamp and Childress 
provide the appropriate historical setting for different types of justice and an 
explanation of how this prima facie principle is incorporated into various theories 
of ethics (utilitarian, libertarian, communitarian, and egalitarian).
30
 The strength of 
the PBE model is that it provides general standards and rules for its target 
audience, health professionals. People working in the health sector rarely have 
extensive knowledge of the theoretical background to practical ethics, even 
though they may be engaged in decisions that require ethical analysis on a regular 
basis. In a pluralist society, the general introduction to ethics that Beauchamp and 
Childress provide is useful at a thin level of moral evaluation because people in 
the health sector come from diverse religious and cultural traditions, and the PBE 
model provides this diverse group with a thin common language.  
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 245-247. 
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4.3 Common Morality and Institutional Ethics Committees 
 
The PBE model is also useful for the numerous institutional ethics committees 
that are now standard in both government and private sector institutions in 
Australia.
31
 It seems appropriate in a pluralist society that research involving 
humans or sentient animals ought to be constrained by ethical protocols, and the 
PBE method can be usefully employed for this purpose. Australia has a highly 
developed set of protocols that provide a necessary cross-check for treatment and 
research involving humans and animals. There are also several acts of parliament 
that provide guidelines, limitations, and, when necessary, punitive protocols for 
medical practice and research.
32
 The primary statutory body responsible for 
administering research protocols in Australia is the National Health and Medical 
Research Council (NHMRC). Since the establishment of the NHMRC in 1937, 
numerous protocols have been developed that protect both researchers and 
subjects (human or animal). The stated aim of the NHMRC is: 
developing health advice for the Australian community, 
health professionals and governments; and for providing 
advice on ethical behaviour in health care and in the 
conduct of health and medical research.
33
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Institutional ethics committees (IECs) play a key role in the NHMRC research 
policy. An IEC often includes people with professional expertise other than in 
health (e.g., legal, religious, philosophical) and also a range of non-specialists 
(patients, indigenous representatives, etc.). The strength of the PBE model is that 
it provides this diverse group of people with a common set of principles and rules 
that are relatively straightforward to understand. 
In Western Australia, for instance, the IEC that administers the Human 
Reproductive Technology Act (1991) is the Reproductive Technology Council 
(RTC). The RTC consists of the following: a Chair, a nominee of the Royal 
Australian and New Zealand College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, several 
clinicians involved in obstetrics and gynaecology (but not IVF), one legal 
nominee for the Law Society, one nominee from the Health Consumer‘s Council, 
and several nominees of the Minister for Health that include a philosopher or 
ethicist, a religious representative, and some health researchers. In such a diverse 
group the PBE model is useful because it enables people to appreciate their 
differences and to articulate their concerns via a common set of terms.  
 
For instance, the current religious appointee to the RTC is a Catholic priest and 
theologian. His objection to stem cell harvesting from embryos is based on the 
sanctity of life principle, derived in Catholic moral philosophy from the doctrine 
of creation and the philosophical tradition of natural law.
34
 This view stands in 
contrast to the common scientific view that embryos are not persons and therefore 
                                                 
34
 Personal communication, 15 February 2007. The writer of this thesis was also a nominee of the 
Minister for Health (bioethics) to the RTC for several years.  
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the usual constraints of the Human Tissue Act do not apply.
35
 In the language of 
the PBE model, the Catholic theologian can explain why he thinks the principle of 
nonmaleficence ought to be primary, because harvesting stem cells from a viable 
embryo does harm to the embryo. Alternatively, the scientist can argue that the 
principle of beneficence ought to be primary. The process of harvesting stem cells 
does destroy embryos, but embryos are not persons and major health benefits may 
well flow from stem cell research.  
 
This ideological impasse between the theologian (nonmaleficence) and the 
scientist (beneficence) illustrates MacIntyre‘s claim, referred to earlier, that there 
are no moral scales for weighing the relative merits of moral principles in relation 
to complex cases.
36
 In the RTC case above, the theologian‘s concern for the 
protection of embryos (nonmaleficence) is set against the scientist‘s concern for 
medical benefits (beneficence), but there is no objective system of measurement 
to show how or why one principle trumps another. Clearly MacIntyre is right 
about the impasse but he seems to overstate the problems that flow from this lack 
of agreement. The thick moral disagreement among members of the RTC over the 
moral status of the embryo does not negate the role of the RTC to administer the 
Human Reproductive Technology Act (1991). Members of the RTC are in 
agreement that the activities of IVF clinics and other research institutions that 
utilise embryos ought to be constrained by the thin consensus on reproductive 
issues contained in the Act. The Act was derived from a process of consultation 
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 A similar view is expressed by legal representatives but for different reasons. The WA Human 
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that was consistent with the rule of law in a pluralist society. Hence, thin 
agreement about process transcends thick disagreement over specific moral issues. 
 
If, as a pragmatist like Williams argues, a liberal society involves a complex mix 
of moral traditions, the impasse over stem cell harvesting in the RTC case is 
precisely what one ought to expect. In Williams‘ words, 
We use a variety of different ethical considerations, which 
are genuinely different from one another, and this is what 
one would expect to find, if only because we are heirs to a 
long and complex ethical tradition, with many different 
religious and other social strands.
37
 
In the context of an ethics committee such as the RTC the conversation over stem 
cell harvesting is not primarily concerned with the resolution of the moral issues 
involved. The broader conversation over stem cell harvesting arose in Australia 
because scientists requested access to the thousands of spare embryos left over 
from IVF procedures. The birth of the first IVF baby in 1978 initially provoked a 
wave of protest, directed primarily at Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe, the two 
primary collaborators in the IVF process. In the early years, one of the main 
critics of Edwards and Steptoe‘s method was Robert Winston, one of Britain‘s 
most high-profile reproductive specialists.
38
 However, as each new IVF birth 
diminished the anxiety over the projected birth defects, Winston became a vocal 
champion of IVF.
39
 Now, after thirty years of research on children born via the 
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IVF process, various studies have shown that IVF children exhibit only a slightly 
higher percentage of the range of abnormalities that naturally conceived children 
are born with.
40
 By 2008 approximately 3.5 million babies had been born using 
IVF techniques, and most Australian states now have several IVF clinics that 
operate free of the initial angst that Edwards and Steptoe experienced.  
Later developments, such as the ability to freeze embryos, a technique for 
injecting sperm directly into the ovum, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
were seen as positive by IVF clinicians and their clients. Embryo freezing meant 
that the process of superovulation, which carries an inherent health risk, could be 
reduced because embryos not used in the first IVF treatment cycle could be stored 
for later use; sperm injection increased the number of embryos available for 
implantation; and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis allowed clinicians to select 
embryos free of some of the major genetic abnormalities. Once the anxiety over 
birth defects diminished, the clinical and social benefits of IVF seemed self-
evident to people working in IVF and their clients. This success does not imply 
that the IVF process is free from ethical concerns or free from controversy, so the 
IVF process in Australia remains strictly regulated. Much of the public anxiety 
over IVF has diminished, however, because the technique has proved to be 
relatively safe.  
 
For people opposed to IVF, the fact that this technique has turned out to be 
relatively safe for woman and babies born via IVF has not diminished their 
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concerns about some aspects of this form of reproduction. Recent developments 
such as embryo freezing, sperm injection, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
has heightened concern because these new techniques encourage clinicians to 
produce embryos that are surplus to the immediate reproductive purpose. From 
this perspective, the fact that there are now thousands of frozen embryos in 
Australia available for stem cell harvesting remains a secondary problem. The 
primary moral problem, if one grants a high moral status to the embryo, is any 
activity that causes harm to an embryo.  
 
When moral principles are used as tools in moral debate, the Beauchamp and 
Childress approach seems valid even if all they do is to aid conversation. Much of 
the criticism directed at the PBE model concerns the transition between thin 
agreement over principles and rules and the thick application of these principles 
and rules to particular issues through the process of reflective equilibrium. 
Beauchamp and Childress slide too easily from common morality agreement over 
thin moral rules to the application of these principles and rules to thick moral 
dilemmas. The following section will highlight some of the problems associated 
with the process of reflective equilibrium. 
 
4.4 Thin Principles and Thick Problems 
 
The popularity of the PBE model, particularly in the USA, led to a generation of 
health professionals being taught how to apply principle-guided decision making 
to specific cases. After a generation of its application, however, the role of 
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principle-guided ethics in medicine is being challenged. In spite of its popularity, 
there are strong objections to both the common morality theory and the principle-
guided method of decision making that Beauchamp and Childress advocate. In the 
1994 collection of studies entitled A Matter of Principles: Ferment in U.S. 
Bioethics, all but one was critical of this type of common morality theory.
41
 In the 
introduction the editors claim that despite the widespread concern over bioethical 
issues, the discipline of bioethics needs to be reformulated and broadened, but the 
dominance of principlism in the United States has restricted this widened 
perspective.
42
 
 
Now routinely referred to pejoratively as ―principlism‖ or ―the Georgetown 
mantra,‖43 principle-guided ethics, according to Warren Reich, ―sought to create a 
consensus based on shared arguments that were divorced from the horizons of 
meaning and the meaningful narratives that initially inspired them.‖44 The lack of 
consensus on the application of the PBE model in complex situations is why 
Jonsen and others argue for a ―second generation‖ of bioethicists whose ―ethics 
consists of more than principles‖ by incorporating other methods like 
―phenomenology, hermeneutics, narrative ethics, casuistry, and virtue ethics.‖45 
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The major criticism of the PBE model is that it is too simplistic for the type of 
complex moral issues that arise in bioethical debates. The most common 
objections relate to the process of reflective equilibrium. Beauchamp and 
Childress argue that wide reflective equilibrium drives rational agents together 
because it incorporates principles and rules from ―all plausible moral judgments, 
principles, and relevant background theories‖ and from ―as wide a variety of kinds 
and levels of legitimate beliefs
 
as possible.‖46 They contend that this type of 
reflective thinking is analogous to hypotheses in science, but this comparison is 
misleading.
47
 The PBE method trades on accepting that the four common morality 
principles are foundational and that the process of reflective equilibrium enables a 
moral agent to sort out how and why one principle trumps another.  
 
Beauchamp and Childress state that their proposal is ―fundamentally Rawlsian … 
and it escapes categorization by labels such as foundationalism and 
coherentism.‖48 They mean by this that their method is not a true coherence theory 
because it appeals to principles justified by wide reflective equilibrium and that 
this process gives the principles a foundational validity. This claim, however, is 
not straightforward. While it is possible to use a Rawlsian type reflective 
equilibrium justification in science, there is extended debate about the validity of 
this process in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate in epistemology.
49
 
Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge this when they state that ―we cannot here 
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engage the tangled issue of whether coherentism is to be preferred to 
foundationalism.‖50 Given the target audience for the PBE model, one can 
understand why Beauchamp and Childress steer clear of this debate. The link 
between the four foundational principles is not epistemologically problematic 
when they are used as common morality principles because the appeal in this case 
is to general moral rules. When these principles are linked to reflective 
equilibrium, however, as they are in the PBE method, the point and purpose is to 
solve particular cases. This requires some form of intuitive understanding of how 
and why one principle trumps another in the same manner that Rawls‘ theory 
requires people to share a common intuition with respect to justice.
51
 
 
The PBE method fails to acknowledge the shift in emphasis that Rawls himself 
made. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that moral agents find common 
ground through the process of reflective equilibrium.
52
 However, in a later 
publication, and in response to criticisms of the ―common ground‖ hypothesis in 
A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that a diversity of views is ―a permanent 
feature‖ of a liberal democracy.53 Beauchamp and Childress cite Rawls‘ change of 
mind over the limitations of the common morality thesis in the fifth and sixth 
edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, but only in a footnote,
54
 and there is no 
indication that Rawls‘ shift in emphasis has impacted on their common morality 
thesis.  
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The appeal to reflective equilibrium is problematic in moral theory because it does 
not sufficiently account for the reason why complex moral issues are often 
intractable. Moral debates often end at the beginning because no agreement is 
possible on the premises or foundations that rational moral agents bring to the 
discussion. When consensus does occur it is often coincidental. This coincidence 
of agreement is because moral agents acknowledge a thin minimalism that may 
have nothing to do with the moral debate. This thin agreement is not because the 
discussants reach some common framework to which diverse moral agents can 
ultimately appeal.  Moral minimalism is not foundational. As Walzer argues ―it is 
not the case that different groups of people discover that they are all committed to 
the same set of ultimate values… Often enough, what goes deepest for one group 
… is likely to mean little to another.‖55  
 
The earlier example of the RTC‘s deliberations on stem cell harvesting illustrates 
what Walzer means by thin moral minimalism. It is clear that the theologian‘s 
concern over stem cell harvesting was based on deeply held views concerning the 
moral status of an embryo. It is equally clear that the scientist held no such views; 
thus the destruction of embryos for stem cell harvesting caused him no moral 
qualms. At the start of this chapter the four-principle approach was described as a 
useful but not definitive guide for decision making, and this impasse illustrates 
this point. In the stem cell debate, the principle of nonmaleficence can be usefully 
employed by the theologian in ways that the scientist can appreciate, primarily by 
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showing why the Hippocratic principle ought to apply to embryos in the same 
way that it is applied to babies or infants. Similarly, the scientist can appeal to 
beneficence in ways that the theologian can appreciate, primarily by showing the 
potential for stem cells to be utilised in medicine. No amount of reflective 
equilibrium can produce a shared agreement between the theologian and the 
scientist in regards to the status of the embryo.  
 
Walzer argues that ―the value of minimalism lies in the encounter it facilitates, of 
which it is also the product,‖ but such encounters do not ―produce a thick 
morality.‖56 In other words, the RTC encounter does not produce thick moral 
agreement about stem cell harvesting because the rational discussants involved 
share incommensurable views about the moral status of embryos.  
 
The role of the RTC in Western Australia is to regulate a series of protocols that 
had already been decided upon via rule of law agreements that form the basis of a 
liberal democracy. After extensive deliberation, the Australian Federal Parliament 
decided in favour of stem cell harvesting (2002) and a few years later also voted 
to allow therapeutic cloning of embryos for research purposes (2007).
57
 For both 
the theologian and the scientist, the encounter is the RTC process itself. The fact 
that they participate shows that they share a thin minimalist appreciation for the 
role that an ethics committee plays in a liberal democracy. 
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The PBE method is usefully thin and provides enough coherence for a consensus 
over general issues but it is too thin to provide consensus in cases that involve 
diverse and thick narrative accounts of the moral issues at stake. In other words, a 
thin consensus between diverse moral agents over some moral issues is possible 
because the diverse theories of justification coincide in such a way that the moral 
agents can align themselves to a common position. However, this consensus 
breaks down in complex issues because not enough similarities in the justificatory 
process exist to allow for a common position to be held. So in the RTC case, the 
agreement is about process because the role of a regulatory body such as the RTC 
is to cross-check the IVF clinics in WA. This involves making sure that clinics do 
not succumb to economic pressure by ignoring the strict regulatory requirements 
over IVF protocols (age, health, relationship status, etc.).
58
 
 
The Beauchamp and Childress model breaks down in complex cases because the 
choice to elevate one principle over another is not a self-evident outcome of 
reflective equilibrium. Even in a simple case, the decision to elevate one principle 
over another is not because it is self-evident that one ethical principle trumps 
another. Rather, it is because the case is simple enough that no real juggling needs 
to take place and because the decision makers agree on which principle best 
supports their own teleological or ideological objectives. A case in point is the 
routine decision that health professionals make to override the decision of a drunk 
but injured patient who says he does not want to be treated. If asked to justify the 
decision, using the four-principles, the health workers could argue that they 
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elevated beneficence over autonomy because patient autonomy is diminished by 
drunkenness. In this simple case, the principles provide a descriptive justification 
for a decision that has already been made, rather than a prescriptive justification 
for a decision that ought to be made. The consensus among health workers about 
this type of action is not because medical beneficence self-evidently trumps 
patient autonomy. Rather, the consensus among health workers exists because 
treating such a patient in this manner is consistent with the promotion of patient 
health. In complex cases the application of principles is fraught with difficulties 
because each of the stakeholders in a difficult case would have their own reasons 
for arguing why one principle is more crucial than other. 
 
4.5 Nonmaleficence or Beneficence: The Quinlan Case 
 
The case studies in the first five editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics are 
appropriately used as discussion starters and appear, without commentary, at the 
back of the book. In the sixth edition Beauchamp and Childress weave the case 
studies into the chapters devoted to an explanation of the four-principles. They 
have done this with the now famous Karen Quinlan case,
59
 which involves issues 
of medical nutrition and hydration (MN&H) and physician-assisted death. This 
case is woven into the justification of the reason why a rational moral agent ought 
to elevate the principle of beneficence, in some cases, over the normal ―do no 
harm‖ prohibition in medicine. Beauchamp and Childress conclude their analysis 
of this case with a statement that is appropriately thin: ―healthcare providers may 
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legitimately withhold or withdraw MN&H under some conditions.‖60 There is not 
much to argue about in such a general statement because even in a Catholic health 
system, where MN&H is normally obligatory, withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration is permissible for dying patients.
61
  
 
Beauchamp and Childress think that the withdrawal of MN&H should be 
considered a legitimate option for some non-dying patients, such as in the Karen 
Quinlan case, and in doing so they argue that the principle of beneficence 
overrides the normal medical principle of nonmaleficence in such cases. The 
problem here is that even if one agrees with the removal of MN&H in the Quinlan 
case, what aspects of this case can be used to highlight the same response in other 
cases? The Quinlan case involved an intricate mix of familial, medical, and legal 
issues unique to that case. The decision to withdraw treatment in the Quinlan case 
involved medically-assisted death because the patient was eventually allowed to 
starve to death more than ten years after artificial respiration was removed.  
 
The final court decision to allow the removal of the feeding tube provided parity 
in the USA over the type of medical intervention that constitutes life support, so 
that both hydration and nutrition could now be considered an optional form of 
life-support in the same manner that artificial respiration is optional. In the USA 
the Quinlan case served as a persuasive precedent in common law. However, the 
beholding obligation for anyone who appeals to this case as a precedent is to show 
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how and why the Quinlan case satisfies the persuasive precedent requirement. 
Using the legal process to resolve complex cases has its own drawbacks, not the 
least of which is the length of time for the process to take its course. Some 
philosophers argue that decisions ought to be made much earlier because once the 
decision is made to choose death the ten-year wait for passive euthanasia to take 
its effect is unreasonably burdensome. In connection with the Quinlan case Singer 
argues that once the decision is made to allow a person to die, the medical 
professionals should actively ensure ―that it comes in the best possible way‖62 and 
therefore mercy killing ought not be ruled out for some cases. The old legal 
maxim, ―hard cases make bad law,‖ applies to complex ethical issues as well and 
for roughly the same reasons. Complex cases are rarely so similar that the 
justification for elevating beneficence over nonmaleficence in one case 
necessitates the same decision in another. The following section will show that 
when advocates of the PBE model use particular cases to illustrate why one 
principle ought to trump another they presume that both the facts of the case and 
the decision to elevate one principle over another emerge impartially from the 
process of reflective equilibrium. 
 
4.6 Principle-Based Health Ethics in Australia 
 
The Beauchamp and Childress model has been incorporated into Australian health 
care primarily through the work of Kenneth R. Mitchell and Terence J. Lovat.
63
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Mitchell and Lovat substantially borrow the Beauchamp and Childress 
justification for the PBE model and similarly focus on decision making for 
medical and health professionals. They presume the efficacy of Beauchamp and 
Childress‘ model of decision making and refer to the ―fundamental bioethical 
principles‖ when they state that ―such an approach … will bring order and 
coherence and enable generalization across issues from diverse areas of 
medicine.‖64 They further state that ―bioethics is not a matter of beliefs, emotions 
or opinions‖ but rather an ―intellectual inquiry motivated by a concern for what 
should be decided‖ and ―guided in this search for the ‗right and wrong of it‘ by 
the fundamental values and moral principles which come from inquiry into 
general normative ethics.‖65 This strong series of claims about the objectivity of 
the PBE model is not defended in the text other than by showing how the 
principles are applied to particular cases.  
 
In a subsequent publication, but with a new contributing author,
66
 these authors 
make more explicit the distinction between moral philosophy and ethics, primarily 
because they want to distinguish ethical analysis in health care from the type of 
ethical analysis in psychology, sociology, and theology.
67
 The authors make 
several bold claims that they think distinguish practical ethics from the broader 
concerns of morality found in psychology, sociology, and theology. They claim, 
first, that practical ethics is of ―greater significance than law, politics or self-
interest‖; second, that principles used are universalisable; third, that practical 
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ethics is broadly concerned with ―human well-being and the maintenance of a 
peaceful society‖; fourth, that practical ethics is concerned with the role of reason 
and moral justification; and fifth, that practical ethics is prescriptive of what moral 
agents ―should do‖ rather than ―can do.‖68  
 
The claim that ethics is of greater importance than law, politics, or self-interest 
requires further explanation if it is to be accepted at all. Aristotle, for instance, 
disputes the separation of ethics from politics primarily because ethics 
presupposes a cooperative polis. Politics, in the sense that Aristotle understood it, 
is the most authoritative science because the purpose of the other disciplines is to 
contribute to the flourishing of the polis itself. Thus for Aristotle practical ethics is 
primarily concerned with social habituation, and the role of reason is not therefore 
a purpose-independent concept.
69
  
 
The claim that ethics uses principles that are universalisable is qualified by the 
statement that ―moral concepts, principles, and action-guides apply to all persons 
equally.‖70 Few moral philosophers accept this view of universalisability as its 
stands. Universalisability, in a Kantian sense, applies to the strength of the moral 
imperative, and, in the utilitarian sense, to the impartial motivation of the decision 
maker.
71
 Neither of these two concepts of universalisability imply that a 
universalisable argument ought to apply to ―all persons equally.‖72   
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When Mitchell et al. suggest that health care professionals can no longer rely on 
traditional values or professional codes of practice, because modern medicine has 
changed, they appeal to something that is supposedly more basic or foundational 
than what professional codes can offer. They want to deal with the changes in 
medicine by accepting a basic level concept of principles and then apply the 
principles to particular cases in what they describe as a ―more rational manner.‖73 
This supposedly more rational approach to ethics involves the application of the 
PBE model to particular cases. To make this explicit, Mitchell et al. provide case 
studies for each of the chapters devoted to the four-principles. This has the effect 
of guiding the reader to adopt a particular type of case study for the principle that, 
in the authors‘ view, is the most appropriate. However, while the PBE model does 
provide action guides for decision making in simple cases, it provides no 
objective test for determining why one principle fits a case better than another, 
particularly in complex cases.  
 
In the first edition of their text Mitchell and Lovat used a famous medical case to 
illustrate why the principle of nonmaleficence ought to be overridden by the 
combined weight of autonomy and beneficence in some cases of end-stage 
disease.
74
 The case involves a young woman dying from ovarian cancer and a 
resident in a gynaecology-oncology ward. In 1988, the Journal of the American 
Medical Association (JAMA) published a report on this case written by an 
unnamed medical resident entitled ―A Piece of my mind: It‘s over Debbie.‖75 The 
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report recounted the resident‘s decision to euthanise (with a morphine drip) a 
young woman dying of ovarian cancer. The report was primarily his personal 
account of dealing with her request when she said, ―Let‘s get this over with.‖ 
After being published in JAMA the case was subsequently recorded on several on-
line pro-euthanasia websites to show how the compassionate side of medical 
practice can sometimes justify voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted death. 
Mitchell and Lovat appear to have used this case in this context because most of 
the case studies in the chapter on nonmaleficence are devoted to physician-
assisted death. In the commentary on the ―It‘s over Debbie‖ case, Mitchell and 
Lovat state, ―Other medications could have been used to relieve the patient‘s 
suffering and enable her to rest comfortably.‖76 This commentary seems to be 
directed at the resident‘s decision to euthanise the patient using morphine. Given 
that the patient was already on a morphine drip, the clinical decision to overdose a 
dying patient using morphine is unwise. In this case the resident achieved his 
desired result but this was more by good luck than good clinical practice.
77
 The 
morphine issue, however, is one of several clinical issues that this case raises, all 
of which go unacknowledged in the Mitchell and Lovat account.  
 
Mitchell and Lovat appear unfamiliar with the furor that this case attracted when 
the anonymous resident‘s article was first published in JAMA. Rather than being 
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seen as a compassionate doctor‘s response to patient suffering, many surgeons and 
oncologists saw it as a classic case of malpractice. Most blamed the editor, Dr. 
George Lundberg, for publishing an anonymous report by a resident doctor. 
Doctors also objected to the flippant and simplistic presentation of a complex 
medical and ethical issue. Clinical objections focused on the actions of the 
resident, primarily because a medical resident should not be euthanising a patient 
he has met only recently and of whom he has no medical history other than a bed 
chart. Furthermore, the decision to euthanise the patient was not discussed 
thoroughly with the patient, or with the older woman that the article refers to as 
being in the room at the time. The furor over this case was significant enough for 
the New York Times to publish a special supplement that questioned the ethics of 
both the physician and the medical journalists involved in the case.
78
 In this 
supplement, Dr. Mark Siegler, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Center 
for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of Chicago, argued that the report 
―did a disservice to the medical profession by giving the appearance of 
sanctioning the physician‘s behavior.‖ Similarly, Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director of 
the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota, suggested that 
the action of the resident was a severe indictment on the training residents were 
receiving. He rejected the actions of the resident primarily because it was an 
irresponsible abuse of power that was done without consultation.
79
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Even more disturbingly for the anonymous author and the editor, the State 
Attorney‘s office in Chicago, where JAMA is published, issued a grand jury 
subpoena requesting that the editor hand over all documents associated with the 
case because the state prosecutor wanted to indict the author on a charge of 
manslaughter.
80
 JAMA in turn sought to establish legal protection for itself and the 
author by challenging the grand jury subpoena and claiming journalistic privilege, 
a stance highly unusual in medical publishing where peer review is dominant. 
 
Clearly this case does not allow for the straightforward juggling of principles that 
the PBE model promotes because the facts of the case were interpreted by the 
resident in ways that are incompatible with good medical practice. Mitchell and 
Lovat removed this case from the subsequent edition of their text, but this 
omission also illustrates the main problem with principle based decision making. 
The principles are thin moral concepts that are useful for helping a health 
professional to understand the issues involved, but they do not combine readily 
into a uniform process of reflective equilibrium. One reason for this is that the 
individual observer will bring his or her own thick interpretation of both the 
principles and how they should be applied to a particular case. A second problem 
is that the facts of the moment may not necessarily tell the whole story, as 
highlighted by the JAMA case. 
 
A complex case such as the one above challenges Mitchell and Lovat‘s claim that 
principles enable ―order and coherence‖ because the impartial decision maker can 
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generalise across diverse disciplines of medicine.
81
 There is no order or coherence 
here because there is no independent method of juggling principles. When 
Mitchell, Lovat, and Kerridge argue that ethics is not about professional codes but 
about principles, they present an impoverished view of practical ethics.
82
 Dr. 
Siegler and Dr. Caplan objected to the actions of the resident so vociferously 
because his actions were inconsistent with professional practice. If and when 
doctors decide to alleviate the suffering of a dying patient they ought to be 
constrained by professional standards of medical practice. This means that the 
treatment options that the resident can choose from should be comparable to that 
offered by another resident doctor for a similar patient under the same conditions. 
In the JAMA case the patient would have been under the supervisory care of an 
oncologist or palliative care specialist. At the very least, the resident should have 
consulted a senior clinician to seek advice, and it is entirely possible that the 
consultant may have suggested a process with a similar outcome.  Furthermore, a 
patient should be consulted whenever a proposed intervention might result in 
death. 
 
The JAMA case illustrates why complex cases are rarely amenable to the PBE 
model of decision making. A similar problem arises in the chapter that Mitchell, 
Kerridge, and Lovat devote to the abortion issue. The authors acknowledge the 
complexity of the abortion issue and they also acknowledge that they differ in 
their respective positions.
83
 They suggest that even with this complexity they can 
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make one important point, that the ―moral, legal, social and political division‖ 
within society is unlikely to be resolved by legislation because it is difficult ―to 
see how such diametrically opposed viewpoints could ever reach consensus.‖84 
The presumption here is that legislation is designed to resolve opposing points of 
view, but this misconstrues the role of legislation. Legislation on abortion does 
not resolve the moral question on abortion but it does resolve the impasse that 
results from this division.  
 
When presented with the four-principles, people opposed to abortion will 
inevitably elevate the principle of nonmaleficence over autonomy because they 
preface the debate with the claim that protecting the life of an innocent human 
being is a defensible rational position. Similarly, those who think that abortion 
should be decriminalised inevitably elevate either beneficence (for reasons of 
harm minimisation) or autonomy (for reasons of choice). The PBE method offers 
no mediation in complex cases because a rational observer is not impartial and the 
decision to elevate one principle over another is not the product of reflective 
equilibrium. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The criticism of principle-guided ethics is not directed at principles per se. Rather, 
it is because critics of principle-guided ethics think that Beauchamp and Childress 
overstate the applicability of principles in complex situations. Toulmin, for 
                                                 
84
 Mitchell et al., Bioethics and Clinical Ethics for Health Care Professionals, 238. 
 147 
instance, argues that principles are often not that necessary in debates over 
complex moral issues.
85
 Writing as a staff member on the National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
Toulmin writes that agreement on a case by case basis is possible even when 
people disagree over the ethical principles. Toulmin and Jonsen (also a member 
on the above Commission) are critical of principle-guided ethics, suggesting 
instead a return to casuistry: 
Increasingly, then, over the last twenty years serious 
discussions of the moral problems that arise out of social 
conscience and public policy have moved in a taxonomic 
direction. As in the days of Ciceronian and Christian 
casuistry, a feeling for the features of moral experience 
that led Aristotle to put ethics in the realm of praxis and 
phronesis, not theoria and episteme ... has reentered the 
moral debate.
86
  
The attempt to turn the PBE decision making protocol into the standard model of 
bioethics has failed because it lacks the explanatory power of the standard model 
approach used in the sciences. A standard model in science involves three major 
characteristics.
87
 First, it acknowledges a consensus of rational discussants 
(scientists) over the foundational premises and boundary assumptions on which 
evidence derived from the scientific method is evaluated. Second, a standard 
model has vast explanatory power and can therefore be used to evaluate other 
models or theories. Third, a standard model is always open-ended, capable of 
being refined or even overturned.  
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It is clear from the sixth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics that 
Beauchamp and Childress remain committed to the idea that practical ethics is 
based on an epistemologically valid form of foundationalism: ―applied ethics … is 
the attempt to interpret general norms [the four-principles] for the purpose of 
addressing particular problems and contexts… General norms are usually only 
starting points for the development of concrete norms of conduct.‖88 The PBE 
method is meant to act like the standard model approach used in other disciplines 
but it lacks the three characteristics outlined above. First, there is no consensus 
among moral philosophers that the PBE method is the preferred method of moral 
decision making. Second, it lacks the explanatory power of a standard model. 
Beauchamp and Childress make the bold claim that the function of common 
morality and reflective equilibrium is to ―provide a basis for the evaluation and 
criticism of groups or communities whose customary moral viewpoints are in 
some sense deficient,‖89 but there is no indication in recent literature on the PBE 
model that this foundationalist goal has been reached. Third, the PBE method is 
too remote from the type of moral evaluation that Toulmin and others advocate. 
The major criticism of the PBE model is not that it is not useful but rather too 
grand. As Oliver Rauprich points out with respect to the Beauchamp and 
Childress common morality model: 
It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well 
compatible with a standard coherentist justification. I 
suggest that the authors should give up the foundational 
account for a more modest account of common morality as 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 1-2 (italics added). 
89
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 387 (italics added). 
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a resource of well-established moral insights and 
experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither 
sufficient nor infallible.
90
 
Clearly Beauchamp and Childress‘ contribution to the discussion of complex 
ethical issues has been extensive, but Rauprich‘s more limited expectation for 
common morality reflects the thin acceptance of common morality principles. The 
fact that principles are thin does not mean they are insignificant. Thin minimalism 
provides moral agents with what Walzer calls ―the rules of engagement that bind 
all speakers,‖91 or what Stuart Hampshire has called ―a thin notion of procedural 
justice … the conditions of mere decency.‖92  
 
Jonsen makes a similar point in his criticism of Singer‘s preference utilitarian 
equality principle: 
the ethics of bioethics is not a clean, closed system of 
rational argument. No theory dominates bioethics, and no 
methodology has one universal acceptance. While a few 
bioethicists, such as Princeton professor Peter Singer, 
adhere to such a system (in his case to a strictly logical 
utilitarianism), most bioethicist today are improvisers, 
drawing from various forms of philosophical and 
theological ethics the elements that seem suitable for the 
argument at hand.
93
 
From an Aristotelian perspective, the right thing to do in a given case is to allow 
oneself to be constrained by the praxis of the teleological activity (medicine, law, 
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politics, etc.) and the phronesis or practical wisdom of time, place, and 
circumstance (habituation). As Jonsen says above, this is not a ―clean, closed 
system of rational argument‖ because it does not provide black and white answers, 
but it does provide a thick level of practical guidance within particular practices. 
The next chapter will reconstruct the meta-narrative of practical ethics advocated 
in Singer‘s version of preference utilitarianism. 
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Chapter 5: Preference-Guided Enquiry 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter argued that the PBE model is a useful but not definitive tool 
for decision making in practical ethics. This chapter will make the same claim 
about Peter Singer‘s version of practical ethics. In Australia, Singer‘s contribution 
to the discipline of practical ethics has been even more influential, due primarily 
to the legacy of British utilitarianism. Singer began writing not long after the birth 
of the practical ethics revolution, and his main contribution to practical ethics is 
the principle of equality, a decision making protocol based on a type of preference 
calculus. He is a serious thinking social activist and few philosophers seem to be 
as committed to social change as he is.
1
 In his most recent publication he argues 
that moral agents ought to extend their care for the poor, using the principle of 
universalisation, to all people who are suffering, irrespective of where they live.
2
  
 
Following his utilitarian predecessors, Singer argues that rational moral agents 
ought to extend their circle of moral consideration to all sentient animals, those 
that can feel pain, and then give higher moral consideration to humans and 
                                                 
1
 Peter Singer‘s book Animal Liberation is credited with launching the Animal Liberation 
movement. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals 
(New York: A New York Review Book, 1975). 
2
 Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (Melbourne: Text 
Publishing Company, 2009). 
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animals that are self-aware, ―capable of abstract thought, of planning for the 
future, of complex acts of communication.‖3 
 
In the PBE model a rational decision maker is encouraged to use common 
morality principles. This is not the case in Singer‘s version of practical ethics 
because he does not appeal to moral principles that are knowable or real. Singer‘s 
practical ethics promotes the role that reason can play in sorting out moral 
dilemmas by advocating a decision making protocol that he calls the ―principle of 
equality‖ or ―equal consideration of interests.‖4 An impartial moral agent uses this 
principle of equality to calculate both quantitative and qualitative interests of all 
stakeholders in order to achieve preference or interest satisfaction. 
 
Singer‘s form of practical ethics pivots on the facts of a given case being 
knowable and therefore capable of being adjudicated from a preference utilitarian 
standpoint. As with the PBE model, this simple formula is both a strength and a 
weakness. In order for the equality principle to work as Singer posits, the facts of 
a given case must be knowable ―real-world‖ facts, facts that are self-evident to an 
impartial observer. Herein lies the main problem with this model of decision 
making. Far from being self-evident, the facts in complex cases are often in 
dispute. 
 
                                                 
3
 Singer, Practical Ethics, 61. 
4
 Singer, Practical Ethics, 11, 12-14, 21-26, 83, 286; applied to animals, 56-57, 62, 63, 64, 67; to 
disability, 52-54, 189; to the fetus, 164; and to non-self conscious beings,131.  
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This chapter will reconstruct the decision making protocol advocated by Singer by 
showing, first, why he thinks ethics should be grounded in evolutionary altruism 
and the principle of universalisation and, second, why he thinks that the role of 
reason implies preference consideration. The reconstruction will show that, as 
with the Beauchamp and Childress principle-guided model of decision making, 
Singer‘s version of practical ethics is a useful but not definitive method of ethical 
decision making. The shifts in Singer‘s thinking over the principle of equality also 
serve to illustrate how difficult it is to formulate a standard theoretical approach 
that solves problems in a complex discipline like ethics. 
 
5.2 Ethics and the Principle of Universalisation 
 
Singer‘s analysis in Practical Ethics begins with a thin recognition of the 
principle of universalisation. He then extends this out to a thick explanation of the 
role that reason plays in decision making, via the principle of equality and the role 
of the impartial observer. Singer appropriately describes this new method of 
decision making as ambitious and tentative.
5
 The tone of Practical Ethics, apart 
from comments directed against rule-based
6
 and religious perspectives on ethics, 
provides a tentative exploration of how preference calculus and the principle of 
equality can be consistently applied to specific issues. With the publication of The 
Expanding Circle, however, Singer revises his dismissive attitude toward rules. 
He now recognises that equal consideration of interests, on its own, does not 
                                                 
5
 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 12, 14. 
6
 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3. 
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provide a workable model for practical decision making because ―we lack the 
time and information‖ for the ―long and involved calculations‖ required.7 
 
This change in attitude toward rules is one example of how Singer‘s argument for 
a practical ethic has evolved.
8
 Another shift in emphasis occurs over his initial 
appeal that the principle of universalisation serves as a basis or foundation for 
ethical decision making. In Practical Ethics the starting point for moral evaluation 
is the principle of universalisation, primarily based on a broad recognition among 
philosophers and other thinkers.
9
 A few years later, in The Expanding Circle, 
Singer argues for a biological explanation of why we have ethics, based on the 
emerging idea that some ethical behaviour might be hard-wired into the human 
genome through the process known as evolutionary altruism.
10
 Singer argues in 
Practical Ethics that the rational agent builds on the inherited evolutionary 
altruistic tendency by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests. In 
The Expanding Circle he modifies this somewhat to argue that the rational 
extension to evolutionary altruism is the principle of impartial consideration.  
 
For Singer, this new ―simpler idea‖ is that ethics ―evolved out of our social 
instincts and our capacity to reason,‖ and once rational thinking takes over, the 
principle of equality expands the circle of consideration to all self-aware beings.
11
 
This new look at ethics shows, first, why altruistic behaviour provides an 
                                                 
7
 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 161. 
8
 MacIntyre argues that epistemic shifts like this occur when moral theorists discover for 
themselves or are forced to acknowledge by others that the epistemic basis of their theory is not as 
certain as they once thought (see Chapter 6). 
9
 Singer, Practical Ethics, 11-14. 
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 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 16-27.  
11
 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 111. 
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explanation of why ethics exists in human society and, second, why the principle 
of equality offers the best model for applying rational thinking to this basic 
starting point.
12
 In The Expanding Circle three propositions support this new look 
at ethics. First, ethics is rooted in the altruistic behaviour of our human 
ancestors.
13
 Second, the capacity for rational thinking enabled humans to extend 
their own self-interestedness into a set of behaviours that takes into consideration 
the interests of all stakeholders.
14
 Third, there is now no justification for limiting 
this type of ethical analysis to humans, so the circle of consideration should be 
expanded to include other sentient and self-aware animals.
15
  
 
Singer argues that because ethics is part of our biology, the tendency for humans 
to codify ethics is therefore a natural outgrowth of biological altruism.
16
 However, 
once humans begin to make rational choices, the principle of equality trumps 
altruistic choices because altruistic behaviour can lead to discrimination against 
others. A rational agent must go beyond evolutionary behaviour and simple rule-
following to the point where the good for one self-aware being (qualitatively 
calculated) should be considered as having no greater value than the good for 
another.
17
 Singer maintains that this new way of thinking provides a scientific 
explanation for ethics that is now necessary because religious and non-religious 
thinkers agree that solutions to ethical dilemmas should be sought ―outside 
religion and independently of belief in God.‖18 
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 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 84-85. 
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5.3 Ethics and Reciprocity 
 
Singer begins his justification for a scientific solution to ethical dilemmas with an 
introduction to E. O. Wilson‘s sociobiological justification for ethics.19 He accepts 
Wilson‘s explanation regarding the foundation for ethical behaviour but rejects his 
further suggestion that ethical premises can be derived from biological 
foundations, as this step involves a naturalistic fallacy.
20
 Singer argues that the 
science of sociobiology has something to offer the study of ethics because it 
provides an explanation of how altruism began to manifest in different species and 
also why ethics evolved in human social interaction.
21
 Sociobiology explains why 
rules or canons of behaviour prohibit some actions and allow others, but it cannot 
determine the ethical efficacy of these actions.
22
 Singer explains how acts of 
reciprocity have produced several types of altruistic behaviour among social 
animals – kin altruism, non-related reciprocal altruism, and group altruism – 
although he thinks that group altruism plays only a minor role.
23
 These tit-for-tat 
relationships seem to be a necessary survival instinct for social animals, and this 
instinct is now commonly referred to as the principle of reciprocity.  
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 Edward Osborn Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975). 
20
 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 74. 
21
 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 29. 
22
 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 80-81. 
23
 Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson provide an alternate view on group selection in Unto 
Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 416. 
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The genetic tendency to help kin can be extended to a reciprocal relationship 
between non-related members of a species, or even of a different species, if for 
some reason a benefit is gained from working together. For instance, reciprocal 
altruism occurs when monkeys groom each other. Altruistic instincts might also 
help to explain the human motivation to help a stranger in trouble. Reciprocity 
does not mean that the groomed monkey or the human stranger will one day 
return the favour. Rather, because reciprocal altruism is so widely practised 
among long-lived social species such as apes and humans, an individual who acts 
altruistically can reasonably expect this level of cooperation from another member 
of the same group if he or she is caught in a similar situation.
24
 Altruistic 
behaviour in animals appears similar to types of behaviour affirmed among 
humans (self-sacrifice, heroism, generosity, cooperation). Singer is probably right 
that human cooperative behaviour provides a precursor for the prescriptive 
―ought-type‖ language of ethical theory. The moral prohibition against murder, 
for instance, came a long time after the pragmatic recognition that this type of 
killing was ultimately self-destructive.  
 
Singer makes the forceful claim that because human social behaviour parallels 
forms of altruism observable in other social animals, it is therefore implausible to 
deny that ―human ethics has its origin in evolved patterns of behavior [altruism] 
among social animals.‖25 According to Singer, animals act altruistically, humans 
act altruistically, and so by inference human ethics must have derived from human 
altruism. This strong claim is not without difficulties, however, because it is 
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indeed plausible to deny the proposition: ethics if and only if altruism. While it 
seems true that ethics includes altruistic behaviour, to argue that ethics has its 
origin in altruistic behaviour seems too strong given present knowledge of gene-
shaped human behaviour. The attempt to establish a link between genes and 
behaviour produced an early form of genetic determinism such as the alleged gay 
gene
26
 and the psychopathic gene.
27
 More recent work reveals a more nuanced and 
complex relationship between genes and human behaviour.
28
 
 
Singer acknowledges another problem that arises from claims about altruism: ―we 
can understand why reciprocal altruism should prosper after it gets established, it 
is less easy to see why the genes leading to this form of behavior did not get 
eliminated as soon as they appeared.‖29 Known as the paradox of altruism, this 
problem presents a difficult challenge for any theory that links altruism with a 
genetic explanation for ethics because altruistic behaviour contradicts some 
aspects of natural selection.
30
 For example, animals that act altruistically by 
warning of approaching danger would get killed first, and thus the biological drive 
towards altruism should diminish due to natural selection. 
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A further problem arises with the way evolutionary altruism in animals is 
assessed. Even a careful researcher can read altruistic characteristics into animal 
behaviour when it might not be warranted. A recent study of meerkats, the pin-up 
species for altruistic behaviour in animals, reported very different findings than 
previous meerkat studies.
31
 This report found that after 2000 hours of observation, 
not one example of warning-call altruism was observed. This group of researchers 
argues that guard-duty among meerkats was not an organised activity but 
something that meerkats did when they were not eating. In short, basically they 
were watching out for themselves.
32
 If this is the case, then perhaps the 
evolutionary drive towards this type of behaviour is driven by selfish genes, not 
altruistic ones.  
 
The discipline of sociobiology has itself only recently emerged as a distinct 
discipline, and two of its main proponents, E. O. Wilson and Richard C. 
Lewontin, are in sharp disagreement about what conclusions should be drawn 
from sociobiological studies.
33
 The study of the connection between the evolution 
of genetic tendencies and sociobiological behaviour is too inconclusive to draw 
strong conclusions about ethical behaviour among humans. 
 
Singer‘s argument therefore, that altruistic behaviour provides the foundation for 
why we have ethics, seems to be a reasonable hypothesis, but it belongs to a field 
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of study that is still in its infancy.
34
 Twenty-five years after the publication of The 
Expanding Circle, debate over the evolutionary basis of ethics still has a long way 
to go.
35
 There is no consensus among scholars about how altruism works or even 
whether it does form the basis of ethics as Singer posits.
36
 Singer acknowledges 
that even if some consensus does develop concerning evolutionary altruism, it will 
only explain why we have ethics, not why one explanation of ethics is better than 
another.  
 
Although the argument for ethical altruism takes up half of The Expanding Circle, 
it is tangential to the main argument that Singer promotes. He recognises that 
central questions about ethics and values are untouched by the biological 
explanation for why ethics exists.
37
 For Singer, the development of rational 
thinking eventually opened up the possibility that humans could make ethical 
choices. Initially these choices were driven by customary morality or cultural 
preferences, but then the extended use of the principle of universalisation 
expanded this circle of consideration to included all human stakeholders, 
regardless of geography or culture.  
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Singer argues in The Expanding Circle that further progress is possible by 
converting the concept of moral impartiality into a formal decision making 
protocol that gives equal weight to the interests of all stakeholders, human and 
non-human:  
We can progress toward rational settlement of disputes 
over ethics by taking the element of disinterestedness 
inherent in the idea of justifying one‘s conduct to society 
as a whole, and extending this into the principle that to be 
ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests 
of all affected by it.
38
 
This passage is a bit clumsy because Singer does not mean that equal weight 
should be granted to the interests of all the stakeholders. In his model, some 
interests do outweigh others, and the justification for this different weighting is 
more cogently presented in Practical Ethics.
39
 However, before he sets out why 
the equality principle explains what ethics is, when reason is allowed to play its 
legitimate role, he begins Practical Ethics by showing firstly what ethics is not. 
 
5.4 What Ethics is Not: Four False Assumptions 
 
Singer states that many people make false assumptions about ethics. First, they 
assume that the study of ethics is a ―set of prohibitions particularly concerned with 
sex‖; second, they assume that the study of ethics is ―noble in theory but no good 
in practice‖; third, they assume that ethics is ―intelligible only in the context of 
religion‖; and lastly, they assume that ethics is ―relative or subjective.‖40 These 
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four false assumptions about ethics provide the background to Singer‘s fuller 
account of what practical ethics ought to be according to the principle of equality. 
 
The first false assumption that people make, according to Singer, is to think that 
ethics is a set of prohibitions particularly concerned with sex. He says this 
misconception about ethics and morality is still defended by Bishops and 
―traditional moralists.‖41 He refers here to the preoccupation of some bioethicists 
with issues of sexual morality such as promiscuity, homosexuality, and 
pornography. Singer argues that there are more important moral issues. On this he 
is probably right, but this does not mean that one can dismiss religious concern for 
sexual morality so arbitrarily. For instance, a Bishop‘s concern regarding sexual 
morality might be theologically thick but still be consistent with a thin concern for 
general human wellbeing. A serious thinking Bishop‘s concern for sexual 
morality could be part of an intricately argued theory of natural law. Or perhaps, 
following Kant, the Bishop‘s concern over sexual issues could be driven by 
standard categorical imperatives. It is even possible that the Bishop‘s concern 
could have a utilitarian basis, such as harm minimisation, because promiscuity 
does increase HIV infection rates. The Bishop‘s concern for sexual morality is 
also consistent with a latter claim made by Singer himself: 
We found that we must concede that those who hold 
unconventional ethical beliefs are still living according to 
ethical standards if they believe, for any reason, that it is 
right to do as they are doing.
42
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Singer‘s claim that ethics is not simply a set of prohibitions particularly concerned 
with sex seems justified, but one should not assume that these concerns are devoid 
of rational thinking. Singer could argue that the Bishop‘s views are unpopular 
(perhaps by showing how sexual freedoms have changed) or he could highlight 
what he considers to be more important matters, but using the Bishop to illustrate 
a narrow sex-based focus of moral deliberation is disingenuous and unfairly 
caricatures religious scholarship. 
 
The second false assumption that Singer challenges is that ethics is an ideal 
system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. This seems to be the 
primary motivation behind his advocacy for the principle of equality. Singer is not 
content to argue points of moral theory in the classroom, and few modern 
philosophers practise what they preach as consistently as he does. Utilitarian 
philosophers, at least well-known ones, seem committed to making a practical 
difference. Bentham made significant contributions to civil government and the 
legal profession, and he was actively involved in both the abolitionist movement 
and in the elevation of women in British society. Similarly, Mill also advocated 
strongly on behalf of women, he was active in developing proportional 
representation, and he argued strongly that the state should be constrained from 
asserting undue control over the liberty of an individual.  
 
Singer sets the scene for Practical Ethics by suggesting that the failure of an 
ethical system based on rules does not necessarily lead to the failure of ethics as a 
practice. He argues that doing ethics by simple rule following is not justified 
 164 
because sometimes rules need to be broken. The weakness of deontological or 
rule-based ethics seems obvious to utilitarian philosophers. A theory that 
incorporates conflicting moral duties contains a theoretical weakness because a 
rational agent cannot apply one moral rule without overriding another. Singer 
cites the familiar Jews in the attic scenario to show that when rules conflict, 
rational consideration becomes consequentialist. His point is that when those he 
calls ―traditional moralists‖ defend rules, they are really defending a particular or 
subjective moral code, rather than one that is both universalisable and objective.
43
  
 
For Singer, a system of ethics that does not work in practice suffers from a 
theoretical defect, because ―the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide 
practice.‖44 These are important observations because they set a substantial goal 
for a theory of ethics that has proved difficult to achieve in the past. Significantly, 
the latter part of this chapter will show that Singer‘s equality principle suffices as 
a thin moral principle but fails when applied to complex moral issues. 
 
The third false assumption, that ethics is intelligible only in the context of religion, 
is a familiar criticism, and Singer cites Plato‘s Euthyphro to defend the claim that 
ethics must be rationally justifiable, not simply an appeal to the gods. Singer‘s 
explanation of why the study of ethics should be treated independently of religion 
is misleading, however, because he again presents an unfair caricature of the 
religious position. He states that the motivation for being ethical, according to 
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religious ethics, is to avoid roasting in hell.
45
 This claim might be an appropriate 
description for a television evangelist, but it is not appropriate for the scholarly 
thinking about ethics found in many religious traditions. The Bishop, for instance, 
if he is Catholic, is unlikely to use the concept of hell as justification for moral 
behaviour. Catholic tradition does acknowledge rules and principles, but this is 
done on the basis of a long tradition of natural law theory in both philosophy and 
theology.
46
 
 
According to Singer, the fourth false assumption that people make is to think that 
ethical claims are either subjective or relative. The bulk of Practical Ethics is 
devoted to explaining how rational thinking thwarts claims that ethical decision 
making is either subjective or relative. Singer rejects the traditional meaning of 
subjectivism, namely, that judgments about human conduct are limited to personal 
perception. He is, however, a subjectivist in the utilitarian sense because he agrees 
with the claim that humans have a subjective motivation to pursue pleasure and to 
avoid pain. But this form of subjectivism is rationally extended to a form of 
ethical egoism.
47
 This motivation promotes an initial desire for preferences or 
interests to be satisfied on a subjective basis. However, once humans begin to 
think ethically, the motivation to have one‘s own preferences satisfied ought to be 
extended to all relevant stakeholders. Singer does not defend ethical objectivity in 
the traditional sense because he claims that: 
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Ethical truths are not written into the fabric of the 
universe: to that extent the subjectivist is correct. If there 
were no beings with desires or preferences of any kind, 
nothing would be of value, and ethics would lack all 
content. On the other hand, once there are beings with 
desires, there are values that are not only the subjective 
values of each individual being. The possibility of being 
led, by reasoning, to the point of view of the universe 
provides as much ―objectivity‖ as there can be.48  
Singer agrees with Sidgwick that a rational moral agent ought to make decisions 
from the detached point of view of the universe: 
The ethical point of view does, as we have seen, require us 
to go beyond a personal point of view to the standpoint of 
an impartial spectator. Thus looking at things ethically is a 
way of transcending our inward-looking concerns and 
identifying ourselves with the most objective point of view 
possible – with, as Sidgwick put it, ―the point of view of 
the universe.‖49 
Having outlined what Singer thinks ethics should not be overly concerned with, 
the next section will reconstruct the way he thinks ethics should be done, once 
reason is allowed to play its proper role. This reconstruction will show that 
Singer‘s three-step process for preference-based decision making provides a 
useful but not definitive method of moral enquiry. It will also show that the most 
significant weakness of the principle of equality is that it exhibits aspects of a 
noble theory that does not work in practice, at least for many complex issues. 
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5.5 What Ethics Is: The Role of Reason 
 
In both Practical Ethics and The Expanding Circle Singer argues that solutions to 
moral dilemmas are possible by appreciating the role that reason plays using what 
he calls a new understanding of ethics.
50
 He tackles some of the most intractable 
issues in practical ethics using this decision making method, and his statement on 
abortion below illustrates his confidence in the process. 
In contrast to the common opinion that the moral question 
about abortion is a dilemma with no solution, I shall show 
that, at least within the bounds of nonreligious ethics, 
there is a clear-cut answer and those who take a different 
view are simply mistaken.
51
 
This is a bold claim because among the various arguments for and against 
abortion, no argument has achieved the statues of being the solution based on 
rationality qua rationality. Later in this chapter, Singer‘s solution will be shown to 
be plausible within the confines of preference calculus, but it also contains several 
basic assumptions that undermine his bold claim.  
 
According to Singer, resolving ethical disputes is done by taking the impartial 
point of view and extending this to a type of equality that gives equal weight to 
the like interests of all relevant stakeholders.
52
 This new understanding involves a 
three-step process of moral enquiry. Rational agents should, first, universalise 
self-interestedness by acknowledging the interests of other stakeholders; second, 
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determine both the quantity and the quality of these interests; and, third, act in a 
way that promotes preference satisfaction overall. Singer‘s explanation for the 
role of reason in ethics is kept simple because his primary concern is to show how 
the principle of equality works. This is partly due to his target audience, but it is 
also because he thinks that the ―proof of the pudding lies in the eating‖ as far as 
preference utilitarianism is concerned.
53
 
 
Step 1: Ethical Action and Universalisation 
 
Singer‘s first step of moral deliberation defends the claim that ethical conduct is 
acceptable only from a point of view that is universal. He cites Moses‘ version of 
the golden rule, the Stoic concept of a universal natural law, Kant‘s categorical 
imperative, and the utilitarian ideal that every stakeholder counts as one as 
justification for the claim that ethics involves universalisation of some sort.
54
 The 
principle of universalisation is also referred to appropriately as the principle of 
fairness because it expands the consideration of ethics to all humans, such as in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
If Singer is right to suggest that some non-human animals exhibit self-awareness, 
then it would also seem reasonable to expand the circle of ethics to include them 
as well. The practical difficulty is how one decides where to draw the line 
between those animals and humans who are only sentient (cats, dogs, human 
fetus) and those animals and humans who are self-aware (humans over 2 years, 
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chimps, dolphins). A pig, for instance, is not technically self-aware, although this 
may be due to a human preference for visual self-awareness. If, as seems to be the 
case, pigs, dogs, and cats differentiate themselves using their sense of smell, then 
the self-awareness circle might include many different species of animals. Singer 
does acknowledge that trying to calculate the qualitative interests of animals and 
humans is a difficult problem, and this issue will be dealt with later in this 
chapter.
55
 
 
Singer explains that while most ethical theories take universalisation for granted, 
no single form of universalisation has been agreed upon. He is right that the 
principle of universalisation provides a boundary condition for ethical thinking 
that is removed from local or particular concerns. To this extent, the oldest 
expression of universalisation, ―treat others only as you consent to being treated in 
the same situation,‖ is as timeless as moral theory gets. Harry Gensler describes 
the Golden Rule as ―wisdom of the ages‖ because it has been replicated in 
numerous and diverse human communities.
56
  
 
Taken literally, however, the golden rule is absurd, which is why both Kant (a 
non-consequentialist) and Sidgwick (a consequentialist) sought to formalise this 
basic principle of fairness into a philosophical maxim. So, the principle of 
universalisation is best understood as a tool that philosophers use to identify the 
boundary of ethical theory, rather than as a means to solve moral problems. A 
major thinker like Kant uses three different formulations of the categorical 
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imperative in an attempt to provide a prescriptive or formal approach to 
universalisation. His explanation of the categorical imperative illustrates the 
problems associated with pushing the principle of universalisation too hard. As a 
descriptive principle of fairness, universalisation remains a useful concept because 
it connects a moral claim with all the relevant stakeholders, but as a prescriptive 
tool it is incapable of solving complex moral dilemmas. 
 
The failure of theories of ethics to agree on how to apply the principle of 
universalisation does not dissuade Singer from attempting an equally bold 
initiative.
57
 He argues that precisely because ethics takes a universal point of 
view, a rational agent can accept that a moral action is never justified if it attempts 
to argue from the standpoint of a partial or sectional group. Therefore, the first 
step in Singer‘s version of moral enquiry is to accept that ethical actions have to 
be universalisable. Singer argues that deontological forms of universalisation are 
too demanding and that the only way to resolve Kantian-type rule conflicts is to 
formulate a complex hierarchy of rules or commands. He claims that the 
consequentialist approach is untouched by complexity problems because the 
emphasis is on goals.
58
 Significantly, he does not say, at this early stage, why 
emphasising goals rather than duty reduces complexity. Later in this thesis this 
claim will be shown to be too bold, largely as a result of Singer‘s subsequent 
recognition of the impractical complexity of preference calculus in The Expanding 
Circle.
59
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Singer argues that universalisation is a useful first step in ethics because it helps to 
differentiate claims about ethics from claims about personal or cultural preference. 
He illustrates this by showing how racism is thwarted by the principle of 
universalisation. Both consequentialists and non-consequentialists provide cogent 
arguments against racism, and the connecting principle for Singer is the principle 
of fairness or universalisation, even though the respective theoretical traditions 
may share almost nothing else in common. In other words, the principle of 
universalisation provides a thin justification for extending the boundary of ethical 
consideration to all humans – and perhaps some non-humans. From a historical 
perspective, this seems appropriate because many moral philosophers have used 
the principle of universalisation as the starting point of moral evaluation, even 
though they have had different perspectives on what constitutes universalisable 
moral argument. 
 
However, the idea that one should universalise ethical deliberation in this way 
does have its critics. Toulmin argues that the Modern shift from particular 
concerns toward universals was a retrograde step because it rejected important 
Middle Age and Renaissance conceptions about ethics that followed Aristotle in 
claiming that the Good lacked universal form. Toulmin says the move toward 
principles of universality had its genesis in the seventeenth-century hope that 
ethics might achieve a formal theoretical status.
60
 He claims that the 
Enlightenment shift toward universals was part of a general shift away from four 
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different kinds of practical knowledge advocated in Renaissance humanism: the 
oral, the particular, the local, and the timely. He further claims that the focus of 
philosophical enquiry during the Modern period ignored particular and local 
concerns because philosophers were searching for a higher-order foundation for 
ethics, one that was abstract, timeless, and universal.
61
 Toulmin further argues that 
this search for an epistemic foundation for ethics was misguided precisely because 
practical philosophy should give timely consideration to oral, particular, and local 
concerns.
62
 In effect he advocates a conception of rationality that targets the 
pragmatist concern for appropriate reasonableness between rational discussants, 
rather than one that is disconnected and impartial. Toulmin agrees with Rorty that 
strong foundationalist claims need to be rejected because they preclude a type of 
thinking that fits the practical rationality necessary for disciplines like medicine 
and law.
63
  
 
Dancy is another philosopher who rejects the focus on moral universalisation. He 
claims that grounding ethical decisions in moral universalisability is mistaken 
because it ignores the difference that new knowledge can make to a given case.
64
 
Because this new knowledge may be sufficient to cause a change of mind about 
moral action, it calls into question what were previously thought to be sufficient 
reasons for moral judgment. Dancy claims that we should not be driven from case 
to case by universalisable moral judgments because we cannot be certain about 
the particular facts of a case on which moral action is judged.
65
 In the same way 
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that an experimental scientist can never be certain that experimental probability 
leads to facts, a moral agent will not be sure that a universalisable moral rule 
should be applied to a particular case. Dancy argues that ethics does not need ―a 
suitable supply of moral principles‖ because practical rationality is about 
particular cases and should always be open, revisable, and conditional to the 
complexities involved.
66
 
 
This is the problem Kant overlooks when he tries to justify how one categorical 
imperative can be used to trump another. In his essay, On a Supposed Right to 
Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, Kant defends the moral duty to be truthful to a 
murderer, even when lying could prevent harm. He states that honesty and 
truthfulness are a ―sacred and unconditional command of reason, and not to be 
limited by any expediency.‖67 Kant is responding to critics who claim that moral 
imperatives are not absolute. Modern philosophers also reject the absolute 
commands of reason that Kant attached to the principle of universalisability. For 
example, MacIntyre argues that as long as one is creative, absurd propositions 
such as ―let everyone except me be treated as a means‖ can be turned into 
categorical imperatives.
68
 This proposition seems blatantly immoral but it is 
consistent with all formulations of Kant‘s categorical imperative. 
 
In Singer‘s case, however, he does not use the principle of universalisation in this 
formal sense. Rather, he uses it as a principle of fairness, to show how ethical 
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thinkers differentiate between ethical claims that are universal and other claims 
that are not. The fact that they universalise is Singer‘s justification for taking this 
first step in moral enquiry. Given this limited understanding, it seems to provide 
an appropriate boundary for articulating moral claims. 
 
Step 2: Ethical Action and Preference Utilitarianism 
 
After grounding ethics in the principle of universalisation, Singer‘s second step of 
moral enquiry is to adopt what he calls a broadly utilitarian position.
69
 He follows 
Sidgwick in claiming that from the ―point of view of the universe,‖ it is self-
evident that the good of one individual counts the same as the good of another.
70
 
In so doing, Singer argues that we can no longer limit ethical consideration to 
humans and that the circle of ethics should therefore be expanded to include all 
sentient beings at one level and self-aware beings at another.
71
 He explains that 
the motivation to include sentient and self-aware animals in ethical consideration 
is simply an extension of the type of arguments now used to oppose racism. When 
rational thinking eventually acknowledged that the colour of a person‘s skin was 
irrelevant to ethical concerns, treating people differently for that reason was no 
longer acceptable. For Singer, the time has come to expand the circle of ethics as 
far as the sentience boundary, because this is the only reasonable comparison that 
can be made between humans and other species.
72
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In many institutions this recognition has already taken place. In Australia, 
research institutions are required to consider the suffering that animals may 
experience in the process of the research. It is routine now for animal research 
ethics committees to reject applications that fail to take animal suffering into 
consideration. When Practical Ethics was written, Singer had in mind 
pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies who, until relatively recently, gave no 
serious consideration to the suffering caused to their animal research subjects. 
Singer‘s method of explanation, however, seems unnecessarily provocative, and 
this sometimes masks the point he is trying to make: 
If experimenters are not prepared to use orphaned humans 
with severe and irreversible brain damage, their readiness 
to use nonhuman animals seems to discriminate on the 
basis of species alone.
73
 
Singer is not suggesting that experimenters ought to start using disabled humans 
as research subjects. He is making the point that a severely disabled child has less 
capacity to suffer (sentience) than many research animals. Singer‘s thought 
experiment highlights a significant problem associated with preference calculus. 
The child in the case above must be orphaned because Singer appreciates that a 
non-orphaned child has parents whose interests need to be considered. This 
accommodation to the loss felt by parents provides a key to appreciating why 
Singer‘s disabled infant illustration fails on utilitarian grounds. If one takes into 
consideration the interests of parents then one ought also to take into 
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consideration the interests of unrelated members of the community who feel 
uncomfortable about using disabled children in this way. If so, then the interest 
calculus is weighted against using disabled children. A fuller account of the 
problems associated with the principle of equal consideration of interests will 
follow later in this chapter, but the following description highlights the problem in 
the above case: 
The principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a 
pair of scales, weighing interests impartially. True scales 
favour the side where the interest is stronger or where 
several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of 
similar interests; but they take no account of whose 
interests they are weighing.
74
 
The capacity to suffer is used by Singer as a short-hand category for sentient 
beings. Because the capacity to suffer is not restricted to humans, a rational agent 
ought to accept that the subjective human preference to avoid suffering must, in 
some sense, also be accepted for all sentient beings.
75
  
The essence of the principle of equal consideration of 
interests is that we give equal weight in our moral 
deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by 
our actions. This means that if only X and Y would be 
affected by a possible act, and if X stands to lose more 
than Y stands to gain, it is better not to do the act. We 
cannot, if we accept the principle of equal consideration of 
interests, say that doing the act is better, despite the facts 
described, because we are more concerned about Y than 
we are about X. What the principle really amounts to is 
this: an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may 
be.
76
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The reason that Singer‘s thought experiment about using disabled orphans as 
research subjects can be rejected, on preference utilitarian grounds, pivots on the 
last sentence in the quote above. When Singer claims both that ―true scales favour 
the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to 
outweigh a smaller number of similar interests‖ and that ―an interest is an interest, 
whoever‘s interest it may be,‖ he seems not to appreciate how this impacts on his 
animal suffering argument. At some stage, the amount of preference satisfaction 
achieved by causing animals to suffer could conceivably be overridden by a 
greater number of people who benefit from the research. Were this to be the case, 
preference calculus justifies animal suffering.  
 
Singer‘s description of a sphere or circle of interest77 is similar to cost-benefit 
protocols commonly used in a stakeholder analysis.
78
 The aim of stakeholder 
analysis is to map the stakeholders and then to give equal consideration to their 
concerns. Equal consideration does not imply that the interests of all stakeholders 
are granted equal value. There are often valid reasons for overriding the interests 
of a small number of stakeholders if the benefits gained from doing so are 
substantial, so equal consideration does not necessarily imply equal treatment. 
 
The difference between Singer‘s preference circle and other stakeholder models is 
the recognition of the individual interests of non-human stakeholders. In other 
stakeholder models, animals are lumped together in species groups. In Singer‘s 
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version of interest calculation, the individual cow, sheep, or chicken has interests 
that ought to be given equal consideration in the same way as that offered to 
individual humans.
79
 A chicken counts for something because it can suffer and 
therefore the decision to use a battery-hen model of egg production must weigh 
the amount of individual chicken suffering against the amount of interest 
satisfaction from farmers and people who eat eggs. If eggs can be harvested from 
hens not held in cages, for little extra cost, then it seems reasonable to choose this 
method. A method of egg harvesting that does not require a battery of hens 
appears to diminish only marginally the interest of egg eaters, whereas the 
suffering of the battery hens appears significant. Because hens are sentient 
creatures, Singer‘s second step of moral evaluation seems valid, at least to some 
extent.  
 
The idea that one should expand the circle of ethics to include animals is a 
reasonable extension to traditional arguments that limit ethics to human concerns 
only. Singer argues that because there is no justification for refusing to take any 
interests into consideration, the ―limit of sentience (using the term as a 
convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or 
experience enjoyment or happiness)‖ is the only defensible boundary of concern 
for a moral agent.
80
 The difficulties associated with implementing this aim might 
diminish its impact, but it still seems a reasonable goal to pursue. Bentham‘s 
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claim, that if a being can suffer, it should be given ethical consideration is 
arguably still the best formula for the ethical consideration of animals.
81
 
 
Step 3: Ethical Action and the Principle of Impartial Concern 
 
Singer‘s third step of moral enquiry requires a moral agent to calculate interests or 
preferences in a manner that achieves the most preference satisfaction for all 
stakeholders on an impartial basis. It is this third step toward preference 
satisfaction that brings into focus the calculus problems referred to earlier. The 
practical problem of calculating equal consideration of interests is critical, and 
Singer‘s initial contention that ethics must work in practice is seriously 
compromised, at least for complex cases. 
 
This section will reconstruct Singer‘s explanation of how equal consideration is 
applied by an impartial rational agent. Using his own examples, the reconstruction 
will show that the equality principle is not straightforward. According to Singer, a 
rational agent ought to acknowledge the principle of universalisation, expand the 
circle of ethics to include all stakeholders (human and non-human), and then 
apply the principle of equality to the stakeholders on an impartial basis. Singer 
describes his position as both ―ambitious‖ and ―tentative.‖82 It is indeed ambitious 
to think, given several millennia of moral thinking, that a new version of 
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utilitarian calculus can achieve what other theories of ethics have thus far failed to 
accomplish. 
 
In Practical Ethics Singer is appropriately tentative because he is attempting to 
show how a consistent utilitarian position deals with ethical issues unresolved 
using traditional methods of ethical decision making. He states that the principle 
of equality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact, because it takes 
seriously the interests of the stakeholders for their own sake.
83
 The defence of this 
claim takes up only four clearly argued pages in Practical Ethics. Singer argues 
that the principle of equality, or equal consideration of interests, has four 
characteristics: 
 
 Equal consideration of interests gives equal weight to the like interests of all 
affected by an action because an interest is an interest, no matter whose 
interest it might be. 
 
 Equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of scales, weighing interests 
impartially and favouring the side on which the interests are stronger 
[qualitative calculus] or on which several interests combine to outweigh a 
smaller number of similar interests [quantitative calculus]; but it takes no 
account of whose interests are being weighed. 
 
 Equal consideration of interests prohibits making our readiness to consider the 
interests of others depend on their abilities or other characteristics, apart from 
having interests. 
 
 Equal consideration of interests is a minimal principle of equality because it 
does not dictate equal treatment.
84
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At one level, this minimal description serves as an appropriate introduction to the 
type of preference calculus Singer advocates. He introduces the equal 
consideration of interests model by arguing that ―the universal aspect of ethics … 
does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly 
utilitarian position.‖85 He also provides an appropriately tentative epistemological 
limitation on the role that equal consideration of interests plays in rational ethical 
deliberation: 
This tentative argument for utilitarianism corresponds to 
the way in which I shall discuss practical issues in this 
book. I am inclined to hold a utilitarian position, and to 
some extent the book may be taken as an attempt to 
indicate how a consistent utilitarianism would deal with a 
number of controversial problems.
86
 
Given these limitations, Practical Ethics achieves this limited aim because the 
bulk of the book is devoted to explaining how a preference utilitarian applies 
equal consideration of interests to complex issues. Singer‘s tentative defence of 
preference utilitarianism mitigates the calculus problems referred to earlier. With 
the publication of The Expanding Circle, however, Singer provides a more 
nuanced philosophical defence of the principle of equality, and he is bolder about 
equal consideration of interests as a decision making protocol.
87
  
 
In The Expanding Circle Singer also changes the name of the calculus required in 
preference utilitarianism. In Practical Ethics the focus is on equal consideration of 
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interests but this phrase is confusing because, as Singer says, ―Equal consideration 
of interests is a minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate 
equal treatment.‖88 This confusion is partly due to the imprecision of Singer‘s 
description of equal consideration of interests. For instance, in The Expanding 
Circle the principle of equality is described as a decision making protocol that 
gives ―equal weight to the interests of all affected by it.‖89 This statement implies 
that all interests have equal weight, but this is not what he means. The essence of 
the principle of equality is expressed more cogently in Practical Ethics where he 
states that an impartial decision maker should give ―equal weight‖ to the ―like 
interests‖ of all stakeholders.90 This is because some stakeholders have stronger 
interests than others. However, the epistemological problem here is that a decision 
that involves both quantitative and qualitative evaluation of interests requires 
inside knowledge of the stakeholders. This requirement bears directly on the 
concept of impartiality, which Singer claims is indispensible for preference 
satisfaction. 
 
In The Expanding Circle Singer describes the process of impartial ethical 
consideration in several ways: as ―the principle of impartial consideration,‖ as ―an 
objective point of interest of all,‖ as an ―imperative of impartial reason,‖ as the 
―viewpoint of an impartial spectator,‖ as an ―appeal to impartial rationality,‖ as a 
―standpoint of impartial reasoning,‖ and as ―the standpoint of impartial 
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concern.‖91 The following reconstruction will use his phrase, ―principle of 
impartial consideration,‖ to mean the process of applying equal consideration of 
like interests from an impartial perspective. In The Expanding Circle Singer 
combines the biological explanation for ethics with a revised account of impartial 
consideration of interests.
92
  
 
As discussed earlier Singer defends evolutionary altruism as the basis for rational 
thinking in ethics. He then argues that reason progressed from altruistic acts to 
acts defined by customary rules and traditions. For Singer, the principle of 
equality is the next logical step that reason must take if it is to progress. In The 
Expanding Circle Singer makes a series of bold assertions concerning the 
practical application of the principle of impartial consideration. For example, 
We can progress toward rational settlement of disputes 
over ethics by taking the element of disinterestedness 
inherent in the idea of justifying one‘s conduct to society 
as a whole, and extending this into the principle, that to be 
ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests 
of all affected by it.
93
 
Inherent in this bold claim is that if rational agents use the principle of impartial 
consideration in ethical thinking then progress can be made towards resolving 
complex ethical issues. This argument resembles the appeal to a standard model 
approach referred to previously. This resemblance is strengthened when Singer 
further argues that the principle of equal consideration of interests stands 
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―alone‖94 and is ―unique‖ as a ―rational basis for ethical decision making.‖95 In 
short, ethical behaviour evolved out of our social instincts and progressed, once 
the capacity to reason developed, to give a rational agent a broader point of view, 
which allowed interest calculation to be done on an impartial basis.
96
 By 
combining the altruistic origin of ethics with an understanding of impartiality, one 
arrives at what Singer calls a new understanding of ethics.
97
 This is the same 
position he advocates in Practical Ethics, but he makes it more assertively in The 
Expanding Circle. He is now convinced that progress toward rational solutions for 
moral issues is possible by taking the idea of impartiality and extending it to give 
equal weight to the like interests of all affected stakeholders.
98
  
 
Singer makes a further strong claim when he argues that ―wherever there are 
rational, social beings, whether on earth or in some remote galaxy, we could 
expect their standards of conduct to tend toward impartiality, as ours have.‖99 The 
claim that a rational social being in another galaxy would also give equal weight 
to the like interests of all affected stakeholders seems overstated. There is no 
obvious evolutionary requirement that a rational social being in another galaxy 
would have a sense of self at all, let alone one similar to humans.  It is quite 
possible that a rational being, without a sense of self, would have an evolutionary 
advantage. For instance, a rational being with a strong social network, but without 
a sense of self, would probably be more efficient in its decision making because 
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its evolutionary fitness would be driven by goals associated with a collective good 
rather than the privatised good associated with individuals. If life on Earth serves 
as a type-case for how life evolves generally, then Singer‘s claim seems 
overstated because social animals with a sense of self are rare. The most common 
and successful evolutionary model of social cooperation on this planet is the type 
of cooperative behaviour found among non-self-aware beings.  
 
Singer‘s other claim, that equal consideration of interests is the only ―rational 
basis for ethical decision making‖ is also overstated. This bold assertion is strange 
given the acknowledgement in The Expanding Circle that preference calculus has 
several practical difficulties, an acknowledgement confirmed by the case studies 
in the next section of this chapter.  
 
The new understanding of ethics promoted in The Expanding Circle provides a 
different set of conditional statements associated with the principle of impartial 
consideration than that offered in Practical Ethics. For instance, in Practical 
Ethics Singer is dismissive of the need for rules, but in The Expanding Circle he 
recognises that rules are necessary for social interaction. In Practical Ethics he 
says that a system of rules breaks down because it has to develop an increasingly 
hierarchical structure of complex rules to resolve conflicts.
100
 In The Expanding 
Circle, however, Singer now acknowledges that the principle of impartial 
consideration is too demanding so that some common morality rules are now 
required.
101
 Because a rational agent could always do something more, impartial 
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consideration is too demanding or, in Singer‘s words, the principle of impartial 
consideration is an ―ethic for saints‖ when most of us are sinners.102 Singer seems 
to recognise, with his saints and sinners analogy, that a fully impartial rational 
being is not going to be found among humans. An impartial rational thinker with a 
sense of self also seems like a contradiction in terms because a being with a strong 
sense of self will have desires and motivations that inhibit its capacity for making 
decisions solely on the basis of the principle of impartial consideration. 
 
The new understanding of ethics defends the need for a set of rules for the 
following reason. Common morality rules are necessary because they trade on a 
―feeling for others‖ rather than on an ―impersonal concern for all.‖103 This is a 
significant shift given the ―proof of the pudding‖ justification for equal 
consideration of interests in Practical Ethics.
104
 This conditional application for 
impartial concern has its own set of problems. For instance, on what basis does an 
impartial agent decide which common morality rules to obey and which not to 
obey? The following case studies used by Singer illustrate how the application of 
the equality principle fails the ―proof of the pudding‖ test. 
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5.6 Impartial Consideration of Interests: Practical Case Studies 
 
Case 1: Battery Hens or Economic Profit 
 
Even in simple cases preference calculus can be complicated so that establishing 
objective criteria on which to assess the quantitative and qualitative interests of 
the stakeholders is challenging. The battery hen example, referred to previously, 
illustrates this point. For instance, it is not clear how an impartial agent can decide 
what criteria to use for both quantitative and qualitative preference satisfaction 
between the farmer and the hens. According to Singer, self-aware beings are 
normally entitled to greater consideration within the circle of interest because self-
aware beings can fit the experience of suffering, or even the potential to suffer, 
into an extended awareness of their own lives.
105
 For example, it could be the case 
that the loss of production to the farmer is so substantial that it would bring a 
significant level of suffering to himself, his family, and his employees. Because 
farmers, employees, and other family members have qualitatively greater capacity 
for suffering than hens, the process of preference or interest satisfaction must be 
weighted in their favour, at least on an individual basis.  
 
If this is the case, then the farmer‘s extended awareness of his own suffering, the 
loss of his livelihood, and the impact on his family may lead to preference 
satisfaction (qualitatively considered) in their favour, even when compared to 
hundreds of caged battery hens. Although it seems counterintuitive, it also seems 
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possible that hens in cages are not as stressed as humans think because research 
on battery hen stress cortical levels is ambiguous.
106
 However, even if one grants a 
significantly higher stress level to battery hens, at what point do combined hen 
interests outweigh combined human interests, impartially considered? 
 
Case 2: A Case of Competing Loyalties 
 
A similar calculus problem arises in the sick father illustration that Singer uses to 
show how impartial consideration ought to be applied.
107
  He describes a situation 
in which he has an existing dinner appointment with three friends but his father 
phones and tells him that he is sick. Singer acknowledges that the decision to visit 
his sick father or to keep his dinner appointment is a matter of judgment, because 
the preferences of the various stakeholders ―do not come with labels attached.‖108 
He claims, however, that an impartial observer can arrive at a ―reasonably 
confident verdict‖ by imagining himself in the position of each of the various 
stakeholders. He can then weigh up the respective preferences and take the action 
that provides the most preference satisfaction.
109
  
 
There are several practical problems in this apparently simple case that impact on 
the efficacy of the principle of impartial consideration as a method of rational 
decision making. For instance, Singer does not consider the relationship between 
himself and the other stakeholders to be morally significant, because the element 
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of disinterestedness precludes this.
110
 However, he also says that because he 
knows his father and his friends well, he can confidently say that his father‘s 
preference to be visited outweighs the combined preferences of the other four 
stakeholders (himself and his three friends). If inside knowledge of the 
stakeholders is necessary for preference satisfaction, however, in what sense is the 
decision disinterested?  
 
A further problem arises with the application of the principle of impartial 
consideration because it is not clear how or why Singer‘s decision to visit his own 
father provides practical guidance in similar cases. In Singer‘s example, he is 
convinced that the regret of his friends is less significant than the disappointment 
of his father. Even if one concedes that Singer is right because he knows his sick 
father and his friends well, the process of impartial consideration does not take 
seriously enough several other factors that can influence rational decision making. 
For instance, it ignores issues of projection and manipulation that can and do take 
place within familial relationships. It ignores the impact a domineering father 
might have on the son‘s decision making capacity. For example, the son knows 
from past experience that his father gets angry if he does not visit when asked to, 
and this could influence his decision making. In this scenario, the father‘s 
preferences are strong-type preferences, but they are also selfish and 
manipulative. According to the principle of impartial consideration, the son would 
have to concede to this selfish behaviour because ―true scales‖ favour the stronger 
interests without taking into account whose interests are being weighed.
111
 Singer 
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appreciates the difficulty of establishing the facts on which to base the principle of 
impartial consideration, but he still maintains that impartial consideration can ―test 
the soundness‖ of ethical choices.112 Given the practical problems highlighted 
above, it is difficult to know what it might mean to ―test the soundness.‖ The 
decision to ignore emotional, psychological, relational, and historical alliances in 
favour of preference satisfaction is both a theoretical and practical problem with 
the principle of impartial consideration model of rational decision making.  
 
Case 3: Warriors and Nut Gatherers 
 
In another illustration Singer uses a dispute over scarce resources between 
warriors and nut gatherers. He contends that the respective claims of the warriors 
and the nut gatherers can only be evaluated by appealing to something other than 
self-interest (such as the warriors need more energy for fighting than nut gathers 
do for gathering nuts).
113
 He argues that a warrior is entitled to a larger share of 
nuts, and that this decision is impartial because it compares energy requirements 
necessary for fighting and for nut gathering. This justification is impartial as far as 
energy requirements are concerned because all warriors get the same amount of 
nuts.
114
  
 
Singer then argues that because both warriors and nut gatherers make a claim for 
more nuts, a valid decision would be one that can be justified to warriors, nut 
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gatherers, and the community in general. Customary morality in this sense, 
according to Singer, is a ―system of rules and precepts guiding our conduct 
towards one another, supported by widely shared judgments of approval … and 
disapproval.‖115 Here again we see a significant shift in thinking between the 
justification for equal consideration of interests in Practical Ethics and the 
justification for the principle of impartial consideration in The Expanding Circle.  
 
Anne Maclean rightly shows that Singer‘s warrior/nut gatherer consideration is 
compatible with the recognition of warriors‘ requirements, but this type of 
impartiality is different from that required by the principle of impartial 
consideration.
116
 Maclean argues that Singer equivocates on the meaning of 
impartial consideration, between the decision to accept that moral standards must 
be disinterested or impartial and the suggestion that impartiality implies equal 
consideration.
117
 She argues that when Singer makes a moral judgment between 
the respective needs of warriors and nut gatherers he argues for a decision that is 
acceptable to all members of the group, a type of customary morality.
118
 McLean 
is right here because customary rules are impartial in one sense, because they 
apply to every situation of the same kind, but they are also partial in another, 
because they are derived from a particular communal understanding of why 
warriors ought to get more nuts than the nut gatherers. The type of impartial 
judgment necessary for the principle of impartial consideration is not like this 
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because the moral agent places herself in the role of all the stakeholders in order 
to work out which action provides the most preference satisfaction.
119
  
 
Case 4: Earthquake Triage 
 
Singer offers a further justification for the equality principle with two illustrations 
of what one ought to do when confronted by victims of an earthquake when one 
has limited resources. In the first case Victim A has a crushed leg and is in agony 
while Victim B is in slight pain.
120
 In this case Singer argues that equal treatment 
(one shot of morphine each) will not do because A will still be in great pain after 
only one shot of morphine. More pain is relieved by unequal distribution because 
A is in considerably greater pain than B. Singer states that this type of assessment 
―is in line with the principle of declining marginal utility,‖ a guiding principle that 
―for a given individual, a set amount of something is more useful when people 
have little of it than when they have a lot.‖121 When coupled with the principle of 
equal consideration of interests, more weight is granted to individual preferences 
if greater overall preference satisfaction can be achieved by unequal treatment. 
Thus, in this case Singer suggests that the preference value of A is greater than 
that of B.  
 
There is not much to argue about in this case as long as the facts of the case are as 
given. It does seem reasonable to give A all the pain relief, but whether one needs 
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the justification of preference calculus, or any ethical justification at all, is a moot 
point. One could argue that this case illustrates a practical rather than an ethical 
dilemma. If the decision maker decided to give one shot of morphine to each 
patient, she could hardly be described as committing an unethical act, given the 
emergency setting.  
 
To illustrate how preference satisfaction works in a more complex setting, Singer 
alters the scenario so that Victim A has now lost a leg and is in danger of losing a 
toe while Victim B has an injured leg that can be saved.
122
 Once again, the 
rational decision maker only has enough medical resources to treat one patient. 
Singer argues that the rational impartial observer should treat the less seriously 
injured person first, Victim B, because it is worse to lose a leg than it is to lose a 
toe.
123
 In this case Singer claims that one should not use the principle of declining 
marginal utility because treating the less serious patient provides more preference 
satisfaction. This is because the more seriously injured patient has already lost a 
leg and the scarce resources can only be used to save a toe, whereas, by devoting 
the resources to the less seriously injured person, a leg is saved. 
 
This account is obviously a thought experiment, which Singer uses to illustrate 
how complex situations require different types of reasoning. The problem with his 
account, however, is that it relies on the facts of the case being known to the 
impartial rational observer. Ethical decision making using equal consideration of 
interests involves a subjective analysis by the rational agent of the qualitative and 
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quantitative preferences of individual stakeholders. The subjective nature of equal 
consideration and the difficulty of consistency are symptomatic of problems 
associated with the predictive calculations necessary in all forms of utilitarianism. 
Utilitarian theories in general pivot on the ability of the rational agent to ascertain 
correctly the product of the calculus: for Bentham it is the pain/pleasure calculus; 
for Mill it is the quality of happiness; and for Singer it is preference satisfaction. It 
is for this reason that Singer refers to himself as a cognitivist, at least as far as 
ethics is concerned, because preference calculus requires that the facts of a given 
case are in some sense knowable by the impartial observer.
124
 
 
Singer uses the two cases above to illustrate what an impartial observer ought to 
do in an emergency. His rational solution is not what would happen in a real 
emergency, however, because in a real emergency the person with scarce 
resources is a paramedic who by definition is not an impartial observer. A 
paramedic trained in emergency medicine knows that facts of triage medicine can 
be elusive. It is for this reason that the actions of an individual paramedic ought to 
be governed more by training and precedent than by rational preference 
satisfaction.
125
  
 
This case illustrates the practice-guided type of enquiry that will be advocated in 
Chapter 7 because the paramedic works within the tradition of medicine or, more 
specifically, emergency triage, so that she is guided by established ―internal 
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goods‖ of emergency practice.126 As a paramedic, she is not the arbiter of what 
constitutes ―good‖ decision making in emergency situations. She is responsible 
for making the decision about who to treat and not to treat, but even here there are 
specific action guides within the practice of triage medicine. Hence, a paramedic 
does not make impartial decisions based on facts but acts according to standard 
triage protocol. The most common form of triage uses a colour-coded 
prioritisation system. A triage officer in charge might already have tagged 
patients. The triage officer makes a judgment call about the severity of injuries 
and tags each patient with a card folded in one of four ways.
127
 
 
1. RED  Top priority: Casualties whose injuries are  
considered life-threatening. 
 
2. YELLOW Second priority: Casualties whose injuries are  
not considered life-threatening but need 
treatment prior to transport. 
 
3. GREEN Walking wounded: Casualties who are able to  
walk and can be transported from the scene. 
 
4. BLACK Dead: left for certification by a medical officer. 
 
Good decision making in triage medicine conforms to good practice, and good 
practice is determined over time by generations of people trained in emergency 
medicine. Triage (sorting) is thus a pragmatic tool used by paramedics to make 
emergency medical decisions because the concept of good medicine is a 
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historically extended practice and therefore not amenable to the impartial 
consideration of a rational agent. 
 
If the facts of the first simple case are taken for granted, then the decision maker 
using either the equality principle or medical triage would probably do the same 
thing. In the second, more complex case, however, the rational preference 
decision maker risks making a wrong decision, on utilitarian terms, because 
Victim A may in fact be more seriously injured than first thought. If, for the sake 
of explanation, the diagnosis of A is wrong, because he has an aortic tear as well 
as having lost a leg, then his life-saving treatment would trump, on preference 
utilitarian terms, the leg-saving treatment that Victim B requires. In a complex 
situation, the predictive requirements of utilitarianism necessitate that the rational 
agent make sound judgments about preferences on an impartial basis when it is 
probably not possible to do so. 
 
The paramedic using triage protocol, on the other hand, would be considered to 
have followed good practice even if she misses the aortic tear and treats Victim B 
first. All that the paramedic need do is to act in a way that is consistent with 
standard triage practice. Diagnosis at emergency sites must of necessity be based 
on professional judgment, and if the judgment of the triage officer turns out to be 
wrong, this does not make the actions of the triage officer bad practice; it simply 
means an unfortunate decision was made in a difficult situation. Adding 
complexity to the simple scenarios that Singer uses is not an exercise in pedantry 
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because complexity provides a more realistic boundary for the types of ethical 
decision making common in medicine.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Several problems arise in relation to Singer‘s argument for preference calculus, 
primarily because he overstates the efficacy of his version of preference 
utilitarianism in a pluralist society such as Australia. If one accepts both Singer‘s 
initial argument in Practical Ethics that the study of ethics should not promote 
noble theories that do not work in practice and also his latter concession from The 
Expanding Circle that the decision to take ―seriously the idea of impartial concern 
for all would be impossibly demanding,‖128 then the only conclusion one can draw 
from this is that the principle of equality should not be promoted. Certainly one 
should not be as assertive as Singer is when he claims that the equality principle 
allows progress towards settling disputes over ethics,
129
 that impartial 
consideration is the only rational basis for ethics,
130
 and that the principle of 
impartial consideration is a uniquely rational basis for ethical decision making.
131
 
 
These overstated claims for the role that reason plays in practical ethics serve to 
illustrate Williams‘ concern that simplification in ethics is a mistake, because 
moral deliberation is necessarily complex and engages human characteristics other 
than the capacity for rational thinking. In this regard, Singer‘s version of practical 
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decision making suffers from a problem similar to the Beauchamp and Childress 
model. The moral life is too complex for the type of decision making model that 
Singer promotes. While it is certainly a good idea to give serious consideration to 
the interests of all relevant stakeholders, Singer‘s claim that impartial 
consideration allows progress towards solving complex moral dilemmas is 
overstated.
132
  
 
The focus of this thesis is the cash value or practical consequences for human 
conduct of decision making protocols in practical ethics. From this pragmatist 
perspective, Singer‘s preference utilitarian decision making protocol has 
diminished cash value in a pluralist society. When Singer presents his version of 
preference utilitarianism as something like a standard model of ethics for rational 
agents, he overstates its efficacy, at least in a pluralist society. There is no 
consensus among philosophers, the primary rational discussants in moral 
philosophy, that Singer‘s principle of impartial consideration is as efficacious as 
he contends. Moreover, in a pluralist society, the equality principle lacks the 
explanatory power necessary for it to trump other theories of ethics.  
 
Another significant problem with Singer‘s equality principle is that it is 
ambiguous. This ambiguity relates to whether Singer is a cognitivist or a non-
cognitivist, as far as ethical truths are concerned. In a series of essays published in 
1999, Singer responded to Frank Jackson‘s claim that he was a non-cognitivist in 
relation to moral truth because Jackson assumed that Singer‘s version of 
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preference utilitarianism has the same non-cognitivist basis as Richard Hare‘s 
moral prescriptivism.
133
 For Hare, a utilitarian conclusion can be achieved so long 
as one knows the facts of a given case and is prepared to universalise ought-type 
statements to maximise the preferences of all concerned. Jackson interprets 
Singer‘s explanation in Practical Ethics as a non-cognitivist appeal to inferences 
that are not true in the epistemic sense but which do contain prescriptive force or 
ought-status.
134
 In reply, Singer says that Jackson is wrong to refer to him as a 
non-cognitivist. While he does agree with Hare that moral statements contain 
imperatives, Singer states that he follows Sidgwick in claiming, ―it is a self-
evident truth that from ‗the point of view of the universe,‘ the good of one 
individual is of no greater significance than the good of another.‖135 Thus, as far 
as Singer is concerned, there is at least one important ethical judgment that is self-
evidently true, which is why he would not call himself a non-cognitivist.  
 
Singer‘s appeal to ―the point of view of the universe‖ was addressed in Chapter 1 
so it suffices to repeat here Williams‘ point that the disengaged or impartial moral 
agent is precisely what one does not want when dealing with complex moral 
issues.
136
 The four case studies above illustrate this point. In the first case, while it 
seems counterintuitive, it is possible that healthy hens in battery cages are less 
stressed than healthy free-range hens. In the case of competing loyalties, Singer 
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ignores the emotional and psychological issues that impact on the strength of 
preference satisfaction. A strong preference can result from being selfish, or 
narcissistic, or even cruel, so a rational agent should not satisfy these preferences 
simply because they are strongly held. In the triage case, the complexity of the 
second scenario diminishes the ability of a rational agent to provide the most 
preference satisfaction because the facts of the case are too complicated. In this 
case the practice of triage medicine offers a superior decision making protocol 
than the principle of impartial consideration. In the long run, moreover, the utility 
of triage medicine is superior to preference calculus because it is driven by a 
teleological imperative (health) that is useful in many different settings. 
 
Perhaps the major difficulty with Singer‘s position is one he recognises. Toward 
the end of The Expanding Circle he acknowledges that ―taking seriously the idea 
of impartial concern for all‖ is ―impossibly demanding,‖ because there is always 
something else we could have done better, and so some common morality rules 
are required because an ―ethic of rules‖ places appropriate limits on what is 
expected of a moral agent.
137
 Further on in the same passage Singer offers another 
reason for having rules, namely, that we ―lack the time and information needed‖ 
for ―long and involved calculations.‖138 This more realistic assessment of 
impartial consideration is in stark contrast to his earlier assessment in The 
Expanding Circle that ―standards of conduct‖ for self-aware beings anywhere in 
the universe will ―tend toward impartiality, as ours have.‖139 Having recognised 
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that impartial consideration of interests is too demanding, he goes full circle and 
says that some ―common morality‖ rules are therefore now required.140 Rules are 
now necessary for the following reasons: 
 
 To limit moral obligations 
 To make them more personal 
 To educate the young 
 To reduce the need for intricate calculations 
 To control the temptation to bend ethical calculations in our own favour 
 To build a commitment to truthfulness that is essential for 
communication.
141
  
 
Singer maintains that rules are now ―normally useful and normally to be obeyed 
but always ultimately subject to critical scrutiny‖ from the standpoint of impartial 
concern.
142
 He does not seem to appreciate that this appeal to rules that are 
normally to be obeyed but sometimes can be overridden lacks rational application 
unless one knows in what circumstance they ought to be overridden. This problem 
is most clearly seen in his book on life and death issues, which is devoted to 
debunking the traditional ethics of ―Bishops and conservative bioethicists‖ who 
argue for the sanctity of life principle.
143
 Singer, like Kant before him, argues that 
the time has come for a Copernican revolution in applied ethics, and the way to do 
this is to find a new set of rules or commands that are not based on sanctity of life 
principles.
144
 He calls this revolution ―the new approach to life and death.‖145 The 
problem for Singer is that the old approach, a system of rules associated with 
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respect for the sanctity of life, exhibits all the characteristics of a system of rules 
that he claims ought normally to be obeyed. As a result Singer‘s advocacy for the 
principle of impartial concern lacks application in a pluralist society because 
common morality rules are too thin to be used in a way that provides progress 
towards settling disputes over ethics.
146
 Consensus over thin moral rules breaks 
down when these rules are applied to complex cases because rational discussants 
derive their views from a diverse array of incommensurable moral positions. The 
point of departure for the next chapter is MacIntyre‘s explanation of the 
conceptual incommensurability of rival moral arguments, like those above, and 
his historicist justification for an alternative tradition-guided approach to moral 
enquiry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 100. 
 203 
CHAPTER 6: TRADITION-GUIDED ENQUIRY 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The central claim of this thesis is that in a pluralist society, a practice-guided form 
of moral enquiry offers greater explanatory power – over both the agreements and 
the disagreements within practical ethics – than other forms of moral enquiry 
because it trades on a thin consensus within practices that already exists. This 
chapter will focus on one of the most strident critics of the contemporary approach 
to decision making in practical ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre. In an essay with the 
provocative title, ―Does applied ethics rest on a mistake?,‖ MacIntyre answers in 
the affirmative.
1
 He claims that the basic mistake is the attempt to make decision 
making impartial and disinterested, based on a construction of the self that is 
independent of a moral agent‘s personal history and sense of purpose. The central 
claim of MacIntyre‘s essay is that the kind of activity that is presumed in decision 
making protocols used in practical ethics does not exist, at least not in a form that 
can produce rational agreement.
2
 This lack of agreement, for MacIntyre, leaves 
moral philosophy in a state of crisis.  
 
This chapter will first outline MacIntyre‘s ―moral crisis‖ thesis directed at 
contemporary approaches to practical ethics. A reconstruction of his tradition-
guided methodology will follow, through his three major publications on this 
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theme, in which he makes the case that the crisis is so dire that the time has come 
to return to an earlier from of moral enquiry (Aristotelian Thomism). Two 
propositions concerning MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided methodology will be 
defended in this chapter. First, it will be argued that although MacIntyre‘s case for 
tradition-dependent rationality is sound, the consequences that flow from this 
realisation are not as devastating as he thinks. Second, it will also be argued that 
the commitment MacIntyre makes to a revised form of Thomism is not sustained, 
even on his own terms. 
 
6.2 Epistemological Crisis and Moral Enquiry 
 
In the Prologue to the third edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre states that he has 
not yet found any reason for abandoning his central thesis that the Modern 
expression of ethics is deprived of context.
3
 By context he means an Aristotelian-
style context of ―practical beliefs and of supporting habits of thought, feeling, and 
action … a context in which moral judgments were understood as governed by 
impersonal standards justified by a shared conception of the human good.‖4  
 
MacIntyre argues, following Aristotle, that practical reasoning of this sort works 
because adherents to a tradition (generals, judges, surgeons or natural scientists) 
recognise that skills associated with their particular practice are communicated by 
case-histories and precedents rather than by set precepts. Moreover, MacIntyre 
argues that ―the precepts cannot be understood except in terms of their application 
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in the case-histories; and the development of the precepts cannot be understood 
except in terms of the history of both precepts and case-histories.‖5 So for 
MacIntyre, the ―teaching of method‖ within a tradition is ―nothing other than the 
teaching of a certain kind of history‖ in which a practice has evolved.6 
 
MacIntyre‘s historicist approach to understanding morality pivots on the idea that 
human beings are essentially story-tellers and that moral principles and rules are 
constituted by and constitutive of a broader narrative or tradition. He claims that a 
moral agent can only answer the question, ―What am I to do?‖ once she has 
established the story or stories in which she is embedded.
7
 Because an 
individual‘s search for the moral life is conducted within specific traditions, 
conclusions drawn are constitutive of, and constituted by, a particular narrative 
explanation of the moral life. Objective rationality for MacIntyre is therefore 
found ―not in rule-following‖ but in ―rule-transcending‖ and ―knowing how and 
when to put rules and principles to work and when not to.‖8 
 
MacIntyre‘s teleological emphasis for moral enquiry stands in contrast to his 
pessimistic assessment of Modern moral philosophy. The hypothesis that 
MacIntyre advances in After Virtue is that the language of morality is in a ―state of 
grave disorder.‖9 In the chapter entitled ―The Nature of Moral Disagreement 
Today and the Claims of Emotivism,‖ MacIntyre explains that the disorder in 
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moral enquiry can be seen in the adversarial mode of contemporary moral debate: 
militarism or pacifism, a right to bodily integrity or abortion is murder, justice as 
a form of socialism or justice as defined by the free market.
10
 MacIntyre argues 
that there are three characteristics of the disordered state of contemporary moral 
debate. First, using a concept adapted from the philosophy of science, MacIntyre 
suggests that rival moral arguments are conceptually incommensurable: 
Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be 
easily expanded so as to be made so; the conclusions do 
indeed follow from the premises. But the rival premises 
are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the 
claims of one as against another… From our rival 
conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises; but 
when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and 
the invocation of one premise against another becomes a 
matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion.
11
 
The second characteristic of contemporary moral debate, according to MacIntyre, 
is that each of the moral discussants thinks that his or her respective propositions 
are based on impersonal rational argument: 
the appeal is to a type of consideration which is 
independent of the relationship between speaker and 
hearer. Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal 
criteria—the existence independently, of the preference or 
attitudes of speaker and hearer, of standards of justice or 
generosity or duty.
12
 
The third characteristic is that the conceptually incommensurable premises of 
rival arguments all have diverse historical origins. Some appeal to ―Aristotle‘s 
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account of the virtues,‖ some to a Marxist ―concept of liberation,‖ some to a 
Lockean concept of rights, and some to a ―view of universalisability‖ following 
Kant or the ―moral law‖ following Aquinas.13 In an earlier essay entitled ―Why is 
the search for the foundations of ethics so frustrating?‖ MacIntyre‘s discontent 
with applied moral philosophy had already been articulated:  
Premises about moral law with a Thomistic and biblical 
background are matched against premises about individual 
rights that owe a good deal to Tom Paine, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and John Locke; and both are in conflict 
with post-Benthamite notions of utility. I call such 
premises incommensurable with each other precisely 
because the metaphor of weighing claims that invoke 
rights against claims that invoke utility, or claims that 
invoke justice against claims that invoke freedom, in some 
sort of moral scale is empty of application. There are no 
moral scales … hence moral arguments terminate very 
quickly and in another way are interminable.
14
 
MacIntyre also encapsulates his distrust about the idea of moral progress in the 
title of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Here again he argues that the attempt 
to replace authority with reason should be rejected because the Modern appeal to 
principles that are ―undeniable by any rational person,‖ independent of ―social and 
cultural particularities,‖ is a mistake since neither the Enlightenment thinkers nor 
their successors could agree on what these undeniable principles are.
15
 Here again 
MacIntyre contends that moral philosophy of the Modern period failed to see how 
connected moral arguments are to the historical tradition from which they emerge: 
What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to 
and what we now need to recover is … a conception of 
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rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception 
according to which the standards of rational justification 
themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which 
they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the 
limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their 
predecessors within the history of that same tradition.
16
 
Two years later MacIntyre published the third book on the same theme with the 
title, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Once again he emphasises the 
disorder of contemporary moral debate: 
Debate between fundamentally opposing standpoints does 
occur; but it is inevitably inconclusive. Each warring 
position characteristically appears irrefutable to its own 
adherents; indeed in its own terms and by its own 
standards of argument it is in practice irrefutable.
17
 
MacIntyre claims that the Enlightenment vision for a clear and distinct method of 
moral enquiry has remained largely unfulfilled. Moral enquiry has instead evolved 
into distinct forms of emotivism, by which he means evaluative moral judgment 
based on expressions of personal preference, attitudes, or feelings.
18
 MacIntyre 
thinks that emotivism describes the state of moral argument because it accurately 
describes what happens in the search for impersonal and objective criteria for 
moral action. 
Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments 
and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or 
feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character.
19
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It is the emotivist forms of contemporary practical ethics that MacIntyre finds 
most problematic. The preoccupation with principles in practical ethics illustrates 
the fragmentation of moral enquiry that MacIntyre contests. In the four-principle 
approach of Beauchamp and Childress, the moral agent is encouraged to juggle 
principles on an impartial basis and then to produce a rational account of the 
juggling process, justifying why one principle trumps another in a given case. 
Similarly, with the equality principle advocated by Singer, a moral agent takes 
into account established moral rules, the qualitative and quantitative interests of 
all the stakeholders (present and future), and then impartially evaluates which set 
of interests trumps all others. In contrast, MacIntyre asserts ―that in [present-day] 
moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for 
expressions of personal preference.‖20 
 
MacIntyre‘s assessment of what a moral agent ought to do, given the present state 
of disorder in contemporary moral enquiry, is to reengage with a historicist 
method of moral enquiry that can be traced back to Aristotle. In the Prologue to 
the third edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre provides an interesting biographical 
note that sheds light on a transition in his thinking between 1981 when After 
Virtue was first published and 1988 when Whose Justice? Which Rationality? was 
published. He states that when he wrote After Virtue he was already an 
Aristotelian but not yet a Thomist, but that he became a Thomist soon after 
because he became convinced that ―Aquinas was in some respects a better 
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Aristotelian than Aristotle, that not only was he an excellent interpreter of 
Aristotle‘s texts, but that he had been able to extend and deepen both Aristotle‘s 
metaphysical and his moral enquiries.‖21  
 
This transition will become clearer as the following section unpacks MacIntyre‘s 
tradition-guided method of enquiry. The aim of his historicist methodology is to 
reorient moral enquiry: 
If the characteristics of our own moral arguments which I 
have identified—most notably the fact that we 
simultaneously and inconsistently treat moral argument as 
an exercise of our rational powers and as mere expressive 
assertion—are symptoms of moral disorder, we ought to 
be able to construct a true historical narrative in which at 
an earlier stage moral argument is very different in kind.
22
   
6.3 Tradition-Guided Enquiry 
 
MacIntyre‘s thinking on tradition-guided enquiry has evolved through the 
publication of three major works on moral theory: After Virtue (1981), Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry 
(1990). This historicist emphasis was evident in earlier material, however, where 
MacIntyre claimed that ―moral concepts are embodied in and constitutive of forms 
of social life.‖23 Nevertheless, the application of this model to Aristotelian and 
then Thomistic traditions evolved during the publication of the above trilogy. 
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After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981, 1984, 2007) 
 
A pessimistic assessment of moral argument provides the starting point of 
MacIntyre‘s most significant contribution to moral theory, After Virtue. He 
describes the language of morality as being in a ―state of grave disorder‖ because 
some of the assumptions about rationality associated with the Cartesian or 
Modern period are unreliable and others are simply fictional.
24
 However, for 
MacIntyre the main weakness of the Modern period was a failure to appreciate the 
role that history and tradition play in the way moral concepts are utilised. 
 
The impartial observer status, for instance, is fictional, according to MacIntyre, 
because a moral agent is already embedded in a social milieu in which the 
boundary conditions of rational argument have been defined in specific ways. He 
further claims that the Modern attempt to remove concepts such as truth and 
reality from their teleological framework deprives these terms of the only context 
in which they can be made ―fully intelligible and rationally defensible.‖25 
 
Once these foundationalist assumptions are rejected, MacIntyre argues that the 
attempt to weigh one moral argument against another, on some impartial basis, 
breaks down because the so-called point of view of the universe is local, timely, 
and subjective for each moral agent.
26
 He suggests that because protagonists in a 
moral debate can draw conclusions from valid inferences, the metaphor of 
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weighing competing moral claims against each other, such as rights against utility 
or justice against freedom, does not work. The reason for this failure is that there 
are no moral scales that a moral agent can use to show how one moral argument 
trumps another.
27
 MacIntyre argues that because protagonists in a moral debate do 
not often agree on the foundational premises on which the debate is conducted, 
agreement is therefore either rare or accidental. The more common characteristic 
of moral debate, according to MacIntyre, is that moral argument gives way to an 
―increasingly shrill battle of assertion with counter-assertion.‖28 
 
After Virtue is a dogged either/or presentation of Aristotelian teleological morality 
or no morality (except on Nietzsche‘s terms). Nietzsche‘s legacy is evident in the 
first chapter, entitled ―A Disquieting Suggestion,‖ where MacIntyre argues that 
most of what passes for moral argument since the Enlightenment needs to be 
rejected.
29
 The climax of After Virtue is a comparison between Nietzsche‘s 
scathing attack on moral objectivity and Aristotle‘s practical telos.30 MacIntyre 
argues that it was Nietzsche, more than any other philosopher, who perceived 
correctly that objective moral claims were really expressions of a subjective 
will.
31
 Richard Neuhaus describes MacIntyre‘s position as a choice between the 
teleological virtues of Aristotle and the moral nihilism of Nietzsche, but this 
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misrepresents MacIntyre.
32
 MacIntyre agrees with Nietzsche that the objective 
status of moral concepts such as natural rights and utility is fictitious, so he is not 
suggesting that a moral agent has to choose between Aristotle and Nietzsche.
33
 
Rather, he argues that because Nietzsche is right about the epistemic failure of 
Modernity, Aristotle‘s practical rationality offers a more productive alternative for 
the moral life.
34
 
 
MacIntyre gives three reasons why moral debate is in such disarray. First, a 
complex moral argument employs specific normative and evaluative concepts, 
and there is no rational way to adjudicate between competing moral claims. 
Second, independently of one another, competing moral arguments falsely purport 
to be based on concepts that are impersonally rational. Third, contemporary moral 
debate lacks awareness of the historical transition of meaning that occurs over 
time to moral concepts such as justice or moral duty.
35
 Given the parlous state of 
moral enquiry, MacIntyre advocates a return to a type of tradition-guided enquiry, 
first, by appreciating the setting in which moral precepts were first used and have 
since evolved and, second, by evaluating how well a moral tradition supports what 
he calls the telos of a ―whole human life.‖36 MacIntyre argues that this historicist 
method is not relativistic because moral progress is possible once the Aristotelian 
teleological link between the self and social identity is made.
37
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The link between rationality and culture in After Virtue is the main reason why 
MacIntyre was initially considered to advocate a type of moral relativism, but this 
claim misrepresents his position. MacIntyre does advocate a form of 
epistemological relativism, but he is not a moral relativist, primarily because he 
agrees with Aristotle that a teleological purpose is the primary motivation for 
human flourishing.
38
 The charge of relativism is partly due to the time MacIntyre 
took to explain the distinction between moral pluralism, which he endorses, and 
moral relativism, which he does not. Several years following the publication of 
After Virtue he published articles that deal directly with the confusion between 
pluralism and relativism, where he defends a type of moral enquiry that evaluates 
the historical benefits of pluralism from a teleological perspective.
39
 
 
MacIntyre advocates a teleological approach precisely because of the failure of 
the Enlightenment to provide objective criteria for moral deliberation. This 
teleological emphasis transcends the limited goods of particular practices because 
it constitutes the good of a unified human life. MacIntyre argues that the search 
for moral virtue is constituted within a particular tradition and is constitutive of a 
search for the telos of the whole human life for the individual concerned. For 
MacIntyre, a teleological account of ethics should involve what he calls a 
fundamental contrast between ―man-as-he happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-
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if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖40 As such, After Virtue involves an historical 
analysis of various traditions and a tentative conclusion about which tradition he 
thinks best serves the telos of the whole human life. 
 
For MacIntyre, practical rationality in a living tradition is made coherent through 
the application of internal goods over time. Rational analysis of a living tradition, 
therefore, involves an ongoing socially embodied discussion between practitioners 
and others about the goods that are constitutive of that tradition.
41
 MacIntyre 
argues that a living tradition will go through various epistemological crises, and 
he uses this transition stage both to examine how well the tradition deals with its 
own epistemic claims and also to compare how well one moral tradition stacks up 
against another.
42
 
 
Changes in the methodology associated with utilitarian calculus illustrate for 
MacIntyre how a moral tradition deals with its own epistemic shortcomings. 
Bentham‘s hedonistic utilitarianism was reformulated by Mill primarily because 
an objective standard for calculating the quantity of pleasure could not be 
sustained, and thus an alternative hypothesis that recognised qualitative 
differences between pleasures was required.
43
 Similarly, Singer‘s argument for 
preference utilitarianism transcends some of the epistemic problems associated 
with Mill‘s higher quality pleasure calculus. MacIntyre claims that understanding 
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the history of justification in a moral argument is integral to a living tradition like 
utilitarianism, because contemporary moral claims are derived from ―historically 
extended, socially embodied‖ arguments about the internal goods that ―constitute 
that tradition.‖44  
 
Behind the teleological purpose that is integral to long-lived human societies, 
MacIntyre says a central thesis begins to emerge, namely, that humans are story-
telling animals. So the key question for a moral agent is not, ―What am I to do?,‖ 
following Kant and Bentham, but to ask, ―Of what story or stories do I find 
myself a part?‖ following Aristotle.45 MacIntyre contends that because stories are 
essential to understanding the unity of a person‘s life, questions about moral good 
are best understood in the context of how an individual can fulfil the teleological 
expectations in these stories. The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative 
quest ―embodied in a single life.‖46  
 
The narrative quest, according to MacIntyre, is a search for the final telos of 
human life, a search that enables moral virtues to be understood in the context of a 
teleological Good. These virtues are described by MacIntyre as dispositions that 
are necessary both to ―sustain practices‖ and to form character because they 
supply a moral agent with both ―self-knowledge‖ and an ―increasing knowledge 
of the good.‖47 
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This two-sided quest can be explained further. In the first instance, MacIntyre 
acknowledges that a moral agent is involved in a quest for a set of virtues that 
sustain, in Aristotelian terms, the telos of human flourishing (courage, honesty, 
respect, etc.). The primary disposition towards a teleological concept of virtue 
also sustains a moral agent in the secondary pursuit of a set of goods that are 
internal to particular practices such as medicine, philosophy, painting, or 
architecture. 
 
The primary pursuit of human flourishing is deliberately vague in Aristotle 
because he maintains that a moral virtue such as courage is the mean between 
extremes of foolishness and cowardliness. According to this definition, courage is 
a state of character that is conditionally measured with respect to the right time, 
the right people, and for the right ends.
48
 MacIntyre argues that the good life must 
transcend Aristotle‘s metaphysical idea of happiness. For MacIntyre, the good life 
also involves a secondary pursuit that enables a moral agent to ―understand what 
more and what else the good life for man is.‖49 This secondary pursuit, for 
MacIntyre, involves a narrative account of the internal goods that sustain a 
practice. Virtuous actions require a disposition to achieve the goods that are 
internal to the practice and also to sustain the practice in its teleological quest. For 
MacIntyre, the virtues ―find their point and purpose‖ in the way they define the 
internal goods that sustain relationships within a practice.
50
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These internal goods sustain both the form of life and the traditions in which an 
individual finds him or herself engaged.
51
 The concept of a ―practice‖ in 
MacIntyre‘s work is sufficiently nuanced and useful to warrant it being quoted in 
full.  
By a ―practice‖ I am going to mean any coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.
52
 
Tradition-constituted enquiry is therefore a type of analytic method that examines 
both the primary and secondary pursuits of a tradition by focusing on its own 
narrative account of its practices. A practice, moral or otherwise, is made 
intelligible, according to MacIntyre, only from within a ―larger and longer history 
of the tradition through which the practice in its present form was conveyed to 
us‖; thus the history of a single life is therefore characteristically ―embedded‖ and 
―made intelligible‖ in ―the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions.‖53 
 
MacIntyre uses the first eight chapters of After Virtue to defend his initial claim 
concerning the parlous state of moral enquiry. The centerpiece of After Virtue, 
both literally and philosophically, is chapter nine, where MacIntyre explains why 
Nietzsche and Aristotle, albeit in different ways, offer a way forward. The way 
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forward in chapters ten through seventeen is based on two central premises that 
tentatively point to a new method of enquiry. First, he explains how Nietzsche 
perceived more clearly than anyone else why the attempt to provide a foundation 
for moral enquiry based on reason alone had failed. Second, he explains why a 
renewed appreciation of Aristotelian virtues is necessary to overcome this 
failure.
54
  
 
The eighteenth and final chapter is subtitled ―Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and 
St Benedict‖ and contains an appeal to return to forms of life in which the moral 
virtues can be sustained. MacIntyre argues that moral enquiry is now at a turning 
point, for if his account of contemporary moral discourse is accurate, then ―what 
matters at this stage‖ is to establish what he calls ―local forms of community‖ that 
can sustain us through the ―new dark ages‖ that are already upon us. 55  The end of 
After Virtue seems equally as pessimistic as the beginning because MacIntyre 
claims that the predicament we find ourselves in will not be solved without 
establishing a form of moral community that is consistent with what he calls 
―another – but doubtless very different – St. Benedict.‖56 
 
Even sympathetic readers of After Virtue found this conclusion unsatisfactory. 
After strenuously arguing that reason is itself tradition-dependent, MacIntyre‘s 
tentative conclusion contains an appeal to a particular tradition within 
Catholicism, one he thinks offers a paradigmatic community for nurturing the 
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moral life. Whether or not he is right about the Benedictine community carries 
little significance because he does not defend the claim. This concluding sentence 
of After Virtue reads like an unconvinced attempt to avoid the relativistic 
comparisons of traditions. It appears that MacIntyre attempts to deal with his own 
version of an epistemic crisis because once having deconstructed Modernity he 
seems inclined to want more certainty about the moral life than Aristotle offers. 
 
In the Postscript to the second edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre responds to 
critics of the tradition-guided approach and reminds readers that the search for a 
rational solution to moral dilemmas remains an epistemic problem, regardless of 
whether one agrees with his analysis of any particular tradition, positive or 
negative. MacIntyre says he is not the first to articulate that the ―evaluative and 
normative concepts‖ of moral philosophy cannot be found except as embodied in 
the ―historical lives of particular social groups‖ that have evolved over time.57 
This evolution of moral argument is sometimes internal, because the premises on 
which moral argument is conducted are themselves refined, and sometimes 
external, because moral discourse interacts with other forms of argument. 
 
Gilbert Meilaender exemplifies a common criticism of MacIntyre‘s concluding 
paragraph when he claims that in the time since After Virtue was written, 
MacIntyre has not ―made much progress in pointing us to actual communities of 
the sort he has in mind.‖58 Meilaender‘s criticism of MacIntyre does have some 
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initial currency because tradition-guided enquiry contains a self-limiting 
condition, namely that a moral agent is characteristically embedded in several 
different traditions. This criticism is not shared by more sympathetic readers of 
MacIntyre‘s work. John Horton and Susan Mendus edited a series of papers 
devoted to MacIntyre‘s work and they argue that MacIntyre has given serious 
consideration to the two main criticisms associated with the central thesis of After 
Virtue. They argue that in two subsequent publications, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? and Three Rival Version of Moral Enquiry MacIntyre does attempt to 
show how a ―dynamic interaction of rival traditions may provide room for critical 
reflection on a tradition and the avoidance of relativism.‖59 Whether he achieves 
this aim is the subject of the next two sub-sections of this chapter. 
 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) 
 
MacIntyre‘s second book in this series, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, is not 
technically a sequel even though he responds to some of the perceived weaknesses 
of After Virtue. With the publication of this work MacIntyre continues his attack 
on Modernity and provides a substantial defence of tradition-guided enquiry. The 
questioning title ―Whose justice?‖ and ―Which rationality?‖ focuses on his main 
assertion about practical reasoning, namely, that practical reasoning over a moral 
concept like justice, and indeed the concept of rationality itself, depends on the 
social milieu in which these terms are used, because both the theory and practice 
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of justice and rationality can only be conceptualised in time and place.
60
 Using the 
concept of justice, MacIntyre attempts to show that while the thin or common use 
of the term is easily understood, its use as a thick moral maxim is not so 
straightforward because there are at least three rival accounts of justice – 
inalienable human rights, social contract, and some standard of utility.
61
 Because 
there exists a basic incommensurability between these three concepts of justice, 
MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment period results in a new set of 
philosophical conflicts that replaced the old religious conflicts. 
 
The title of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (hereafter Whose Justice?) asks 
two questions that encapsulate what MacIntyre thinks is the main problem with 
the Modern understanding of moral enquiry. Whose form of justice should the 
moral agent accept, and which concept of rationality provides sufficient 
justification for overcoming other rival accounts? The fact that diverse conceptual 
concepts of justice exist at all is sufficient, as far as MacIntyre is concerned, to 
show that practical reasoning cannot be divorced from its own history.
62
 
 
The Modern vision of moral agents who disavow allegiance to any particular 
theory of morality and abstract themselves from their particular social 
relationships is misleading, according to MacIntyre, because the requirement of 
disinterestedness is itself already partisan to a liberal individualist account of 
rational thinking. The neutrality of the Modern concept of rationality is a facade 
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because it ignores what MacIntyre refers to as the ―inescapably historically and 
socially context-bound character‖ that the theory and practice of practical 
rationality must have.
63
 
 
Contemporary writers in practical ethics, at least those who argue that rational 
thinking can resolve moral dilemmas, seem to have forgotten that their Modern 
predecessors tried and failed to achieve a very similar task.
64
 MacIntyre has 
shown that Hume‘s appeal to passions, Kant‘s appeal to the categorical 
imperative, and the various manifestations of the principle of utility were all 
attempts at providing moral agents with irrefutable action guides for rational 
decision making.
65
 The fact that contemporary consequentialists and non-
consequentialists seem immune to each other‘s epistemological claims seems to 
be a source of increasing frustration for MacIntyre.  
 
The conveners of a philosophy conference in 1991 were probably surprised or 
perhaps a little disturbed by MacIntyre‘s keynote address. The conference theme 
concerned the demise of abstract principles and the renaissance of tradition, but 
MacIntyre claimed that nothing of the sort has happened. He argued that in spite 
of numerous philosophers agreeing with the epistemological problem he presented 
in After Virtue, namely, that moral claims can only be intelligible from within the 
―particularities and contingencies of historical movements,‖ little has changed in 
the way practical rationality is currently being portrayed.
66
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The main theme of Whose Justice? is to show how moral progress becomes 
possible by giving consideration to a different type of moral disagreement, a 
disagreement that occurs within a tradition. MacIntyre argues that moral progress 
within a tradition becomes possible via an internal form of disagreement that he 
calls an ―epistemological crisis.‖67 So while the introduction to Whose Justice? 
reintroduces the reader to the dire state of moral debate, the main focus of the 
book is to provide a more substantial defence of tradition-guided enquiry than that 
offered in After Virtue. 
 
MacIntyre follows Kuhn and others in arguing that the history of scientific 
progress provides a useful comparison for the type of tradition-guided progress he 
advocates for moral philosophy.
68
 He claims that philosophers often acknowledge 
that scientific progress is essentially linked to its history but do not seem to 
recognise that a similar type of historicity is required to defend arguments in 
moral theory.
69
 Resolution of an epistemological crisis in science enables 
contemporary scientists to understand their predecessors more intelligently and 
also provides a more coherent explanation of the problem at hand. 
 
Once again following Kuhn, MacIntyre uses Galileo‘s experience with the newly 
invented telescope to show what happens when a scientific crisis arises. He 
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contrasts Galileo‘s link with a scientific tradition, in which previous narrative 
accounts of astronomical observation played a vital role, with what he calls 
―Descartes‘ assumption‖ that a rational observer can know nothing unless his 
thinking is grounded in a ―presuppositionless first principle.‖70 When Galileo 
observed Jupiter‘s moons over several days, he was able to confirm Copernicus‘ 
skepticism over what was then the prevailing Ptolemaic orthodoxy. MacIntyre 
argues that this type of resolution enables science to progress, first because it 
showed why the argument for a geocentric universe was no longer tenable and, 
second, because it opened up the possibility of confirming the heliocentric 
model.
71
 
 
MacIntyre‘s point is that scientific progress rarely occurs independently of its own 
tradition, so from this perspective the revolution that occurs between Kuhn‘s 
normal and abnormal science is overstated. For MacIntyre, scientific progress 
occurs within a tradition, and a new standard model evolves precisely because the 
new model provides greater explanatory power than its predecessor. MacIntyre 
thinks that the same historical links can be seen in moral theory. Moral 
justification is constituted by and constitutive of a particular narrative tradition, 
which implies that doctrines, theses, and arguments require historical 
contextualisation.
72
 MacIntyre argues that tradition-guided enquiry follows a four-
stage process that enables a moral agent to understand how an argument has been 
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constructed over time and how present maxims or rules have been influenced by 
interaction with other ideas. 
 
The first stage involves recognising that moral enquiry is essentially historical and 
concerns how the argument has gone thus far, particularly in relation to the often 
changing status of its first principles. Second, because moral claims are advanced 
linguistically, a moral agent needs to understand what moral terms meant in the 
past and what they mean now. Third, tradition-guided enquiry provides a moral 
agent with an understanding of the diversity of traditions and an appreciation that 
each tradition has its own method of rational justification. Finally, a moral agent 
using ―tradition-constituted‖ and ―tradition-constitutive‖ enquiry can only explain 
how such enquiry works via historical examples.
73
  
 
MacIntyre provides four sample traditions associated with Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Hume to show that each tradition has its own historical justification 
for justice and practical rationality. The choice of these traditions rather than 
others reflects his main theme that an appeal to a tradition involves a moral agent 
in a search for where he or she has come from. In MacIntyre‘s case, these four 
traditions probably reveal his heritage and also provide the necessary historical 
background for why he eventually posits that one of the traditions offers greater 
explanatory power than the others. 
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Having appreciated the essential historicity of a moral tradition, MacIntyre argues 
that the moral agent is then in a position to compare traditions from a teleological 
perspective. This teleological focus was present in After Virtue, where MacIntyre 
argues, following Aristotle, that ethics is the search for the ―essential nature‖ of a 
human being, but his explanation of what is meant by this is vague.
74
 He states 
that the teleological aspect of moral enquiry is essential because it transcends the 
internal goods of a given practice or tradition and engages the moral agent in a 
quest for the teleological good of a ―whole human life.‖75 However, because the 
individual human cannot be divorced from his or her own history, the normative 
concepts of moral philosophy are, for MacIntyre, a socially constructed 
community enterprise. Given that moral argument is socially constructed and 
tradition-dependent, how does a moral agent transcend this constraint in order to 
fulfil his or her essential nature?
76
 This problem is not discussed in After Virtue, 
apart from the vague reference to a new St. Benedict in the last sentence. 
 
In the preface to Whose Justice?, MacIntyre responds to the central criticism 
leveled at After Virtue and commits to making this teleological focus more 
explicit. He seeks to provide an answer to two key questions that arise from 
tradition-guided enquiry. First, ―what makes it rational to act in one way rather 
than another?‖ and second, ―what makes it rational to advance and defend one 
conception of practical rationality rather than another?‖77 
 
                                                 
74
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 52. 
75
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 202. 
76
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 263.  
77
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, ix. 
 228 
As mentioned previously, MacIntyre initially reminds readers of the 
epistemological problem in moral theory and then presents the case that a moral 
tradition is vindicated or not by how it responds to an epistemological crisis. 
However, this internal review only explains how a moral tradition succeeds or 
fails on its own terms, and it does not explain why a moral agent should choose 
one long-lived moral tradition rather than another. So the major focus of Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? is to provide a tradition-guided comparison of four 
distinct traditions – Aristotelianism, Augustinianism, the Scottish Enlightenment 
and Liberalism – with the specific goal of discovering which tradition best 
supports the telos of the whole human life. 
 
The organisational structure of Whose Justice? is similar to that of After Virtue. 
After setting the scene for the state of moral crisis in After Virtue, MacIntyre uses 
the central chapter to show how Aristotle‘s practical reasoning transcends 
Nietzsche‘s critique of Modernity. Similarly, in the first nine chapters of Whose 
Justice?, MacIntyre sets the scene by offering a tradition-guided comparison of 
the four traditions mentioned above. He then uses the central tenth chapter, 
entitled ―Overcoming a Conflict of Traditions,‖78 to show how moral progress is 
possible between two incommensurable or rival traditions by using a two-stage 
process for moving beyond disagreement. 
 
The first stage occurs when adherents of a tradition understand the central thesis 
of a rival tradition – on its own terms. The second stage occurs when these 
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adherents recognise that a rival tradition has resources that can help to explain 
anomalies or to correct defects in its own position. MacIntyre argues that this type 
of resolution is rare because adherents of a tradition rarely exhibit what he calls 
the ―gift of empathy‖ that allows for such reasonable consideration.79  
 
The rarity of this type of resolution is exemplified by MacIntyre himself because 
his description of a tradition that does transcend itself is left until the final pages 
of the book. In the chapters following his explanation for overcoming conflict 
between traditions MacIntyre reverts to his main thesis that the perspectival nature 
of practical rationality and justice can be seen by comparing three distinct 
historical epochs. He begins with the period associate with Aquinas and his 
synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine,
80
 followed by the Scottish Enlightenment 
and the emergence of an educated public,
81
 and lastly he describes a period of 
transition associated with what he calls ―Hume‘s Anglicizing subversion‖ and the 
emergence of liberalism.
82
 
 
As with After Virtue, MacIntyre‘s intricately woven historical account in Whose 
Justice? is not without its own set of assumptions. As with all complex historical 
accounts, the careful reader does not accept any single account as authoritative, 
and philosophers, historians, and theologians have criticised MacIntyre on this 
account.
83
 However, MacIntyre‘s point regarding tradition-guided enquiry is not 
that his method of doing history gives a moral agent access to an authoritative 
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narrative. Rather, he seeks to show how the authoritative narrative of a moral 
concept like justice changes within and between traditions, and this realisation 
allows a moral agent to understand his or her own life within the context of a 
broader teleological purpose. MacIntyre begins his explanation of how one 
transcends a tradition with the synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine achieved by 
Aquinas. His main aim is to show how Aquinas transcended both of them. 
MacIntyre argues that Aquinas shows that Aristotle‘s account is ―radically 
defective‖ because it does not recognise the ―Augustinian understanding of fallen 
human nature.‖84 MacIntyre states that Aquinas‘ account of practical rationality is 
―only fully intelligible, let alone defensible‖ when it is understood from within 
―an extended and complex tradition of argument and conflict that included far 
more than Aristotle and Augustine.‖85  
 
There is a hint here, though probably not much more than a hint, of the 
psychological process that MacIntyre seems to have gone through. Long before he 
converted to Catholicism, MacIntyre‘s pessimism over moral philosophy seems to 
be predicated on the vagueness of Aristotle‘s explanation of the telos of the whole 
human life. When MacIntyre claims that Aquinas shows how ―radically defective‖ 
Aristotle‘s account of the human telos is, the illustration of this defect is ―fallen 
human nature.‖ This obvious theological concept is attributed by MacIntyre to 
Augustine, but it also might explain the gradual transition in MacIntyre‘s thinking 
toward the overt Thomism that he advocates in Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry. 
                                                 
84
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 205. 
85
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 205. 
 231 
 
For MacIntyre, any historical analysis of Aquinas‘ thought that is detached from 
his own tradition in the search for some neutral position of rationality or authority 
does not make sense.
86
 Aquinas‘ great strength was that he provided a synthesis of 
Aristotle and Augustine and showed how the strengths of two rival traditions can 
be reformulated once the inadequacies of each tradition are appropriately 
understood. Aquinas enabled moral theory to progress, according to MacIntyre, 
because he was able to ―identify the limitations‖ and to ―integrate the strengths 
and successes‖ of both Aristotle and Augustine into a more coherent moral 
scheme.
87
 
 
MacIntyre‘s next example of tradition transcendence is the Irish Presbyterian 
philosopher, Francis Hutcheson, during the Scottish Enlightenment. MacIntyre 
argues that Hutcheson, like Aquinas, sought to transcend the Aristotelian concept 
of prudence because the Aristotelian appeal to telos required a higher sense of 
moral excellence. He does this, according to MacIntyre, by arguing that a ―moral 
sense‖ is required for a rational person to transcend the limitations of Aristotelian 
teleology.
88
 This moral sense enables a moral agent to reason correctly and to 
reach a consensus on what the law of nature is and therefore over what the 
principle of justice requires. MacIntyre contends that the concept of ―moral sense‖ 
provided, at least for a short time, a new foundation for the study of moral 
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philosophy and the philosophy of law because it articulated the idea that correct 
reasoning was possible.
89
 
 
MacIntyre‘s final example of tradition transcendence concerns a period he refers 
to as ―Hume‘s Anglicizing subversion‖ and involves the transition from Scottish 
Protestantism to liberalism.
90
 Hume‘s dislike of religious tradition is well 
established, as is his commitment to the ―passions‖ rather than to some uniform 
conceptualisation of rationality. MacIntyre states that Hume‘s account of practical 
rationality is broadly compatible with Aristotle‘s, at least when it concerns the 
impact of social order on rational thinking. So the individual‘s role in articulating 
how a moral concept such as justice is implemented is diminished, for Hume, 
because there is no neutral standpoint that shows why one appeal to justice is 
better or worse than another.
91
 
 
MacIntyre argues that Hume‘s Aristotelian conception of prudence was 
incompatible with the ―traditional Scottish view‖ and thus caused generations of 
Scottish philosophers to articulate their views with Hume‘s skepticism in mind.92 
However, for MacIntyre, the fact that Hume frames his description of the passions 
in ways removed from any theological justification also shows why understanding 
the time and place in which he lived is so important. MacIntyre argues that Hume 
distanced himself from his own Scottish heritage and began to articulate principles 
of the ―dominant English social and cultural order.‖93 Thus, according to 
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MacIntyre, understanding Hume‘s account of philosophical theorising, as with the 
other thinkers, requires ―a particular type of social setting.‖94 
 
MacIntyre‘s historicism is primarily directed at analysing how a tradition deals 
with its own epistemological crises and how it interacts with rivals. He refers to 
this method as ―tradition-constituted‖ and ―tradition-constitutive‖ enquiry because 
it analyses a moral tradition from an historical standpoint, examining how and 
when moral maxims were formed or reformed.
95
 MacIntyre maintains that a 
central characteristic of a long-lived moral tradition is that it evolves through three 
stages. The first stage of a tradition is relatively stable because the relevant 
beliefs, texts, and authorities go relatively unchallenged. The second 
epistemological crisis stage occurs when inadequacies of various types are 
identified but not remedied. The crisis can stem from internal or external 
arguments that are of sufficient strength to warrant re-evaluation of constitutive 
beliefs. The third stage occurs when adherents of a tradition acknowledge the 
inadequacies that prompted the epistemological crisis and begin to formulate new 
ideas to overcome the problem.
96
 For MacIntyre, a good indicator of a moral 
tradition in danger of collapse is when adherents of a tradition become 
preoccupied with refuting rather than recognising the epistemological problems 
pointed out by others. MacIntyre argues that a tradition that is not open to 
criticism of its epistemic premises will find that ―the pressures of skepticism 
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become more urgent‖ and the refutation of the skeptic takes on a primary 
importance.
97
 He further argues that a tradition that remains open to the possibility 
of change can resolve an epistemological crisis, even when key facets of its 
epistemic foundations are challenged. When adherents acknowledge the need to 
reformulate a problem belief, while retaining substantive continuity with the 
original tradition, their position is strengthened by the crisis.
98
  
 
The final chapter of Whose Justice?, entitled ―Contested Justices, Contested 
Rationalities,‖ sums up the argument for tradition-guided rationality and contains 
a surprisingly forthright appeal to the strength of one particular moral tradition 
over others. MacIntyre begins by restating his central thesis, that the ideas of 
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hume are inescapably linked to the conflicts and social 
life in which they were embedded. For MacIntyre, this is not a peripheral or 
accidental fact because in order to understand the ―distinctive conceptions of 
justice and practical rationality elaborated by each thinker,‖ one has to appreciate 
the ―historical context of tradition, social order, and conflict out of which it 
emerged.‖99 MacIntyre acknowledges that if his thesis is correct, then a moral 
agent can only ever speak from within his or her own tradition because of the 
―story-filled‖ narrative of human formation. So when faced with a moral conflict, 
MacIntyre argues that a moral agent has two choices; one can either ―begin 
speaking as a protagonist of one contending party‖ or one can ―fall silent.‖100 
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MacIntyre chooses the first option and argues that, for himself, a synthesis of 
Aristotelian Thomism provides the most appropriate teleological answer to his 
initial epistemological questions, Whose Justice? and Which Rationality?
101
 His 
decision to begin speaking as an apologist for Aristotelian Thomism seems to be 
muted and defensive in one sense, almost as if the shadow of relativism still 
haunts, but authoritative and assertive in another. He seems defensive when he 
says that a book that ends by telling people where to begin does not seem to have 
achieved much.
102
 However, he also encapsulates this new beginning in 
authoritative terms in the final few paragraphs where he states that the Thomistic 
tradition is able to deal with its epistemological crises better than other traditions. 
Thus adherents of the Thomistic tradition can be confident that ―their tradition has 
been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions.‖103  
 
Christopher Lutz argues that understanding this personal dimension of 
MacIntyre‘s work is pivotal if one is to appreciate the story-filled justification for 
Thomism that emerges in his writing. Lutz thinks that MacIntyre‘s advocacy for 
Thomism is the latest in a series of epistemological shifts in his intellectual 
journey. Lutz argues that MacIntyre moved through distinct phases in his thinking 
and writing, from a fideist Christian Marxist in his youth, to an analytic atheist 
during his early academic years, and more recently to Catholicism. The shifts in 
MacIntyre‘s thinking are not viewed negatively by Lutz because they are 
indicative of both the story-filled character of a moral agent that MacIntyre 
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advocates and the type of practical reasoning that deals appropriately with 
epistemological crises.
104
 Whether or not Lutz‘s interpretation of MacIntyre‘s 
personal crises is accurate, the incomplete appeal to Thomism in Whose Justice? 
did make MacIntyre re-consider his position and set the tone for a third book in 
which he provides a more nuanced defence of Aristotelian Thomism. 
 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990) 
 
The third book in MacIntyre‘s trilogy analyses three rival versions of moral 
enquiry as background to a more nuanced defence of the closing appeal to 
tradition and the Thomistic synthesis in Whose Justice? In the text of Three Rival 
Versions of Moral Enquiry (hereafter Three Rival Versions), based on his Gifford 
lecture series (1988), MacIntyre once again begins with a pessimistic assessment 
of the current state of moral debate.
105
 He argues that in the hundred years since 
the death of Gifford it is hardly controversial to claim that disciplines such as 
astronomy and chemistry have made significant and continuing progress. 
However, one cannot say this about natural theology, according to MacIntyre, 
particularly as far as the foundation of ethics is concerned, because there is no 
agreement over what rational progress within the study of ethics ought to be.
106
 
 
Thus he begins Three Rival Versions in now familiar terms and describes Modern 
academic philosophy as a means for a more accurate and informed discussion 
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about moral problems, rather than a discipline that offers progress toward their 
resolution. In Whose Justice? MacIntyre had noted that disagreement over moral 
issues among professors of philosophy is as sharp and irremediable as among 
others.
107
 Thus, the attempt to circumvent religious concepts of morality with 
impartial rational enquiry failed, not because the religious concepts were correct 
but because the theories of ethics based on rational enquiry turned out to be 
equally tradition-dependent and disputatious. He further contended that 
Enlightenment epistemology deprived the moral agent of a method of rational 
enquiry in which the ―standards of rational justification‖ emerge from its own 
history.
108
 
 
In the first lecture, and thus the first chapter of Three Rival Versions, MacIntyre 
provides a similar explanation for the problematic assumptions in contemporary 
moral enquiry already provided in After Virtue and Whose Justice?, so only a brief 
summary is offered here. First, he reminds his audience that in the history of the 
Gifford series there had been no agreed-upon set of ―first premises or principles‖ 
among the contributors.
109
 Second, he argues that when a foundation of ethics is 
advocated, the formulations and conclusions reflect the individual preferences of 
the Gifford lecturer. Third, he claims that when contributors do ground ethical 
theory in one conception of moral agency rather than another, they offer only a 
limited set of resources for establishing what conclusions one should draw from 
this foundation.
110
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For MacIntyre, the level of disagreement exhibited by the Gifford contributors is 
symptomatic of a lack of consensus in academic philosophy in general over what 
constitutes moral argument.
111
 So a stark presentation of the state of moral enquiry 
once again sets the scene for MacIntyre‘s justification for taking a historicist 
approach. Subsequent lectures, and hence chapters, of Three Rival Versions are 
devoted to restating the problem and possibilities of moral argument previously 
articulated in After Virtue and Whose Justice? by showing how rival traditions can 
learn from one another. The three types of moral enquiry analysed in Three Rival 
Versions are different from those offered in After Virtue and Whose Justice?, but 
the tradition-guided methodology is the same. Thus a brief outline will suffice to 
show how MacIntyre attempts to establish the link between one tradition, 
Aristotelian Thomism, and the telos of the whole human life. His idiosyncratic 
style once again presents an intricately woven explanation of why some traditions 
succeed or fail, on their own terms, and why Aristotelian Thomism offers a way 
forward, on teleological grounds. 
 
The first version of moral enquiry that MacIntyre explores is a way of thinking 
about moral theory that he describes as ―Encyclopaedia,‖ represented by the Ninth 
Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. The second version, referred to as 
―Genealogy,‖ is represented by Nietzsche‘s On the Genealogy of Morals. The 
third version, ―Tradition,‖ is represented by the Thomistic synthesis and Pope Leo 
XIII‘s Aeterni Patris. MacIntyre argues that tradition-guided enquiry enables 
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moral agents to understand the internal goods of their own tradition, but also to 
have a greater appreciation of the internal goods of rival traditions. For MacIntyre, 
the epistemological incommensurability between the encylopaedist and the 
genealogist concerning rationality and moral progress justifies his argument for 
the role that tradition should play in moral enquiry.
112
 
 
MacIntyre states that the encylopaedist views the history of moral philosophy as a 
unity, progressing steadily from Socrates through to Descartes, Kant, and 
onwards. Descartes, the archetypal thinker for the encylopaedist, presents rational 
enquiry as ―impersonal, impartial, disinterested, uniting, and universal.‖113 
However, this is exactly the type of rational thinking that the genealogist, 
following Nietzsche, rejects. Genealogy rejects the encylopaedist concept of 
rational truth and consequently the genealogist rejects the claim that rational 
justification produces ethical precepts such as duty, obligation, the right, and the 
good.
114
 MacIntyre claims that the incommensurable gap between the 
encylopaedist and genealogist presents two alternatives, both of which are 
unsatisfactory as far as rational thinking is concerned. Reason is either 
―impersonal, universal,‖ and ―disinterested,‖ or it is the ―unwitting representation 
of particular interests, masking their drive to power by its false pretensions to 
neutrality and disinterestedness.‖115  
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For MacIntyre, the encylopaedist concept of moral progress is unsatisfactory 
because it is based on the illusion that ―the point or purpose of rational debate is to 
establish truths.‖116 However, the genealogical approach is also unsatisfactory 
because it is internally incoherent. The genealogist claim, that truth is 
perspectival, is self-refuting because the methodology used by the genealogist to 
critique the encylopaedist requires a moral agent to stand outside of his or her own 
tradition.
117
 
 
For MacIntyre, both the encylopaedist and the genealogist fail on their own terms. 
The internal failure for the encylopaedist is evident because no agreement has 
been forthcoming over what moral progress is,
118
 and the internal failure for the 
genealogist is evident because the genealogist conception of self is itself narrative-
dependent and therefore parasitic on the very traditions it seeks to supplant.
119
 
 
The tradition-guided alternative that MacIntyre articulates culminates in the claim 
that a dialectical synthesis of Aristotelian Thomism provides a more appropriate 
way forward for pursuing the telos of the whole human life, primarily because it 
succeeds on its own terms whereas the encylopaedist and the genealogist do 
not.
120
 He defends this view by arguing that Aristotelian Thomism has the 
capacity not only to critique other traditions but also to be self-critical. This ability 
to be self-critical, according to MacIntyre, provides the Thomistic tradition with 
an inbuilt flexibility that allows it to deal with its own epistemological crises in a 
                                                 
116
 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 172. 
117
 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 36, 42, 54. 
118
 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 173-174. 
119
 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 214-215. 
120
 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 146. 
 241 
way that takes seriously the concerns of other traditions.
121
 The Thomistic 
tradition accepts that moral claims are embedded in the history of diverse social 
narratives, and this realisation invokes an understanding of morality that, in 
MacIntyre‘s words, ―is never more than sketched in outline.‖122  
 
6.4 Conclusion: MacIntyre’s Teleological Vision 
 
MacIntyre‘s commitment to the self-critical aspects of the Thomistic tradition 
evolved during the process of writing the trilogy of books on moral enquiry 
outlined above. The changing status of his epistemological position is consistent 
with tradition-guided enquiry because it shows that he does attempt to deal with 
the criticism leveled at After Virtue and Whose Justice? However, because his 
style of writing includes an intricately woven historical narrative, it is difficult to 
identify the link between the narrative justification of internal goods (practices) 
within a given tradition and the telos of a life that realises its essence.
123
 
 
With this difficulty in mind Bradley Kallenberg provides a useful simplification 
of what he refers to as MacIntyre‘s ―master argument,‖ particularly in the way 
narrative, practice, and tradition are linked to the central idea of moral progress 
or virtue.
124
 Kallenberg shows that there is a triadic relationship between 
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MacIntyre‘s three key historical concepts and the idea of moral virtue. 
MacIntyre‘s tradition-constituted method includes three major concepts of moral 
enquiry – narrative, practices, and tradition. Narrative is the story-filled 
description of what good character means within a tradition; practice is a co-
operative human activity with established internal goods recognisable by 
practitioners; and tradition is an authoritative account of precepts and principles 
extended over time that have survived epistemic crises of the past.
125
  
 
The moral self, for MacIntyre, is a socially constructed entity. Therefore, a single 
life is always embedded in a longer and deeper history of moral agency than can 
be supported by the various forms of emotivism that dominate contemporary 
moral enquiry. Kallenberg argues that MacIntyre‘s commitment to a form of 
Aristotelian Thomism is necessarily linked to a particular narrative justification of 
how and why Thomism is sustained as a social practice. He argues, however, that 
there was much that was unfinished in MacIntyre‘s explanation of moral agency 
at the end of After Virtue and that not all of these problems were addressed in 
subsequent publications.
126
 Kallenberg seems to be alluding here to commentators 
who were not so generous in their assessment of the synthesis MacIntyre provides 
between Aristotle and Aquinas. In the same way that the conclusion of After 
Virtue, with its appeal for a new St. Benedict, attracted criticism, MacIntyre‘s 
parting advocacy in Whose Justice? for the Thomistic tradition has been criticised 
by philosophers and theologians from both the Aristotelian and Thomistic 
traditions. 
                                                 
125
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 222. 
126
 Kallenberg, ―The Master Argument of MacIntyre‘s After Virtue,‖ 28-29. 
 243 
 
MacIntyre‘s reconstruction project pivots on two key practical issues that 
diminish his historicist narrative. First, the present state of moral enquiry is not as 
dire as MacIntyre depicts, primarily because there is more agreement among 
moral philosophers than he concedes. Second, his idiosyncratic style of writing 
diminishes the historicist claims he makes against rival traditions, primarily 
because it relies on a consensus regarding Aristotelian Thomism that has yet to be 
realised. MacIntyre‘s pessimism over the present state of moral enquiry is 
important because it provides the starting point for his tradition-guided enquiry. 
However, the apparent failure of the Enlightenment project is, for MacIntyre, 
focused too finely on incommensurability and difference between traditions. 
When MacIntyre states that professors of philosophy disagree with each other just 
as much as other people do over a concept like justice, he overstates the problems 
associated with this level of disagreement.
127
 While it is clear that professors of 
philosophy exhibit a diversity of conclusions about moral claims, this is exactly 
what one should expect in a complex discipline like moral philosophy. When 
MacIntyre portrays practical ethics as a shrill battle of ―assertion with counter-
assertion‖ and states that agreement is both ―rare‖ and ―accidental,‖ he 
misrepresents what happens when moral debate is conducted among serious 
thinkers, even when they do come from diverse philosophical traditions.
128
  
 
Certainly some ethical disputes exhibit the shrillness that MacIntyre refers to, but 
it is also common for serious thinkers from diverse ethical traditions to agree on 
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many things. Perhaps the reason this often goes unacknowledged is that when 
people have a common view on moral issues, they do not spend time debating 
why they agree, whereas when people disagree the debate can be interminable. 
This is the point made earlier, that a moral concept like justice has pragmatic 
cash-value, when understood as a thin moral principle, because it plays out in 
practical ways independent of the belief systems of the various moral agents. For 
instance, there is thin agreement among serious thinkers that a moral agent should 
not be deliberately cruel, that keeping another person as a slave is wrong, that 
tyrannical governments should be discouraged, and that a person should be 
considered innocent until proven guilty.  
 
This thin level of moral agreement is more pervasive in moral enquiry than 
MacIntyre acknowledges. For example, Singer‘s most recent book, The Life You 
Can Save, bears a strong resemblance in the practical suggestions it makes for 
overcoming global poverty (fairer distribution and a simplified life) to Ron 
Sider‘s 1990 publication, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger.129 When 
confronted by images of global poverty, one could easily imagine the utilitarian 
philosopher and the Mennonite theologian standing side-by-side because, 
independently of their respectively thick philosophical or theological justifications 
for alleviating poverty, they share a common thin perception that something is 
deeply wrong. 
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When MacIntyre asks, Whose justice? Which rationality?, he seems to overstate 
the level of disagreement in moral enquiry because he is focused on the inability 
of moral enquiry to reach agreement on a thick interpretation of justice. A similar 
overstatement seems to occur with his appeal to the ―epistemological crisis.‖ 
While the warning is useful, because it shows how epistemological claims within 
a tradition evolve, MacIntyre‘s evaluation of the epistemological transitions 
within a tradition seems overly pessimistic. Accepting incommensurability 
between rival truth-claims does not lead ineluctably to the ―failure of Modernity‖ 
that MacIntyre posits. The failure, if it can be called a failure at all, provided a 
necessary reappraisal of epistemic limits in theological and cultural applications 
of moral theory. MacIntyre does not give enough credit to the desires and 
motivations behind the so-called failure. The ―Enlightenment project‖ might have 
failed in an epistemic sense, as MacIntyre posits, but it has also produced 
remarkable advances in almost every practical discipline of human endeavour. 
 
MacIntyre often uses the British utilitarian tradition, particularly the transition 
from Bentham to Mill, to illustrate how a tradition can be motivated to change 
once its epistemological inadequacies are acknowledged. He views the 
epistemological transition from Bentham to Mill to Sidgwick more critically than 
he ought to. He views the history of utilitarianism as one epistemic crisis after 
another, but this view does not seem to appreciate that each of the utilitarian 
reformers made significant socio-political contributions. Even if the 
foundationalism of utilitarian philosophers did evolve in response to a series of 
―epistemological crises,‖ as MacIntyre claims, it would still seem disingenuous 
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not to acknowledge their achievements. From a pragmatist perspective, a more 
useful option is to examine how utilitarian theory cashes out, in each of its 
variations, independent of the foundationalist assumptions. 
 
The philosophy of science provides a good illustration of this type of pragmatism. 
It would be disingenuous to view the transition between Newton and Einstein 
negatively simply because Einstein‘s concept of special relativity overturned 
Newton‘s concept of absolute space and time. In the tradition of cosmology, 
Newton‘s argument for absolute space and time is treated with respect because it 
helped set the agenda for a more complete understanding of the physical universe 
offered by Einstein.
130
 A similar claim can be made about the British utilitarian 
philosophers in particular and even with utilitarian theory in general. Even if the 
epistemological assumptions of Bentham and Mill are exaggerated or even wrong, 
this does not necessarily diminish their contributions. Clearly this is not what 
MacIntyre advocates, however, because his concern over the parlous state of 
moral philosophy is intricately linked to the idea that Modern moral philosophy 
has become disengaged from virtues associated with human flourishing.
131
 His 
explanation for how a moral agent can re-engage with the virtues involves a 
thickly woven narrative synthesis between Aristotle and the Thomistic tradition. 
The complexity of his account creates its own set of problems, however, because 
it relies on a consensus on Aristotelian Thomism that has not been forthcoming.  
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In a collection of essays devoted to MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided method, the 
editors describe his appeal to Aristotelian Thomism as ambiguous and lacking 
clarity.
132
 Horton and Mendus conclude that even sympathetic scholars who 
accept many of MacIntyre‘s claims about the socially constructed self are less 
inclined to accept his argument that this realisation has any important normative 
consequences for moral enquiry.
133
 For instance, Martha Nussbaum, a noted 
Aristotelian scholar, was originally sympathetic to the account that MacIntyre 
offered in After Virtue, but she was openly critical of the transition he made 
between After Virtue and Whose Justice? In a review of Whose Justice? entitled 
―Recoiling from Reason,‖ Nussbaum rejects MacIntyre‘s Thomistic turn because 
she thinks that Aristotle‘s concept of moral virtue is deliberately vague.134 For 
Nussbaum, Aristotle‘s concept of eudaimonia contains a ―rough idea of human 
flourishing,‖ but this provides enough guidance so that both the ―instrumental 
means to that end‖ and the realisation of the ―kind of life‖ that results from this 
flourishing can be fulfilled. She uses the example of medicine to illustrate this 
when she says that a doctor has an instrumental end (medical school) but also a 
moral end, ―What counts as being a ‗good‘ doctor?‖135 So ―good‖ refers to both an 
account of the practice (medicine) and an account of the attitudes and demeanour 
of the practitioner (doctor). Nussbaum‘s evaluation of Aristotle seems appropriate 
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because it reflects his description of the telos of human activity (eudaimonia) as a 
life-time project.  
 
For Aristotle eudaimonia satisfies the criterion of the ultimate end but the virtues 
that strive toward that end are left open, even vague, because they differ from one 
society to another and even from one individual to another. For instance, the act of 
attempting to save a drowning person is courageous for a swimmer but can be 
foolishness for a non-swimmer. For Aristotle, the mean between excess and 
deficiency is a broad middle-road whereby the active content of moral action 
depends on circumstances. A moral agent acts ―for the right person, to the right 
extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way,‖ depending 
on what one is aiming to achieve.
136
 It is this vagueness that Nussbaum finds so 
appropriate because it is deliberately not prescriptive. MacIntyre is not content 
with a vague teleological end for a discipline like medicine. He agrees that good 
practice is what counts for being a good doctor, but virtues expressed solely in 
terms of the internal goods of a practice are not sufficient to achieve the goods 
that provide individual human lives with their telos. MacIntyre is concerned that 
without a unifying form of life that is itself purposeful, the individual may find 
himself or herself embedded in social traditions that are harmful to human 
flourishing. This is why MacIntyre states so starkly that ―without an overriding 
conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity, our 
conception of certain individual virtues has to remain partial and incomplete.‖137 
Thus he seeks to go beyond the Aristotelian concept of instrumental goods 
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because he thinks that virtuous practice is necessarily linked to the telos of the 
whole human life.  
 
MacIntyre agrees with Aristotle that ―good‖ habits are derived from the telos of 
being human and he makes several claims about ethics as a result. First, he thinks 
that there is a fundamental contrast between ―man-as-he happens-to-be and man-
as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖ Second, he states that the 
discipline of ethics is a science ―which enables human beings to realize their 
essential nature.‖ Third, he suggests that this view of ethics ―presupposes some 
account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational 
animal and above all some account of the human telos.‖138 Once he seeks to go 
beyond Aristotle‘s thin concept of flourishing, with a thickly woven Thomistic 
narrative, MacIntyre ends up with the same epistemological problem that he had 
previously perceived as problematic in other accounts of moral enquiry. In other 
words, he rejects the epistemological approach in practical ethics because there is 
no consensus on what premises are foundational, but his tradition-guided account 
also lacks consensus, both on the historical narrative he offers and on the claim 
that the Thomistic tradition succeeds where others fail. Without this consensus, it 
would seem that his version fails to overcome the assertion and counter-assertion 
that he finds so problematic in moral enquiry.  
 
MacIntyre is not content with the thin expression of human flourishing that 
Aristotle provides because he thinks the normative claims of ethics are diminished 
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if human flourishing is not thickly articulated in something like Thomistic terms. 
A significant difference between MacIntyre and Aquinas is that Aquinas‘ account 
is unapologetically and openly theological, whereas MacIntyre thinks the 
Thomistic tradition should be accepted because it succeeds as a tradition on its 
own terms, without the metaphysical assumptions. However, for MacIntyre‘s 
Thomistic version of Aristotelianism to succeed, on its own terms, it needs to 
achieve a level of consensus about the specific practices of the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition. Thus far this level of specificity between Aristotle and 
Aquinas has not been forthcoming, and some of the most strident critics of 
MacIntyre‘s position are Thomistic scholars. For instance, John Haldane, a 
Thomistic scholar, recognises the contribution that MacIntyre made with After 
Virtue but, like Nussbaum, he is skeptical of the transition to Thomism in Whose 
Justice? Haldane‘s main concern with Whose Justice? is that it presents an 
historical account of moral enquiry that is relativistic and internally inconsistent 
with the type of metaphysical realism that Aquinas advocates. Haldane suggests 
that
 
 people who were initially inclined to follow MacIntyre with the tradition-
guided enquiry of After Virtue, such as communitarians like Michael Sandel and 
Charles Taylor, might be less inclined to take the next steps offered in Whose 
Justice? and Three Rival Versions because it involves accepting the authority of 
the Magisterium, an essential component of the Thomistic and therefore Catholic 
tradition.
139
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The problems that Nussbaum and Haldane highlight in MacIntyre‘s Aristotelian-
Thomistic synthesis relate to the same epistemic problem, albeit for different 
reasons. Nussbaum is concerned that MacIntyre misrepresents Aristotle because 
Aristotle‘s explanation of eudaimonia is thin enough to accommodate cultural 
difference in ways that MacIntyre‘s thick explanation of flourishing does not.140 
Similarly, Haldane thinks that MacIntyre misrepresents Aquinas because Aquinas‘ 
metaphysical realism is inconsistent with a process of rational enquiry that is 
solely tradition-dependent. Haldane has two primary concerns with MacIntyre‘s 
tradition-dependent or story-filled concept of truth. First, it is too relativistic and 
leaves MacIntyre with no other option than to compare traditions. Second, it fails 
to acknowledge that Aquinas was a philosophical and moral realist, a type of 
theological foundationalist, a position MacIntyre rejects.
141
  
 
Disagreement over the foundational premises of moral enquiry is the reason why 
MacIntyre went down the path of tradition-guided enquiry in the first place. 
However, his tradition-guided methodology ends with an epistemological crisis of 
its own. If MacIntyre is right that the Thomistic principle of justice derives from a 
particular type of practical rationality, then this should be self-evident to 
Thomistic scholars such as John Haldane. The fact that this level of agreement has 
not been achieved within Thomistic scholarship provides sufficient justification 
for rejecting MacIntyre‘s further claim that the Thomist tradition succeeds when 
other traditions fail. MacIntyre commits himself too strongly to the thesis that a 
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lack of agreement in practical ethics can only be overcome once agreement has 
been reached over the essence of human flourishing. 
 
Although MacIntyre‘s conclusion about Aristotelian Thomism has not proved to 
be decisive for moral enquiry, his historicist methodology is beneficial precisely 
because it places the moral agent in a particular context. Rational enquiry is 
possible because internal goods are understood within a narrative account of a 
particular practice or tradition. The next chapter will show why a pragmatic and 
practice-centred approach to practical ethics offers a more useful model for moral 
enquiry in a pluralist society. Practice-guided decision making trades on (a) a thin 
consensus about the telos of the whole human life together with the practices that 
sustain that end and (b) a thick application of internal goods within those 
practices. 
 
 
 253 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION – PRACTICE-GUIDED ENQUIRY 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis opened with Toulmin‘s claim that scientists often reach 
agreement about common tasks, no doubt as a result of the standard model 
approach to scientific research that has developed over the last century. As 
Toulmin points out, however, this same level of agreement has not been 
forthcoming in philosophy.
1
 Because Australia is demonstrably pluralist, its 
religious, philosophical, and moral language is unavoidably varied. This lack of 
agreement is particularly noticeable in moral philosophy because in a pluralist 
society the variety of moral traditions diminishes the capacity for any one moral 
claim to trump all others. Drew Leder makes this point when he links the conflict 
over a practical ethics text to ―the sheer number of different interpreters reading it, 
and the widely divergent training and concerns they bring to bear,‖ let alone the 
lack of ―clear social consensus about how events are to be interpreted.‖2 
 
Moral pluralism impacts on a society in various ways, not the least of which is the 
diversity of seriously held views that manifest whenever a complex moral issue is 
discussed. Conflict over practical ethics in a pluralistic society is to be expected, 
and the tendency for some writers to simplify moral argument or to caricature 
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another‘s line of reasoning ought to be avoided. Graham Cole contends, for 
instance, that Singer caricatures Christian moral philosophy with his comparison 
between the sanctity of life, which he rejects, and the principle of impartial 
concern, which he supports.
3
 At the same time, Singer‘s own views are sometimes 
caricatured or overblown to such an extent that they are almost unrecognisable. 
Susan Lufkin Kranz does this when she argues that Singer‘s thinking is ―clearly 
an affront to our common humanity‖ and that his views will downgrade the 
central status of human beings so that ethics ―will come to an end and the values 
of the marketplace or some other horror will fill the vacuum.‖4 Criticism such as 
this is misplaced, first, because it fails to do justice to the serious consideration of 
common morality that Singer advocates and, second, because it exaggerates the 
impact that philosophers and philosophy texts have on moral engagement. Even if 
Singer‘s views were as draconian as Kranz contends, his views are unlikely to 
sway moral agents to such an extent that only horror remains.  
 
The motivation that drives utilitarian philosophy since Epicurus – and he too was 
unjustly maligned as a hedonist – is to make decisions that produce the greatest 
amount of good, broadly conceived as pleasure or happiness. The most common 
form of this type of decision making protocol is the various versions of cost-
benefit analysis routinely used in politics. A society that utilises available 
resources for the benefit of the greatest number of people incorporates a type of 
welfare socialism that seems reasonable on many grounds. Utilitarian philosophy 
                                                 
3
 Graham Cole, ―Singer on Christianity: Characterized or Caricatured,‖ in Gordon Preece ed., 
Rethinking Peter Singer: A Christian Critique (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 2002), 95-
105. 
4
 Susan Lufkin Kranz, Refuting Peter Singer’s Ethical Theory: The Importance of Human Dignity 
(Westport: Praeger, 2002), xiv and 15. 
 255 
does incorporate the type of ―complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity‖5 that MacIntyre equates with a practice. Given this, one can 
appreciate how and why utilitarian thinking evolved over time. Clearly, it has not 
achieved the status of a new standard model for ethical decision making that 
Singer envisaged,
6
 because this would involve a consensus among moral 
philosophers that has not been forthcoming. All moral philosophers appreciate the 
role that a broadly conceived hedonic calculus plays in ethics, but most view this 
type of thinking as one aspect of moral deliberation rather than the defining 
principle of moral action that utilitarian philosophers advocate. The contention of 
this thesis is that Singer‘s impartial consideration of interests is useful but not 
definitive in a pluralist society because it takes for granted too many things on 
which there is no common agreement. 
 
Chapter 2 made the case that the lack of agreement regarding a standard model of 
moral theory diminishes the capacity of any one theory to trump its rivals, at least 
in a pluralist society. Problems of incommensurability arose early in the Modern 
period as rival consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories sought to 
replicate the success of scientific theories by finding a moral theory that all 
rational people could appeal to. However, this attempt to find common ground for 
moral thinking was, for many philosophers, misguided. The study of ethics in a 
pluralist society ought to engage moral agents in a different type of thinking.  This 
is the point Williams makes in an essay entitled ―Knowledge, Science, 
Convergence,‖ where he states: 
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The basic idea behind the distinction between the 
scientific and the ethical, expressed in terms of 
convergence, is very simple. In a scientific inquiry there 
should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the 
best explanation of the convergence involves the idea that 
the answer represents how things are; in the area of the 
ethical, at least at a high level of generality, there is no 
such coherent hope.
7
 
This discontent with the absence of moral coherence was compared with the 
relative coherence provided by standard models in science. A standard model in 
science is one for which there is substantial agreement over its boundary 
conditions or assumptions and, more importantly,  it exhibits vast explanatory 
power for linking real-world observations to currently available theories. Moral 
philosophy has never had a standard model of enquiry, primarily because two key 
components are missing. First, there is no unifying theoretical agreement over 
how moral enquiry ought to be conducted and, second, this lack of a unifying 
theory limits the explanatory power of moral enquiry in complex issues.  
 
Philosophers from diverse philosophical perspectives argue that the focus on 
epistemological issues during the Modern period was important but ultimately 
proved inconclusive. From a pragmatic or non-foundationalist perspective, a 
rational agent can side-step epistemology by asking questions such as, ―What does 
it mean to describe something as true?‖ and ―How does this truth cash out in 
practice‖? The chapter introduced several philosophers who contended that a shift 
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in emphasis that is more open to ―phenomenology, hermeneutics, narrative ethics, 
casuistry, and virtue ethics‖8 is now required in moral enquiry.  
 
MacIntyre, one of the most strident critics of contemporary practical ethics, argues 
that the conceptual incommensurability between rival moral arguments dominates 
moral enquiry.
9
 This lack of a unifying theoretical model of moral enquiry is 
seriously problematic if one thinks, as MacIntyre does, that moral enquiry ought 
to deliver much more than it has thus far achieved. Several other philosophers 
discussed in chapter 2 provide an optimistic contrast to MacIntyre‘s dire 
assessment. Rorty, Williams, Dancy, Bernstein, and Toulmin agree with 
MacIntyre that epistemological claims during the Modern period were overstated, 
but they are not as pessimistic about the problems for moral enquiry that result 
from this. Rorty rejected the neutrality of moral claims and suggested that a 
consensus of rational discussants ought to be the goal of moral enquiry because 
this is the most objectivity we can hope for.
10
 Williams argued that the attempt to 
simplify moral enquiry was misguided, suggesting rather that ―Perhaps we need as 
many concepts to describe it as we find we need, and no fewer?‖11 Bernstein 
suggested that the Cartesian anxiety of Modernity needs to be exorcised so that a 
moral agent can move beyond both objectivism and relativism.
12
 Toulmin 
suggested that moral agents need to find ways of moving on from the ―received 
view of Modernity‖ when he claims that the task now is ―to reform, and even 
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reclaim, our inherited modernity, by humanizing it.‖13 Finally, Jonsen and 
Toulmin suggest that when a moral agent accepts that moral enquiry involves the 
realm of ―praxis and phronesis,‖ rather than ―theoria and episteme,‖14 the 
motivation for resolving complex ethical issues is less urgent.  
 
The type of moral enquiry advocated by Williams, Toulmin, and Bernstein in this 
thesis seems more appropriate for a complex pluralist society because ethical 
decision making is relative, in the descriptive sense, to the stories that define us. 
Williams‘ concept of ―relativism from a distance‖15 engages human beings in a 
conversation about what it means to be a moral agent. For Williams, such a 
conversation is more edifying because it focuses on what moral agents have in 
common rather than what separates: 
Morality is not one determinate set of ethical thoughts. It 
embraces a range of ethical outlooks; and morality is so 
much with us that moral philosophy spends much of its 
time discussing the difference between these outlooks, 
rather than the difference between all of them and 
everything else.
16
 
Chapter 3 argued that the motivation for attempting to make moral decision 
making thicker than is either possible or appropriate was driven by both a 
Cartesian anxiety over concepts such as truth and objectivity, and a technical 
anxiety over developments in the sciences. These twin anxieties led to forms of 
practical ethics that ignored the history of moral debate when they appealed to the 
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role that reason ought to play. Robert Baker contends that the ahistoric and 
rationalistic presentations in bioethics texts is similar to that used in philosophy of 
science text books three decades ago. He takes the opening paragraph of Kuhn‘s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions and substitutes the words science and scientific 
with bioethics to illustrate the ―sterility of the ahistoric, rationalist applied ethics 
model of bioethics‖ that he claims is ―embraced by most standard bioethics 
textbooks.‖17  
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote 
or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in 
the image of [bioethics] by which we are now possessed… 
The aim of [contemporary text] books is persuasive and 
pedagogic; a concept of [bioethics] drawn from them is no 
more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than 
the image of a national culture drawn from a tourist 
brochure or a language text.
18
 
Baker‘s suggestion here is that the attempt to turn bioethics into a rational science 
ignored the history of debate over rationality and science. He argues that ―moral 
negotiation‖ involves a consensus ―on some conflict resolving solutions or norms‖ 
in a manner that ―often involves compromising with others, rather than 
convincing them of the correctness of one‘s views.‖19  
 
Robert Stern makes a similar point when he claims that historicism in ethics can 
be compared to the post-Kuhnian philosophy of science that ―increasingly 
abandoned the connection between truth, rationality and progress.‖20 He goes on 
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to suggest the historicist claim that an individual human life, defined by 
historically extended local practice (culture), is similar to what Kuhn, Feyerabend, 
and others insist occurs amongst members of the scientific community working 
within particular theoretical frameworks of understanding. Historicist claims that 
rationality and moral concepts like justice are culturally dependent are similar, 
according to Stern, to the claims of philosophers of science that scientific truth is 
theory dependent. Science offers no neutral or transcendent basis for making 
claims about absolutes. Thus the attempt to turn ethics into a science is based on 
false assumptions about science itself. The neutrality of science, so appealing to 
bioethics writers attempting to overcome the partial divide associated with 
―traditional‖ ethical dilemmas, has turned out, according to Stern, to be neither 
―neutral‖ nor ―impartial,‖ except in a highly qualified sense.21  
 
Chapter 4 reconstructed and critiqued one of the most popular versions of moral 
enquiry currently promoted. Through six editions of Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (PBE), Beauchamp and Childress promoted a form of common morality 
based on four prima facie principles. The PBE method appeals initially to a set of 
norms, such as ―do not kill,‖ because these norms are applicable to rational agents 
everywhere.
22
 The second feature of the PBE method is the appeal to rules of 
obligation (nonmalevolence, honesty, integrity, etc.) because, according to 
Beauchamp and Childress, ―A person is deficient in moral character if he or she 
lacks such traits.‖23 The third feature of the PBE method involves a cluster of four 
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prima facie principles – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice – and 
two subsidiary rules – confidentiality and veracity.24 The PBE method also 
incorporates a decision making protocol known as wide reflective equilibrium. 
This process, according to Beauchamp and Childress, incorporates principles and 
rules from ―all plausible moral judgments, principles, and relevant background 
theories‖ and from ―as wide a variety of kinds and levels of legitimate beliefs as 
possible.‖25 They go on to state that from this perspective ―moral thinking is 
analogous to hypotheses in science‖ because it has the ability to ―test, modify, or 
reject‖ moral arguments.26 This comparison is forced, however, because the 
consensus in science trades on a level of agreement about the boundary 
assumptions of the discipline that is missing in moral enquiry. 
 
The chapter began by claiming that the PBE method is a useful but not definitive 
evaluative process for moral decision making. This claim was defended by 
showing how the four-principle method can be usefully employed in a pluralist 
society because the four prima facie principles serve as a thin form of moral 
communication for stakeholders from diverse moral traditions. However, the 
chapter also showed that the principles are not definitive in complex cases. When 
faced with a complex issue, weighing one prima facie principle against another, 
via the process of reflective equilibrium, does not produce agreement. This is 
because moral agents make decisions based on the narrative content of their own 
lives, so the principles act as placeholders for a moral position that is already held. 
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This lack of specificity is only problematic when the utilisation of principles in 
practical ethics is overstated. In healthcare ethics, for instance, several critics now 
refer pejoratively to the PBE model as the ―Belmont principles,‖ the ―Georgetown 
mantra,‖ or simply to ―principlism,‖ because the principle-based method of moral 
enquiry was presented in high-profile cases as a means of resolving complex 
ethical issues.
27
 
 
Chapter 5 presented a similar case against the most popular Australian version of 
practical ethics, Singer‘s preference utilitarianism. As with the PBE model, 
preference utilitarianism was shown to be a useful but not definitive guide to 
moral decision making. Singer‘s concern for the role that reason ought to play in 
practical ethics has evolved, quite reasonably, over the course of his writing. 
However, this evolution has also increasingly diminished the efficacy of his 
primary decision making protocol, referred to as the equality principle or the 
principle of impartial concern. As with the PBE model, Singer initially overstated 
the efficacy of the equality principle when he claimed that it allows progress 
towards settling disputes,
28
 that it is the only rational basis for ethics,
29
 and that it 
is a uniquely rational basis for ethical decision making.
30
  
 
Singer‘s description of the concept of equal consideration of interest is relatively 
straightforward. He argues that self-interested rational agents, using the principle 
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of universalisation, ought to concede the same self-interestedness to others. Given 
this, he then argues that the equality principle ―acts like a pair of scales, weighing 
interests impartially … but they take no account of whose interests they are 
weighing.‖31 However, Singer‘s preference-guided decision making protocol has 
problems similar to Bentham‘s pain/pleasure calculus and Mill‘s higher quality 
pleasure calculus. This chapter showed that, after initially arguing that a rule-
based understanding of ethics does not work, Singer eventually concedes that 
rules are in fact necessary for the moral life. He does this because he recognises 
that the principle of impartial concern involves calculations that ―we lack the time 
and information‖ for the ―long and involved calculations‖ required.32 Given his 
acknowledgment of the calculus problems associated with the principle of 
impartial concern, the chapter closed by showing that Singer‘s initial argument, 
that the equality principle is the only rational basis for ethics,
33
 was overstated 
and that complex moral issues involve more than preference utilitarian concerns.  
 
The conclusions drawn from the reconstruction of decision making protocols in 
chapters 4 and 5 showed that both methods are useful but that neither achieves the 
aim of providing definitive solutions to complex moral dilemmas. Both principle-
guided enquiry and preference-guided enquiry are best understood as tools that 
can be used to engage moral agents in a conversation about ethics, rather than as 
tools that can be used to solve complex moral dilemmas.  
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Chapter 6 reconstructed a third and very different type of moral enquiry, namely, 
the tradition-guided approach advocated by MacIntyre. As previously stated, 
MacIntyre is one of the most strident critics of practical ethics. He maintains that 
contemporary moral enquiry fails to appreciate both the conceptual 
incommensurability between rival moral arguments and the role that history plays 
in the formation of these arguments. He claims: 
It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment … to 
provide … standards and methods of rational justification 
by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of 
life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, 
enlightened or unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason 
would replace authority and tradition.
34
 
MacIntyre‘s solution involves a reconstructive project that acknowledges how 
moral claims made in the present are part of a longer and deeper historical 
narrative account of the moral life. This historicist account contrasts two questions 
that impact on both the PBE model and Singer‘s preference utilitarianism. 
MacIntyre claims that instead of asking, ―By what principles am I, as a rational 
person, bound?‖ moral agents ought to ask, ―By what principles are we, as 
actually or potentially rational persons, bound in our relationships?‖35 This link to 
social relationships is integral to understanding his account of moral enquiry. He 
contends that it is through the ―institutionalized relationships of established social 
practices‖ that moral agents discover goods that are ―internal to those practices‖ 
and also ―give point and purpose to those relationships.‖36  
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This teleological link to social practices is pivotal in MacIntyre‘s account because 
it provides the motivation for establishing the telos of the whole human life. It 
also provides a key to understanding why he thinks Aristotelian Thomism 
succeeds where other traditions fail. However, MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided 
method also seems to overstate what is possible and, more importantly, what is 
necessary once moral philosophy is viewed as a means for understanding the 
moral life rather than as a prescriptive method for solving complex ethical issues. 
When MacIntyre posits that ethics presupposes three narrative steps, ―some 
account of potentiality and act – some account of the essence of man as a rational 
animal – and above all some account of the human telos,‖37 he constructs a 
tradition-guided explanation for this narrative life that is thick at every level. A 
key focus of his tradition-guided enquiry is to explain the role that practices and 
virtues (internal goods) play in enabling a moral agent to understand and to 
negotiate her life-situation. For MacIntyre, virtues that are necessary for 
excellence within a practice must also be consistent, at least to some extent, with 
the telos of the whole human life. Knight echoes this teleological link in reference 
to After Virtue when he claims that: 
characterization of the virtues in terms of practices is 
necessary, but not sufficient for an adequate specification. 
Virtues are also to be understood as qualities required to 
achieve the goods which furnish individual human lives 
with their telos. And I argue that the unifying form of an 
individual life, without which such lives could not have a 
telos, derives from its possessing some kind of narrative 
structure. Individual human lives however are only able to 
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have the structures they do because they are embedded 
within social traditions.
38
 
Furthermore, for MacIntyre, a practice that does not taking into consideration 
virtues necessary for human social dependency is deficient: 
no account of the goods, rules, and virtues that are 
definitive of our moral life can be adequate that does not 
explain – or at least point us towards an explanation – how 
that form of life is possible for beings who are biologically 
constituted as we are, by providing us with an account of 
our development towards and into that form of life. That 
development has as its starting point our initial animal 
condition.
39
 
The chapter on tradition-guided enquiry argued that MacIntyre‘s advocacy for 
Aristotelian Thomism was important from a personal perspective because it 
provided the latest installment of his life-story, and this is consistent with his 
claim that humans are ―story-telling‖ animals.40 In one important respect, 
however, the appeal to Aristotelian Thomism is inconsistent with MacIntyre‘s 
earlier claim concerning the concept of a practice. For MacIntyre, a practice 
involves accepting both standards of excellence and the achievement of goods that 
are internal to the practice, both of which require an appeal to authority:  
To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those 
standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as 
judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, 
preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and 
partially define the practice.
41
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MacIntyre‘s reconstructive project concludes with an intricately woven claim in 
Three Rival Versions that a new form of Aristotelian Thomism is required to 
overcome problems of moral enquiry because this tradition has been shown to 
have the facilities for dealing with epistemological crises that other traditions do 
not. MacIntyre‘s gradual progression towards Aristotelian Thomism, in the three 
books devoted to tradition-guided enquiry, indicates how difficult his project is, 
insofar as he is reluctant to make explicit his increasingly thick narrative account 
of the moral life that is inherently theological.
42
 The problem for MacIntyre is that 
academic research – in this case the study of Aristotle and Aquinas – is, broadly 
speaking, a practice, because academic study involves a ―coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity.‖43 Academic research of 
this type develops internal goods (virtues) about the texts that are considered 
reliable, the hermeneutic issues associated with translations, and numerous other 
issues. This chapter closed by arguing that if MacIntyre‘s reconstructive project 
was a product of the standards of excellence within the practice of scholarship, 
then Aristotelian and Thomistic scholars ought to agree with his Aristotelian 
Thomistic synthesis. This level of synthesis has not been forthcoming, however.  
J. B. Schneewind illustrates this when he contends that MacIntyre‘s attempt to 
overcome the grave state of disorder to which he alludes at the beginning of After 
Virtue, a disorder that has left moral debate unsettlable at one level and 
interminable at another,
44
 has failed. In Schneewind‘s view, 
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MacIntyre has failed to show that the historical study of 
those traditions, to which his book is largely devoted, has 
anything special to offer toward the resolution of the 
current issues whose ―interminability‖ he took as his 
starting point. Only the genuine use of the resources of a 
given tradition, showing that it actually yields a practical 
solution we can all accept, could do this. And even then 
those outside the tradition would not accept the solution 
because it was generated by the tradition. They would 
accept it because it struck them as reasonable.
45
 
7.2 Ethics as Conversation: Thin Universals and Thick Practices 
 
Whatever the telos of the whole human life is – and this has proved difficult to 
define – Aristotle‘s cautiously thin approach to unpacking human flourishing 
seems appropriate. Clearly there are survival needs that humans need to meet 
before they can flourish, and it is regrettable that two millennia after Aristotle a 
third of the human population still has to focus on ―flourishing‖ at this level. For 
Aristotle, human flourishing (eudaimonia) begins with a rough sketch of the good 
life that is filled in with more detail depending on what activity or practice a 
rational agent engages in.
46
 For this reason, a rational agent ought not look for 
more precision than the activity or practice allows.
47
  
 
Aristotle seems to have in mind here that prudence or practical wisdom involves 
skills acquired over time. Young men, for instance, can become ―geometricians 
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and mathematicians,‖ but Aristotle thinks that a ―young man of practical wisdom 
cannot be found.‖48 The reason for this is that intelligent young men can 
understand mathematics because mathematics requires knowledge, but not skill. 
Practical wisdom, on the other hand, requires both knowledge and skill and 
therefore young men have not had the time necessary to develop the skills 
associated with a complex social activity. 
 
MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice can be usefully employed in the same prudential 
sense because the standards of excellence required in long-lived practices such as 
medicine, law, and politics require a thick habituation of knowledge and skills, 
gleaned and developed over time, in a manner that is consistent with their 
respective ends (health, justice, and civil society). This section builds on the 
reconstructive project of the previous chapters by showing how thin moral 
agreement allows sufficient consensus with respect to thick practices, even in the 
midst of serious moral disagreement. 
 
Conversation in a Pluralist Society 
 
Given that Australia is a pluralist society in which no moral theory or tradition is 
held in common, practice-guided enquiry provides a pragmatic alternative. 
Practice-guided enquiry reconceptualises MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice within 
the tradition of philosophical pragmatism associated with James, Dewey, and 
Rorty. Reconceived in this way, practice-guided enquiry engages people in a 
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conversation within a social space between the incommensurability of their 
respective rival arguments. This alternative approach attempts to build on thin 
agreements in a pluralist society by taking seriously Rorty‘s concept of 
philosophy as conversation: 
The notion of culture as conversation, rather than as a 
structure erected upon foundations, fits well with this 
hermeneutical notion of knowledge, since getting into a 
conversation with strangers is, like acquiring a new virtue 
or skill by imitating models, a matter of  rather 
than .
49
 
For Rorty this type of consensus is not only the best that philosophical objectivity 
can hope for but also, and more significantly, all that is necessary for moral 
philosophy to progress. This pragmatic approach overcomes the illusion of 
foundationalism because it works within established social and political 
frameworks. These frameworks replace what Rorty calls the ―notion of knowledge 
as the assemblage of representations‖ with a pragmatist awareness of what people 
actually do.
50
 Practice-guided pragmatism of this type facilitates three different 
types of conversation that can be edifyingly employed in a pluralist society.  
 
The first type of conversation focuses on thin teleological agreements that people 
in a pluralist society share – and also that most moral theories endorse – namely, a 
shared awareness of virtues that sustain a civil community: justice, kindness, 
peacefulness, civility, beneficence, integrity, respect, etc. This primary 
conversation unites human beings from different cultures because the discussion 
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is about issues that impact on all people, in every culture. Because the 
conversation over thin universals transcends the boundaries of culture, it is 
pragmatically useful because it invites people who are generally different from 
one another to focus on a requirement they share in common, the flourishing of 
civil society. 
 
The second type of conversation builds on the first by focusing on those practices 
within a pluralist society on which there is already substantial agreement. In a 
stable pluralist society, people disagree over many things: religion, party politics, 
sport, and, perhaps most intractably of all, moral issues. In the midst of this 
disagreement, however, there is also considerable agreement that practices such as 
medicine, law, education, and politics (in the Aristotelian sense) sustain a civil 
society. Rorty refers to this type of pragmatism as ―epistemological behaviorism‖ 
because it invokes knowledge gained from social practices.
51
 He further argues 
that this social justification of belief, following Sellars and Quine, is the normal 
conversational discourse that happens amongst knowledgeable peers in particular 
social practices.
52
  
 
The third type of conversation involves a discussion about the internal goods that 
sustain practices such as medicine, law, education, and politics. Because this type 
of discussion entails internal goods, it also entails actions, behaviours, rules, 
protocols, etc., that MacIntyre rightly suggests are ―historically extended‖ and 
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―socially embodied‖ within specific practices.53 One result of this commitment to 
take history and tradition into account, according to MacIntyre, is that ―human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.‖54 Conversation such as this is, first and 
foremost, a conversation among practitioners, but it engages others whenever the 
internal goods of a practice intersect or clash with those of another.
55
  
 
In a liberal pluralist society, the concept of philosophy as conversation involves 
dialogue over the things that moral agents hold in common and also dialogue over 
things that are conceptually incommensurable. Many of the contentious issues in 
moral debate are incapable of resolution from a moral perspective. A liberal 
society supports this diversity, but this diversity is not unrestrained because liberty 
is not an absolute moral principle. The attempt to codify the relationship between 
individual liberty and the prevention of harm to others is not without practical 
difficulties, as shown in chapters 4–6.56 The motivation to codify practical ethics 
stems from a Cartesian anxiety that the space between conceptually 
incommensurable moral theories needs to be filled if we are to avoid moral chaos.  
 
The rationale for a conversational and practice-based focus for moral enquiry is 
that the moral space between rival theories of ethics in a pluralist society is not as 
problematic as is often portrayed. In the same way that cultural difference does 
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not deny common human imperatives, moral difference ought not to deny 
common moral imperatives. The thin moral universals that human beings share 
are often lost in the intractability associated with the focus on divisive issues of 
practical ethics. Acknowledging the pluralism in a liberal society involves an 
acceptance that moral agents can rarely be separated by the legitimacy or 
otherwise of their respective moral arguments. Serious thinking moral agents hold 
opposing views on a range of complex moral issues, but they also hold many 
things in common. Pluralism invokes a conversation about shared common values 
because cultural and moral difference never completes the separation between one 
rational agent and another.  
 
If Sir Martin Rees is right, our shared common values are going to be sorely tested 
as this new century unfolds. Rees, Astronomer Royal in Britain and noted 
astrophysicist, published in 2003 a book entitled Our Final Century: Will the 
Human Race Survive the Twenty-first Century?
57
 in which he claims the odds for 
human survival beyond the twenty-first century to be 50/50. As an astrophysicist, 
Rees is acutely aware that life on planet Earth is at risk of destruction from several 
natural disasters that are beyond the control of human beings. Most of his 
academic work has been dedicated to understanding and explaining cosmic 
catastrophes such as gamma-ray bursts, cannibal galaxies, and the destructive 
power of black holes. The destructive power of these naturally occurring events is 
manifestly greater than anything humans have developed or will develop in the 
future. Our Final Century addresses none of these concerns, however, because the 
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risk of destruction from such means is small. Rees‘ book is a restatement of the 
1960s concern over technical anxiety writ large. He fears for the future of humans, 
and even for a planet that is habitable for life, based on what he thinks the odds 
are for an industrial accident involving genetically engineered viruses or 
nanotechnology. Rees offered a $1,000.00 bet (immediately taken up) that some 
time in the first twenty years of the new century a catastrophic accident caused by 
biotechnology would kill more than one million people.  
 
Few doomsayers are as well credentialed as Rees. His concern over human 
technical imperatives is shared by many, but laying odds on human destruction 
has caught people short before. In the 1960s Paul Ehrlich and others warned that 
human population growth was outstripping the capacity of food production so that 
by the 1970s and 1980s millions of people would be starving to death.
58
 Ehrlich‘s 
dire predictions did not eventuate because farmers across the world increased 
production to match the growth of human population. Although Ehrlich was 
wrong about the date of population catastrophe, he was not wrong about the 
problems associated with exponential population growth. The power of 
exponential numbers is well known to mathematicians, but it has only recently 
been seen as a problem for human populations. The human population did not 
reach one billion until sometime during 1850, but it took less than two hundred 
years to record the second billion. Since then the doubling ratio has been halving 
so that the six billion doubling ratio for the year 1999 was down to 35 years. At 
present the doubling rate of human population is approximately 30 years, but 
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some stabilisation is occurring, particularly in wealthier countries where the rate 
of natural increase is zero or below (birth rate minus death rate = rate of natural 
increase).  
 
The United Nations Population Division now estimates that if stabilisation 
continues, human population will double to 9.7 billion by 2150 and stabilize at 10 
billion some time after.
59
 Much of the debate associated with the growth of human 
population has focused on the ability of the planet to sustain a set number of 
people. Ehrlich was clearly wrong about 5 billion and even the 10 billion that the 
United Nations predicts may be sustainable if new farming techniques continue to 
develop. Because stabilisation in the rate of natural increase within a human 
population occurs routinely in healthy populations, the United Nations set a series 
of Millennium Development Goals, one of which was to halve world poverty by 
2015.
60
  
 
The qualifying condition used by the UN, if stabilisation continues, does not seem 
possible, however, without the type of technical developments in farming and 
agricultural genetics that Rees warns against. Genetically modified organisms 
(animals and vegetation) offer great potential, but there is significant fear, 
particularly in Europe, that the harms outweigh the benefits.
61
 Australia may 
provide a case study for the future because thousands of hectares of previously 
arable land are now no longer in production due to the combined effects of 
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overuse, poor tilling methods, and a changing climate. If this scenario plays out on 
a global scale, the present stabilisation of human population will diminish because 
poverty drives up population. Ehrlich‘s exponential population bomb may yet 
explode after 2050, doubling to 20 billion in less than 20 years.  
 
Absolute poverty,
62
 therefore, is arguably the most significant crisis currently 
faced by moral agents. It seems reasonable to presume now, as Singer and others 
have done, that the moral concern we extend to others, via the principle of 
universalisation, ought no longer to be restricted to national borders. From another 
perspective, however, overcoming absolute poverty is now also a personal or self-
interested crisis because it has become a survival issue. If the population does not 
stabilise by 2050, then human population growth has the potential to result in 5-10 
billion people living in absolute poverty. This raises the specter of poverty-linked 
transmission of viruses that are potentially catastrophic for humanity. The 
potential for this to occur ought to incite moral agents, and people concerned for 
their own self-interest, to engage in conversation via the thin moral considerations 
we hold in common, considerations that focus on our shared humanity. 
 
Conversation and Thin Universals 
 
For people now living in large cities, moral enquiry as a thin conversation about 
universals involves consideration of social cooperation between numbers of 
people unimaginable for ancient philosophers. The level of human cooperation 
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(engaged pluralism) necessary in a large city is often undervalued. Living in a city 
with millions of other human beings involves a level of cooperation as significant 
as living in an aboriginal village or a small isolated community of families.
63
 The 
social relationships are generally not as close, but the level of cooperation is as 
great, or even greater, due to the amount of human interaction that is necessary 
when vast numbers of humans live together. In large cities the capacity for human 
cooperation is often overlooked and is probably masked by media concentration 
on statistically small levels of violence and other forms of social conflict. Whether 
or not large human populations are sustainable long term is yet to be determined, 
but the perception that a larger population leads to more violence and dysfunction 
is routinely overstated.
64
 Significant moral thinkers seem to recognise, 
independently of time and place, that the oldest moral maxim of all, treat others as 
you would want to be treated, is a necessary condition for long-lived human 
cohabitation.
65
 Without this teleological imperative, slavery would be 
indistinguishable from poverty relief. More significantly, in a large pluralist city, 
this eudemonic telos does not need to be prescriptive because a thin consensus 
seems all that is required for the polis to function reasonably well. 
 
Humans are a remarkably cooperative species. Therefore the thick prescriptive 
telos of the whole human life that MacIntyre appeals to seems to be both an 
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unrealisable and, more importantly, unnecessarily complicated goal to set for 
moral enquiry in a pluralist society. This does not imply that a thick prescriptive 
awareness of the moral life is unrealisable or unnecessary for rational moral 
agents. A rational agent who thinks seriously about moral issues is going to 
develop a thick understanding of the moral life, leaning toward one tradition rather 
than another because the process of developing this awareness involves greater 
familiarity with some moral traditions rather than others.  
 
MacIntyre is also right to argue that acknowledgement of the telos of the whole 
human life is necessary for ethics because such an acknowledgement mediates 
between those practices that promote human flourishing (e.g., medicine) and those 
practices that do not (e.g., racism).
66
 When he states that ethics presupposes 
―some account of potentiality and act,‖ ―some account of the essence of man as a 
rational animal,‖ and ―above all some account of the human telos,‖ he does so 
because he argues that there is a ―fundamental contrast‖ between ―man-as-he-
happens-to-be‖ and ―man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖67 
MacIntyre‘s attempt to make this third account, the essential nature of human 
beings, more explicit through the comparative analysis of traditions is clearly 
consistent with his claim that humans are story-filled animals. However, the 
justification he offers for why one thick story trumps others has proved to be 
inconclusive. When MacIntyre claims that professors of philosophy disagree over 
ethics as much as other people do,
68
 he does not seem to appreciate sufficiently 
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that disagreement over thick moral issues does not preclude thin agreement on 
many others. 
 
The solution to competing traditions of ethics in a pluralist society, therefore, is 
not to advocate how or why one tradition trumps others, as MacIntyre does, but to 
recognise the limitations of moral epistemology and to set goals of sufficient 
pragmatism. This pragmatic approach limits what can be said about moral 
knowledge in a pluralist society to a consensus based on thin agreement about the 
values that sustain human flourishing. In a modern pluralist society, a thin level of 
agreement is evident about many aspects of human action in spite of the lack of 
agreement over their respective epistemic justifications. Even if this thin level of 
agreement is restricted to cooperative behaviour, and even if this level of 
agreement was all that could be said about ethics, it remains a significant force for 
human cooperation. The thin conversational approach to ethics outlined above 
seems pragmatically more useful, as a minimalist starting point for moral 
conversation, because it trades on common human teleological imperatives and a 
common awareness shared by most forms of ethical theory. From a pragmatist 
perspective, this thin moral minimalism provides sufficient social cooperation for 
man-as-he-happens-to-be because of existing agreement over practices that 
contribute to the flourishing of the polis. 
 
In this context, the rule of law, highlighted in Chapter 3, provides a thin level of 
moral conversation because it does not arbitrate on why one moral argument is 
superior to another. The rule of law is a mediation process that involves a series of 
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political, legal, and socially established end-points that attempt to resolve conflict. 
When this mediation process is used to address moral issues, it cannot arbitrate on 
the rational efficacy of the arguments involved. The rule of law can and does 
make rulings that have moral implications, but these rulings are primarily 
procedural. In Australia, for instance, the parliamentary debate referred to earlier, 
over whether spare IVF embryos ought to be made available for non-reproductive 
purposes, was decided by a conscience vote of federal parliamentarians after more 
than a year of public consultation. The decision to allow embryos to be used for 
therapeutic purposes is not the right decision from a moral perspective because 
the concept of rightness is argument-dependent. It is, however, the right decision 
from the perspective of the rule of law because due process has been followed. 
Moral agents who disagree with the outcome do not often object to the process 
because they accept that the rule of law plays an important role in a modern 
pluralist democracy such as Australia.  
 
Another example of a contemporary conversation over thin moral universals is the 
various civil and political protocols adopted by member States of the United 
Nations. Historically, the language of human rights was based on foundationalist 
natural law assumptions that rights are basic or universalisable to all humans. This 
epistemological position has been an easy target for consequentialists and non-
consequentialists alike. Bentham famously declared, in an attack on rights 
language entitled Anarchical Fallacies, that ―natural rights is simple nonsense: 
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.‖69 
                                                 
69
 Jeremy Bentham, ―Anarchical Fallacies,‖ in John Bowring ed., The Works of Jeremy Bentham 
Volume II (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), 501. 
 281 
MacIntyre is similarly caustic when he declares that ―the truth is plain: there are 
no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.‖70  
 
This criticism is directed at the foundationalist assumptions of rights language. 
When the Declaration of Independence (1776) declares that the truth of rights 
language is ―self-evident,‖ that ―all men are created equal,‖ and that humans ―are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness,‖71 it contains several epistemological 
claims. However, none of the foundationalist claims, which were meant to 
authenticate or validate the Declaration, is self-evident for the same reason that 
belief in unicorns is not self-evident, since they are nowhere to be found. It is not 
self-evident, in an epistemological sense, that all men [humans] are created or that 
they are equal. Neither is it self-evident that God endowed humans with 
unalienable [unchangeable] rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
Clearly, from an epistemological perspective, the rhetoric of the Declaration 
alludes to more epistemological certainty than it can defend.  
 
A similar issue arises in relation to the United Nations 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR makes a strong 
epistemological claim in the Preamble to ―recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family‖ as the 
―foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖72 From an 
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epistemological standpoint, this statement is problematic because it appeals to the 
inalienability of basic rights for all humans. However, if one accepts that rights 
are truly inalienable, and therefore immune from change by civil, religious, or 
political whim, then the 30 articles routinely clash with other moral imperatives. 
For instance, Article 3 claims that ―everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person,‖ but this is problematic because ―everyone‖ ought not to 
include people who are deliberately cruel. Similarly, Article 18 claims that 
―everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,‖ but once 
again this ―everyone‖ ought to exclude religious practice that is demonstrably 
cruel. Lastly, Article 19 claims that ―everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression … and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers,‖ but ―everyone‖ ought not to include 
publically expressed opinions that are overtly racist or sexist. Once one 
acknowledges that universal does not imply all humans and that inalienable does 
not imply immune from change, then the strength of the UDHR claim is 
diminished from an epistemological perspective.  
 
However, if one views the UDHR as a thin rhetorical statement – a statement 
forged in the midst of a post-WWII, post-nuclear, and post-holocaust conversation 
about the future – then the epistemological problems are less important. Given 
that the original natural law foundation of rights language is well-known to be 
epistemologically problematic, the contemporary appeal to civil and political 
covenants that the United Nations now use seems appropriate. Civil and political 
covenants trade on an agreement about the rule of law that countries either accept 
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or reject. In this sense, the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
(1952) is based on a thin social consensus between member States that more 
could be done to elevate the status of women. In the civil and political sense, the 
UDHR provides a thin moral minimalist consensus of the type referred to 
throughout this thesis. This thin agreement does not imply that member States will 
agree on what the Political Rights of Women entails in detail, but it does imply 
that, having signed the declaration, these States do consider that this issue evokes 
a conversation worth having.  
 
When thin minimalist claims are combined with thick maximalist practices in a 
pluralist society, the language of morality provides substantial explanatory power 
over the moral life because it allows for a social resolution of complex moral 
issues, even in the midst of serious moral disagreement. The next section will 
contend that a thick moral maximalism is also possible over many practices in a 
pluralist society, once agreement has been achieved that the practice itself 
contributes to a thin sense of human flourishing. 
 
Conversation and Thick Practices 
 
Practice-guided enquiry engages moral agents in a conversation at the point at 
which consensus on moral issues breaks down. This method takes for granted 
Williams‘ claim, referred to earlier, that complexity and conflict is a basic fact of 
moral deliberation because moral deliberation involves a complex mix of local 
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and universal concerns.
73
 The practice-guided approach focuses on a level of 
agreement that has already been achieved. This is because a practitioner, by virtue 
of internal standards of excellence within a practice, accepts the authority of those 
standards in a way that overrides his or her own choices, preferences, or tastes. 
Practice-guided enquiry does not seek to establish whether actions are right or 
wrong; rather, it seeks to establish whether actions are consistent with internal 
goods as defined by the practice. For example, a good medical practitioner is one 
whose actions and behaviour are consistent with the practice of medicine because 
a consensus, forged over time, has already been established with respect to actions 
and behaviours that conform to the telos of medicine (health).  
 
The self-authenticating thick standards of a practice have practical consequences 
for human conduct because practitioners have access to an established set of 
internal goods that are historically extended in a manner that is consistent with the 
teleological imperative of that practice.
74
 Conversation within a practice is thick 
because it involves historically extended argument about the internal goods 
(virtues) that define it. MacIntyre is right that an account of a practice that does 
not take seriously the telos of the whole human life is deficient, but he makes too 
much of this necessary evaluative condition. A rational agent can develop a thick 
understanding of a practice while maintaining only a loose or even vague 
connection with the telos of a whole human life.  
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MacIntyre‘s description of a practice is relatively straightforward but the activities 
that he thinks constitute a practice have since been broadened because his 
description was too narrow. He thought that architecture was a practice but 
bricklaying was not (because bricklaying is a skill).
75
 Hauerwas, whose father was 
a bricklayer, questions how MacIntyre draws this fine distinction between a 
practice and a skill.
76
 Hauerwas insists that bricklaying is a practice because it has 
both a narrative history and a set of internal goods that constitute what it means to 
be a good bricklayer.
77
 Perhaps MacIntyre was not sufficiently aware of internal 
goods that pertain to bricklaying but those who lay brick, or have fathers who do 
so, are. A pluralist society involves activities that might not normally be 
recognised as practices in the formal sense, like medicine and law, because many 
activities exhibit roughly the same commitment to internal goods, extended over 
time, that formal disciplines do. If Hauerwas is right, that laying brick is indeed a 
practice, then perhaps it is best not to differentiate too narrowly between practices 
and skills. The type of habituation Aristotle has in mind is useful here because he 
links the internal goods of routine activities, such as bridle-making or sitar 
playing, to their historically extended goals of horsemanship and musicianship.  
 
Rorty‘s concept of a practice is also useful because he links the concept of 
practice to Kuhn‘s concept of normal science when he claims that ―we can get 
epistemological commensuration only where we already have agreed-upon 
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practices of inquiry‖; furthermore, this commensuration is not because practices 
are true but because ―when a practice has continued long enough the conventions 
which make it possible – and which permit a consensus on how to divide it into 
parts – are relatively easy to isolate.‖78 Conversation about complex issues within 
practices is necessarily thick because they are based on established conventions. 
Rorty argues that participating in these thick conversations is ―normal discourse‖ 
and necessary for a rational agent to understand a culture, a practice, a theory, or a 
language.
79
 Commensuration is possible at the level of normal discourse for 
practices such as politics, medicine, or law because these practices have long 
enough histories for the conventions which govern them to become established.  
 
―Abnormal discourse,‖ in this constructivist sense, may call into question the 
received view and, if successful, can move the conversation in a completely 
different, or revolutionary, direction. Abnormal discourse is edifying, according to 
Rorty, because its ―strangeness‖ can ―aid us in becoming new beings.‖80 For 
Rorty, this hermeneutic dimension to knowledge is neither a new discipline nor a 
new method for taking over when epistemology fails; rather, it is an ―expression 
of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled 
– that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and 
confrontation is no longer felt.‖81  
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Often, the internal goods within a practice are modified or even rejected as a result 
of abnormal interaction with other practices. Sometimes this happens voluntarily, 
because practitioners recognise the validity of an opposing argument or 
suggestion; at other times a change to an internal good within a practice will be 
non-voluntary, because external rational agents provide sufficient justification to 
force a change. The advocacy, rejection, and subsequent reinstatement of medical 
lobotomy illustrates how normal (internal) and abnormal (external) interaction can 
lead to change within a practice.  
 
In 1949, Antonio Egas Moniz was awarded a Nobel Prize for his work on medical 
lobotomy, and thousands of patients underwent a variety of procedures that 
attempted to alter the personality of troubled patients by interfering with their 
brain chemistry, usually by surgical means. Walter Freeman developed a 
technique that included tapping an ice pick through the eye socket because he 
thought that by doing so he altered a patient‘s brain chemistry which made them 
more passive. Most of his work was poorly researched and after 1960 his 
technique in particular, and lobotomy in general, fell into disrepute within 
medicine.  
 
Much of the criticism over lobotomy came from people whose expertise was 
external to the discipline of psychosurgery, primarily people working in 
psychiatry, neuropsychology, and other non-surgical behaviour modification 
disciplines. Eventually research showed that psychosurgical techniques, such as 
lobotomy, do not alter a patient‘s behaviour for the better and the technique was 
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subsequently banned in many countries. In recent years, however, a specialised 
form of temporal lobotomy was developed to treat patients who suffer from 
seizures of various types. This involves destroying a part of the brain that causes 
the seizure and this technique has proved to be very successful. The changing 
status of a technique such as lobotomy illustrates the type of normal and abnormal 
conversation that occurs within a thick practice such as medicine. The next sub-
section examines the role that internal goods play in practices extended over time.  
 
Conversation and Internal Goods 
 
MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice has been adapted and utilised by a variety of 
scholars from various disciplines.
82
 It primarily involves a consensus among 
practitioners on the internal goods which are realised in the application of 
standards of excellence. MacIntyre contends that internal goods of a practice ―can 
only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice 
in question.‖83 Without this practical experience one is incompetent to adjudicate 
which actions or behavious are internal goods and which are not. Nancey Murphy 
and George Ellis use MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice to promote a cosmological 
argument for ethics. They agree with MacIntyre that a moral agent needs to locate 
practices within the telos of human life because ―practices and life stories … are 
evaluated morally in relation to the telos of human life‖ and ―the actual content of 
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the ethic [its internal goods] depends on the telos or purpose derived from the 
theology or metaphysics at the topmost level.‖84  
 
James McClendon similarly uses the concept of a practice for articulating the role 
that stories play in religious practice for what he calls the life-shaping convictions 
of practitioners. For McClendon, 
There is no ―essence‖ of religion; religions are neither … 
all more or less true nor … all more or less evil. It follows 
that generalizations about religion are generally mistaken, 
since religions differ in kind, and only concrete, 
sympathetic historical and empirical study can tell us 
about any particular religion. We may call this practical 
theory of religion … in the sense that its concern is the 
life-shaping (as I will say, the convictional) practices 
religions embody. So religions are not to be identified with 
their abstract teachings, far less with their ―errors.‖85 
McClendon uses game playing to illustrate how religious practices can be 
understood by focusing primarily on the teleological practice of ethics as defined 
by its practitioners. Game playing is a teleological activity that involves players in 
standards of action and adherence to rules. The game of chess, for instance, has a 
long established social history in which the complex system of rules and etiquette 
were developed. These rules and etiquette are the internal goods of the game, and 
a chess player needs to understand them to be considered proficient. McClendon 
thinks that game playing illustrates how social practices evolve and how the 
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internal goods, extended over time, are modified.
86
 In chess, for instance, the rules 
of the game have remained relatively static and few changes have been introduced 
in several hundred years, probably because the game usually involves only two 
people and very few spectators.
87
 Team games and games with large audiences, 
on the other hand, often evolve significantly over time to take into consideration 
new technical developments, greater fitness, and corporate requirements relating 
to television sponsorship.  
 
McClendon uses game playing to illustrate how MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice 
can be utilised in complex disciplines. In the same way that game playing requires 
some form of teleological imperative that gives point and purpose to the activity, 
and also some rules of engagement that define how the game ought to be played, 
McClendon argues that MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice can be usefully 
employed in complex disciplines. The following section will offer a tentative 
reconstruction of the thin and thick application of practice-guided enquiry for the 
practice of medicine. The rationale for advocating a practice-based approach for 
medicine is that it refocuses decision making toward its internal goods and its 
teleological imperative.  
 
The focus of practice-guided ethics is the actions of a moral agent from an 
historical or tradition-guided standpoint. The individual moral agent is therefore 
not impartial but should, if he or she has been trained sufficiently, be partial to the 
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internal goods of medicine. Medical ethics is a co-operative behaviour in which 
internal goods are determined by evolving practices over time. Relating this 
practice-first approach to medical decision making involves looking at what 
happens when the ―switches are thrown‖ in medicine. A practice in medicine has 
a ―life of its own‖ because some things work and some things do not. Theories 
about treatment of certain diseases are confirmed or otherwise by clinical trials 
initially and then by practice extended over time. Procedures, diagnoses, and even 
bedside manners become established as ―internal goods‖ because they have a 
pragmatic history of effectiveness. In short, they seem to work. 
 
7.3 Medical Practice: Thin Telos and Thick Internal Goods 
 
MacIntyre argues that to enter into a practice is to accept the ―authority of those 
standards‖; to accept the ―inadequacy of my own performance as judged by 
them‖; and to ―subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the 
standards which currently and partially define the practice.‖88 A pragmatic 
practice-guided approach to understanding the internal goods of medical practice 
requires three levels of competency that relate to the three different types of moral 
conversation referred to previously: 
 
1. a thin historical competency to appreciate how and why the telos of health is 
consistent with human flourishing; 
 
2. a thick practical competency that measures actions (knowledge, skill, and 
behaviour) of a practitioner against the normal discourse of internal goods 
associated with the historically extended telos of health; and 
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3. a social competency of openness to abnormal discourse that accepts that even 
the most cherished internal goods of medicine might be shown to be 
inconsistent with its own standard of excellence (health) and, perhaps more 
importantly, an openness to other standards of excellence. 
 
In contemporary terms, the use of best-practice standards goes some way to 
facilitating practice-guided enquiry. The concept of best practice in a clinical 
situation is not always obvious because best practice for the surgeon may promote 
a different action from best practice for the oncologist, and both may be restricted 
by best practice of a hospital administrator working within budget constraints. 
However, as long as health is the focus, the decision to provide surgery, or 
chemical therapy, or even to restrict or deny treatment because of budget 
constraints can all be said to be good practice if they conform to established 
internal goods that have historically justified the practice concerned.  
 
When Aristotle argues that ―every art and every inquiry, and similarly every 
action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good,‖89 he uses medicine to 
illustrate how this teleological imperative ought to be understood. He defends this 
by suggesting that there is general agreement about the teleological imperative of 
medicine because it is obvious to a rational agent, particularly when he is ill, that 
health is a necessary though not sufficient aspect of human flourishing.
90
 Edmund 
Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma describe this teleological imperative for 
medicine succinctly: 
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the ends of medicine are ultimately the restoration or 
improvement of health and, more proximately, to heal, 
that is, to cure illness and disease or, when this is not 
possible, to care for and help the patient to live with 
residual pain, discomfort, or disability. There are many 
decisions along the way to these ends, but in each decision 
there is a fusion of technical and moral elements... But this 
good is more than simple medical good; it includes the 
patient‘s perception of good—material, emotional, or 
spiritual.
91
  
Rorty similarly states that medicine is considered a practice because it involves a 
consensus on ―agreed upon practices of inquiry‖ and has ―continued long enough‖ 
for the ―conventions which make it possible‖ to be intelligible.92 Pellegrino and 
Thomasma emphasise the purpose-driven aim of medical practice when they posit 
that the chief aim of medicine ought to be a process directed at the good of the 
patient. They acknowledge that medicine can be studied scientifically, but this is 
not what they call the ―justifying principle‖ of medicine.93 The justifying principle 
of medicine is the health of the patient or the health of a community of patients if 
community health is in focus. In this pragmatic sense, the internal goods of 
medical practice are constitutive of and constituted by the teleological imperative 
of health. Given this teleological imperative for health, Paul Hoyt-O‘Conner 
argues that MacIntyre‘s concept of practice can usefully be employed because 
medicine is a historically extended practice with clearly defined internal goods 
(virtues). 
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Since Alasdair MacIntyre‘s landmark book After Virtue, 
there has been renewed interest in the role of the virtues in 
the moral life and attention paid to reappropriating the 
Aristotelian notion of ‗practice.‘ Recent reappropriations 
of the virtues and virtue theory in medical ethics have 
contributed to conceiving more adequately the nature of 
good medicine.
94
  
Clearly medicine is a practice that has achieved this level of acceptance because it 
has historically established internal goods defined by its own standard of 
excellence (health) and is consistent with what MacIntyre refers to as the ―human 
powers to achieve excellence‖ (his description of human flourishing).95 A less 
cumbersome descriptor for medicine is to say that the telos of medical practice 
(health) is consistent with the broader concept of human flourishing (eudaimonia) 
and that a good practitioner requires this historical awareness in order to 
appreciate how medical practice fits into the broader teleological concerns of 
human flourishing. 
 
Medicine: Normal Conversation and Internal Goods 
 
Health practitioners cannot be judged according to the telos of a whole human life 
(eudaimonia) because medicine is practised by people with different life-stories 
who therefore have different views on what constitutes a flourishing life. Once 
agreement has been reached that medicine is a practice consistent with human 
flourishing, however, it becomes transparent that the internal goods of medicine 
are those agreed-upon actions, behaviours, and rules that promote the specific 
                                                 
94
 Paul Hoyt-O‘Connor, ―Virtue and the Practice of Medicine,‖ unpublished paper delivered at the 
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bioethics and Medical Ethics (Boston, 1998). 
95
 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 187. 
 295 
telos of health. In medicine, actions of practitioners (doctors, nurses, etc.) are 
judged either good or bad according to the thick internal goods of medical 
practice. A second practical competency is necessary, therefore, because a 
virtuous medical practitioner is one who measures her actions (knowledge, skills, 
and behaviour) against the accepted internal goods of medical practice. Once 
again, it was Aristotle who first articulated how the concept of an internal good 
can be understood within the specific teleological imperative of a practice. For 
Aristotle, the healing art of medicine does not consist solely in learning the skills 
associated with applying the knife, because a prudent doctor has to learn when not 
to apply the knife as well,
96
 and this takes time and habituation.  
 
In this context, a practitioner is not responsible for deciding the status of internal 
goods within medicine because they have already been historically extended long 
before she arrived on the scene. The telos of health provides a goal of sufficient 
pragmatism for a range of internal goods to be achieved without the practitioner 
having to worry about the telos or purpose of the whole human life. The 
pedagogical emphasis for a young medical practitioner should, therefore, initially 
be focused on teaching her what to do, because it may be years before she can 
fully appreciate how to connect what she is engaged in now with medicine as a 
purpose-driven activity. The term general practitioner implies knowledge and 
skills, but it also implies behaviour and relationships because actions of health 
practitioners (internal goods) occur in a particular social context (hospitals, 
clinics, etc.). The role of a practitioner is not to make decisions about what is right 
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and wrong but to make decisions that are consistent with good practice. In a 
pluralist society, actions of an individual medical practitioner, at least as far as 
medicine is concerned, have already been defined by medical tradition and are 
therefore not contingent upon the religion or culture of the practitioner. 
MacIntyre‘s explanation of a practice is similar to Rorty‘s explanation, following 
Kuhn, of normal discourse. Likewise, MacIntyre‘s concept of an epistemic crisis 
that leads to a change of practice is similar to Rorty‘s use of abnormal discourse. 
Rorty‘s abnormal discourse is a hermeneutic study ―from the point of view of 
some normal discourse,‖ a ―line of argument‖ in which conversation is an 
essential component because it is not possible to ―understand the parts of a strange 
culture, practice, theory, language, or whatever, unless we know something about 
how the whole thing works.‖97 So the focus in practice-centred enquiry is to use 
historicist analysis of actions that pertain to the case from the point of view of the 
internal goods or normal discourse that pertain to the practice concerned. 
 
Medicine: Abnormal Conversation 
 
Because medicine is a practice with an established understanding of internal 
goods, the telos of human flourishing is all that is required for the individual 
practitioner to recognise with some humility that his or her current practice is 
linked to those who have gone before, both the good and the bad. She should also 
exhibit a social competency of openness because the history of medicine is replete 
with examples of malpractice where health professionals failed to live up to the 
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teleological imperative for the patients or for their profession. It is for this reason 
that abnormal conversation is necessary when evaluating a practice because 
people within a practice often fail to see, or do not have the ability to see, wider 
implications of their actions.  
 
In Australia, one method of keeping a cross-check on medical professions is by 
legislation in the form of professional practice Acts of parliament. In Western 
Australia, for instance, the recently revised Medical Practitioners Act runs to 156 
pages and covers numerous aspects of professional behaviour. Its stated objects 
are as follows: 
 
(a) to ensure that only properly qualified and competent 
persons practise medicine and to regulate the practice of 
medicine by those persons; and 
(b) to establish, maintain and promote suitable standards 
of knowledge and skills among medical practitioners, for 
the purpose of protecting consumers of medical services 
provided by medical practitioners in Western Australia.
98
 
 
Codification of medical practice though Acts of parliament is necessary due to the 
scale and diversity of roles that health professionals have. The professionalisation 
of medicine also comes at a price, however, as practitioners have to devote a 
significant proportion of their income to membership in professional associations 
that protect their interests. Medical practice is under closer scrutiny than most 
practices, which is appropriate for a complex and diverse discipline that impacts 
on people so directly. Several layers of peer review process, the focus on 
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―evidence-based‖ practice, epidemiological studies, macro-economic issues, the 
privacy act, and even the threat of legal action can all lead to changes being made 
to medicine as a practice. The actions of a practitioner must be consistent with the 
internal goods of medicine but at the same time be open to, and constrained by, 
other forms of moral enquiry. This places emphasis on the action itself (good or 
bad) rather than the reasons behind the action (right or wrong). A consensus is 
possible because good and bad actions are objective when one is working within a 
thick practice such as medicine. 
  
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This thesis began by stating that a practice-guided approach to moral enquiry 
enables theory to touch practice by focusing attention on a type of consensus that 
transcends traditional theological and philosophical conflicts. In a pluralist 
society, a practice-guided approach to complex ethical issues provides a greater 
level of accountability and transparency because actions of stakeholders are 
judged against the history of a practice. This approach argues that moral pluralism 
should be embraced because diversity in a liberal democracy is to be expected.  
 
When conflicts arise in moral enquiry, particularly in practical ethics, it is 
common for debate to stagnate because rational discussants hold conceptually 
incommensurable views over the moral issues concerned. This thesis has 
highlighted several issues where practice-guided enquiry examines the space 
between rival moral arguments. First, it takes seriously the narrative history of 
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competing moral traditions because moral debate of any note occurs between 
serious-thinking rational agents. Second, it acknowledges the importance of the 
history of decision making within traditions to which moral practitioners belong, 
or find themselves for a time. Third, it recognises that decisions are not arbitrated 
by the individual moral agent, thereby diminishing the role of the impartial 
observer so crucial in theory-centred practical ethics. Fourth, the narrative of 
particular traditions, those practices and internal goods or virtues that constitute 
―good‖ behaviour, provide guidelines against which the actions of a particular 
moral agent can be judged. In a pluralist society, practice-guided enquiry offers a 
more practical model for decision making than ethical rule following. 
 
Practice-guided enquiry trades on MacIntyre‘s explanation of the role that practice 
plays as an evaluative tool for comparing one tradition with another. However, the 
comparative analysis of practices from a pragmatist perspective has a more 
restricted emphasis. This restricted emphasis for practical ethics is because 
consensus at the level of practice is possible even when there is none at the level 
of religious belief or philosophical argument. This is an important distinction in a 
pluralist society because it trades on a thin consensus about long-lived social 
practices such as medicine, law, and politics. This thin consensus over the value 
of such practices is possible even in the midst of thick religious, philosophical, 
and cultural disagreement.  
 
Pluralism brings with it many benefits and challenges. Learning to live peaceably 
in the midst of serious disagreement can be a struggle but it is a struggle worth 
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having. Bernstein contends that learning to live with and among people of rival 
incommensurable traditions is ―one of the most pressing problems of 
contemporary life.‖99  He further states, 
There are no algorithms for grasping what is held in 
common and what is genuinely different. Indeed, 
commonality and difference are themselves historically 
conditioned and shifting… In this sense the plurality of 
rival incommensurable traditions imposes a universal 
responsibility upon reflective participants in any tradition 
– a responsibility that should not be confused with an 
indifferent superficial tolerance where no effort is made to 
understand and engage with the incommensurable 
otherness of ―the Other.‖100 
One way of dealing with the universal responsibility to which Bernstein refers is 
to bypass the thick conceptual incommensurability of rival moral arguments by 
appealing to what Walzer refers to as thin moral minimalism. This thin moral 
minimalism has been appealed to throughout this thesis to show that rival moral 
arguments that are conceptually incommensurable at one level can be 
commensurable at another. Further, even when moral arguments are conceptually 
incommensurable at the level of practical ethics, a resolution of complex moral 
debate is still possible by focusing on the relationship between thin universals and 
thick practices.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99
 Bernstein, The New Constellation, 66. 
100
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